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Introduction
Helen Gavin & Jacquelyn Bent
One topic is guaranteed to polarise any group that discusses it, and
that is sex. What other word is guaranteed to make the person you say it to
hot and bothered? Ask the people around you what is the most perverted
thing you can think of and there would be as many answers as there are
people present. One of the world’s favourite authors, Terry Pratchett, musing
on the difference between erotic and perverted, suggested that erotic would
be using feathers during the sexual act, whereas perverted means using the
whole chickeni. Some of the following chapters stretch this distinction to its
limit.
The perception of what is sexually perverted shifts dependent on
who is talking about it. A person’s profession, gender, age, race, proclivities,
education and even which century they live in, have all effected the
viewpoint on sex and sexual perversions. For example, homosexuality has
long been stigmatised as sexually perverted, (and remains so among some
portions of society), but in most of the world it is no longer considered
pathological. However, in some individual minds and religious dogma,
atypical sex and sexualities are still judged as wrong, unnatural, or immoral.
So what is bad sex? Indeed, do we even have an understanding of
what is good sex? The papers collected in this volume reflect debate and
discussion about these very questions that took place in Prague at the 2nd
Global Conference Good Sex, Bad Sex, Sex Law, Crime, and Ethics in May
2010. The deliberations covered issues of defining sex, sexual consent,
sexual law and its agencies and sexual crimes. Some papers are deliberately
provocative, designed to stimulate dialogue and debate. Others are intended
to be informative, or to signal areas of potential empirical investigation. All
of them address the vexed and vexing topic of sex.
In the section Defining Sex and Sex Crime, the editors’ paper on
sexual deviancy asks what exactly is bad sex? If it is an issue of consent, then
why do we still have intensely negative views about extreme, but consensual
sexual acts that involve no (clear) victim, such as necrophilia, or in which
lack of consent cannot be assumed, such as autassinophilia? We also explore
the background to sexual intolerance as one of state-controlled intrusion and
hypocrisy. In her paper, Claudia Lodia goes further, and suggests that
society’s pathologising of sex that is outside the strict binary of adult
heterosexuality is akin to other undesirable perspectives, such as racism. Just
as racism refuses to acknowledge the benefits of diversity, so does sexual
intolerance and inequality. The argument is extended to zoophilia by Brian
Cutteridge, who points out that the animal husbandry and harvesting
practices that we accept as normal, are exceedingly more harmful to animals
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than having sex with them, and we should question our view of immorality in
the wider context of our relationships with the animal world. The arguments
become even more controversial with Elise Chenier’s paper on the issue of
paedophilia, where she explores how the language of sexual intolerance has
simply shifted from homosexuality to incest and paedophilia.
The next section examines the themes of Ethics and Principles in
Sexual Conduct. Kieran Walsh opens the debate around the age of sexual
consent, and argues that there is a mismatch between the developing
sexuality of adolescence and society’s avowed intention to protect children.
He avers that the latter is more concerned with the state’s need to control
sexuality, in this case to preserve a model of childhood that is out of step with
modern realities. The next two papers examine similar issues of consent, but
focus on the sexual conduct of people with intellectual impairment. Suzanne
Doyle describes some general premises with respect to a disability model of
sexual consent, merging these with the feminist viewpoints surrounding
normative models of sex and sexuality. Then Jami Anderson turns the
spotlight provided by these arguments to one particular case. She assesses the
court’s adjudication that the complainant was not fit to consent, due to
intellectual impairment, and, therefore, did not, and suggests this is flawed,
with the possibility that an erroneous ruling has implications for all issues of
consent outside non-defective, non-impaired parties to sexual acts.
Section 3 further examines the relationship between Sex, Crime and
the Law. Petr Pavlik and colleagues describe sexual harassment as under-
reported in Czech universities, and document the animosity they received
while carrying out research for their paper. The novelty of the focus on
sexual harassment in the Czech Republic has allowed the researchers to
explore definitions and perceptions of sexual harassment whilst being
relatively free from the preconception of such language in other contexts.
This is contrasted with Allison Moore’s examination of the law surrounding
the possession of extreme pornography, for example, that depicting acts that
appear to threaten life. This is detailed and comprehensive legislation that
now moves the burden of guilt from producers to consumers, and this paper
sets out an argument about its flaws with respect to the public criminalisation
of private acts. Amy White’s paper expands on this, as she attempts to
decouple feminist perspectives from pornography regulation. She points out
that the link between pornography consumption and sexual violence is far
from clear, and that feminist criticism would be better employed tackling the
market that dehumanises women culturally and individually, rather than
simply through overt violence. Covert sexual violence is also a theme
explored in Bjorn Ketels’ examination of the use of STDs, specifically HIV,
as a weapon with which to harm a sexual partner. The private act is hence a
public concern, and this paper examines actus rea and mens rea with respect
to intent to harm. The question of harm is also explored by Robert Teixeira
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when discussing the regulation of youth sexuality through new Canadian
laws on the age of consent. His suggestion is that the legislative bodies avow
the laws are to protect children from sexual malfeasance, but in fact reinforce
the status quo of parental authority and gendered power.
Section 4 moves our viewpoint from the substantive law to Sex Law
and its Agencies. Jessica Kennedy and Patricia Easteal use the interesting
metaphor of a boxing match to describe the Australian right to due process
for accused and complainant in rape and sexual assault. Their examination of
the adversarial court practice has currency in other jurisdictions handling
such cases. For example, in their paper on the legal processes dealing with
sexual offences, Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley explore alternatives
to the current system in New Zealand, describing various good practices from
around the world that could be incorporated. By doing this, they have
proposed a hypothetically robust system, but warn of the resource intensive
needs of such structures. Katherine Brown’s spotlight on a part of such
systems, the gathering of photographic evidence, highlights the issue, not just
of resources, but also the need to balance the risks and intrusion against the
need for documented evidence. She explores the types of anogenital and none
genital photographic evidence in sexual assault cases, and presents the
arguments for and against its use.
No matter what the intent, laws always seek to regulate behaviour,
not necessarily a bad thing, but with basic human desires, the interference of
the law is often problematic. In section 5 Regulating Desire, the impact of the
law is outlined in several different expressions of desire. Sharon Cowan, for
example, has analysed feminist positions on the sale and purchase of sex, in
particular, BDSM sex. The attitudes of society and its agents towards
prostitution are seemingly confused and muddied when extreme forms of
atypical acts are encountered. This paper considers the dual sexual outlawing
of those who sell BDSM sex, two unlawful acts combined into one set of
desires. Another set of vendors in the sex trade who are strictly regulated are
the strippers. In Marie-Belen Ordonez’s paper however, the stripper to be
controlled is not female, but the man-boy strippers of the Taboo Club in
Montreal. These dancers are prized for youthful looks, and police
investigators and court officials found it hard to disguise disbelief and disgust
at the performers when the club was raided in 2004. The paper examines why
this is the case. The question of regulation of gay strippers is further
expanded into laws concerning same-sex sex and marriage, by two papers.
Matthew Pierlott first deconstructs the ideological arguments supporting the
view of marriage as an alliance for procreation rather than an erotic
relationship, and brings evidence to bear that marriage is not solely for the
foundation and production of the heterosexually parented family. In contrast,
William Leonard highlights the case of legislative opposition to same-sex
relationships and parenthood, using the story of Antigoneii, who is the result
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of incest, to show how the state imposes values that prohibit atypical sexual
reproduction to all atypical forms of sexual relationship. These would also
include the relationships discussed in the legal arguments in James Martell’s
paper. After every legal avenue he sets out is exhausted, it may be concluded
that there is no justification for regarding bestiality or zoophilia as illegal.
All this neatly brings us back to what is good sex, and what can be
even considered as bad sex? The final section of this volume includes papers
that have themes hinted at throughout the conference. For example, in her
paper, Stephanie Kociez looks at the lack of representation of rape in the
DSM IV-tr as sexually disordered behaviour. Whilst not dismissing the
prevalence and effects of other paraphiliac behaviour that may be associated
with rape, she presents paraphilia and sexual violence as the symptoms of a
syndrome, and lobbies for rape to be reinserted into the diagnostic criteria.
The argument is not yet fully developed here, but is an interesting start. Lina
Papadaki deconstructs the discourse around pornography and its assumed
objectification of its subject, with the hypothesis of pornography’s
manufacture and consumption as a sex act in itself as the basis for discussion.
Ricardo Barroso and colleagues highlight the difficulty surrounding the
developing psychosexuality of young people when it collides with the law
and society’s involvement with dysfunctional individuals and families. They
offer an interesting way forward. And finally, Mark Thomas takes the idea of
object as sex one stage further, with his examination of the automobile as
erotic, violent penetrative partner in a very strange sexual picture indeed.
Conference debated these ideas in great depth, and they are
presented here in summarised form for wider audiences to ponder.
Notes
i T Pratchett, Eric, Victor Gollancs ltd, London, UK, in 1990.
ii In Greek mythology, various books and plays, the daughter of Oedipus and
Jocasta, an accidental incestuous coupling.
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Defining Sex and Sex Crime
 
Sexual Deviancy and the Sex Police: An Examination of the
Religious, Cultural and Psycho-Legal Antecedents of
Perceived Perversion
Helen Gavin & Jacqueline Bent
Abstract
The perception of what is sexually perverted shifts dependent on who is
talking about it. Even the term ‘perversion’ is controversial. Psychologists
generally refer to non-traditional sexual behaviour as sexual deviation or, in
cases where the specific object of arousal is unusual, as paraphilia. There are
a number of clinically recognised disorders of sexual or paraphiliac function:
fetishism and transvestic fetishism, exhibitionism, voyeurism, chronophilias,
frotteurism, sadomasochism, and ‘others not otherwise specified’ (including
scatologia, necrophilia, partialism, zoophilia, coprophilia, klismaphilia and
urophilia). However, interesting absences from this list are erotophonophilia,
in which sexual arousal can only be achieved by the act of murder as its
corollary, autassassinophilia. This paper discusses the journey that our sexual
attitudes have made through the history of religion and medicine, the laws
surrounding sex and their development from religious and cultural taboos
into prohibitions of illegal sexual behaviour, then draws on those arguments
to make a comparison between ‘victim-less’ and ‘victim-rich’ sexual crimes.
Key Words: Paraphilia, perversion, lust murder, necrophilia, sexual suicide,
sex laws, religion.
*****
1. Introduction
There are a number of clinically recognised disorders of sexual
function, termed paraphilias, some of which are punishable by law. This
paper will explore some of the forms of sexual deviance from the perspective
of forensic psychology, and consider why some people find sexual
gratification in unusual and illegal ways.
2. Sex and the Law Part 1
The first written codes of law in history are those inscribed on a
stone showing Hammurabi, the King of Babylon, receiving them from the
Sun-God.1 They include codes about sexual behaviour, as do many of the
ancient laws. Examining historical attempts at sex legislation, there is at least
one common item: all cover both social and religious offences. Sexual
behaviour was punished not only when it harmed others, but also when it
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expressed disbelief in God. Even if sexual heretics endangered nobody, they
still posed an indirect threat to the community, insulting God, and inviting his
retribution.
Jewish sex legislation tried to protect ‘God’s chosen people’ from
four major ‘evils’: population decrease, violation of male property rights,
‘contamination’ with strangers and strange customs, and religious heresy.
Thus, the laws encouraged marital coitus and condemned non-reproductive
sex.2 Non-procreation indicated an antisocial attitude and offended the whole
nation. Rape, adultery, and illegitimate pregnancies violated the rights of
individual men whose personal property was damaged. Homosexual
behaviour and sexual contact with animals were associated with the worship
of foreign gods.
Over time, specific sex laws were modified, or reinterpreted in the
light of changing circumstances. Nevertheless, the legal attitude towards sex
remained unchanged, as a moral stance. What remains unclear is how this
legality was policed. Sex is a private act, so condemnation and conviction is
an unclear process. It is baffling to understand how anyone policing sexual
behaviour would know about deviant thoughts, until considering the role of
the confessional, for example.
In Western Christian tradition, the most fervent adherents of religion
are the intercedents with the deity, who mostly remain celibate, which is
bound to colour any view of sex. The subjugation of sexual desire into
religious ecstasy has been a recurrent theme in Catholic evolution. Therefore,
repression of sexuality under religious strictures may be in and of itself a
deviant view of sexuality.
Repression is an underlying concept in Freudian theory, which
suggests that the three constructs of the psyche are in constant turmoil over
energy. Theorists suggest that sexual deviants have very weak superegos
(morals) and very powerful ids (sexual impulses, libido). The unconscious
develops defence mechanisms to protect a person’s ego, explaining sexual
offenders’ defences of denial, displacement, and projection.3
Complete separation of Church and State means that laws could no
longer be copied from the sacred texts, but must be based on rational and
empirical grounds. So, there is a beginning to understanding that sexual
freedom is a human right as religious freedom and freedom of speech. So we
move from a moral stance, to a legal one. This is the viewpoint of forensic
psychology
3. Psychological Approaches to Sexual Deviance
The advent of psychoanalytic thinking moved the concept of
sexuality into focus within psychology and medicine. Here, it refers not only
to procreation but also to love and personal fulfilment. Freudian psychology
sees a sexual element in nearly all human activity; it is the expression of a
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primary instinct, a basic and powerful inner ‘drive’. Such an acceptance of
sexuality and sexual needs would seem to suggest societal recognition of a
wide range of forms of gratification, but there is still much that is frowned
upon, and with good reason. The question here is not only the distinction
between what society sees as odd and what it deems deviant, but also the
awareness of deviant behaviour.
So, we know that what is considered deviant/paraphilic and sexually
criminal varies across cultures and jurisdictions. The field of psychology has
attempted to characterise paraphilias in terms of their aetiology and the ways
in which they change the functioning of individuals in social situations.
Clinicians discuss eight major paraphilias; paraphilia is defined as the sole
means of sexual gratification being atypical, and which causes ‘marked
distress or interpersonal difficulty’.4
Observation of paraphiliac behaviour has provided valuable
scientific information on the mechanisms of sexual attraction and desire, such
as behavioural imprinting. Normal biological processes may sometimes be
manifested in idiosyncratic ways, and these unusual manifestations are linked
to unusual (traumatic) events in early sexual experience. If a sexual stimulus
is is paired with inappropriate stimuli and situations, then perpetuated
through operant conditioning via sexual response as positive reinforcement,
sexual imprinting results. This process was termed the lovemap by John
Money.5 A lovemap can be shaped by both positive and negative factors,
things that attract or repel erotic tastes. Hence, one person may be attracted to
people of a particular gender, with a particular physical characteristic, with
particular personality traits, etc. The lovemap can become distorted; a
vandalised lovemap occurs when the process or neurological template
development stage becomes traumatised, as in for example being exposed at
a young age to the sights, sounds and tortures of paraphiliac parents; or being
led into a paedophilic and/or incestuous relationship. Paraphiliac lovemaps
are problematic when lust is attached to fantasies and practices that are
socially forbidden, disapproved, ridiculed, or penalised. Sexual imprinting on
inanimate or non-sexual objects is a popular developmental theory for sexual
fetishism.
An alternative view comes from evolutionary theory, positing more
sexually aggressive males continue to pass on their genetic material. Though
our brains have advanced throughout time, our inherent drive to reproduce
has not. This theory may partially account for rape of women of childbearing
age, but fails to address male or older female rape victims or child
molestation.
Neurological hypotheses of paraphilia conjecture that sexual
deviance is associated with frontal and/or temporal lobe damage. It is
concluded that although such dysfunctions are reported among sexual
offenders, evidence is scarce and it might not be specific to this type of
Sexual Deviancy and the Sex Police
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offending. Both cortical and subcortical structures are important for normal
sexual functioning. While the cortex is involved in the modulation of drive,
initiation, and sexual activation, subcortical structures (the hippocampus,
amygdala, and hypothalamus) are implicated in the modulation of sexual
behaviours and genital responses. If there is malfunction in both right and
left medial temporal lobes then a patient may develop Klüver–Bucy
syndrome, which includes the symptoms of docility, dietary changes,
hyperorality and altered sexuality. This last is characterised by a heightened
sex drive or a tendency to seek sexual stimulation from inappropriate objects.
Neuropsychological examinations lead to the conclusion that sexual deviance
is associated with anomalies of a vast cortico-subcortical, fronto-temporal
circuit.6 While neurological data concerning sexual offenders are limited, the
most frequent finding involves dysfunctions associated with the left fronto-
temporal lobes. Thus, the hypothesis that a left fronto-temporal abnormality
would disrupt a regulatory control mechanism and provoke paraphiliac
tendencies still prevails.
Whatever explanation one accepts in explaining unusual sexual
attraction, it is clear that some will often be viewed as illegal and prosecuted.
These include paedophilia and sexual coercion. There are some unusual
forms of sexual gratification, however, that challenge the view of sexual
legality, and the identification of victim and perpetrator. These may pose real
dilemmas that can face the sex police.
4. Love from beyond the Grave
The ultimate disgust reaction comes from one act that could almost
certainly be defined as victim-less. Necrophilia is the erotic attraction to
corpses, possibly an attempt to gain possession of an unresisting or non-
rejecting partner. In many jurisdictions, it is not considered a crime. In some
cultures, it is even natural, with a bride who dies a virgin being deflowered
before she is buried. The most common necrophiles work in mortuaries and
graveyards. In 1979, Karen Greenlee worked at a California Mortuary, and
was given the task of driving the hearse containing the body of a 33-year-old
man to his funeral. She wasn’t seen for 2 days. When found, she was charged
with illegally driving a hearse and interfering with the burial. Karen
confessed to amorous episodes with between twenty to forty dead men.7 Who
is the victim here? The grieving relatives? In truth, the legal system has
difficulty deciding on a victim in cases of necrophilia. Psychological theory
suggests that an inferiority complex means that intercourse is more attractive
to the necrophiliac because the corpse cannot reject advances, is never
unfaithful, and makes no sexual demands.
However, the question of identifying someone as a victim is even
more problematic when the corpse asked for it.
Helen Gavin & Jacquelyn Bent
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5. ‘Please kill me, it turns me on’
Sharon Lapotka had several online businesses, but she used the Web
mainly to interact with a larger variety of people who shared her
unconventional interests. She had a variety of pseudonyms, often referred to
as ‘masks’, allowing her anonymity to pursue unusual fantasies, including ‘a
fascination with torturing till death.’ Such behaviour demonstrates the Mardi
Gras phenomenon - the ability to mask and assume a variety of personalities,
allowing one to speak and act freely with little or no consequence,
particularly prevalent on the Internet, where users can express themselves
freely and anonymously in online chat rooms and news groups.
Sharon certainly used this phenomenon extensively. She had posted
messages looking for a man to satisfy her fantasy of being sexually tortured
and murdered. In August 1996, Robert (Bobby) Glass answered her
messages. Bobby had a fetish for inflicting pain, and agreed to fulfil Sharon’s
fantasy. On October 13th, Sharon set out to visit Bobby in his trailer in
Lenoir, NC. On October 20th, Sharon’s husband Victor finally found the note
telling him that she would not be returning. Victor contacted the police; the
investigators discovered her online life, and connection to Bobby Glass. The
search of Bobby’s trailer revealed items belonging to Sharon and her
decomposing remains were found in a shallow grave around 75 feet from the
trailer. Bobby was charged with first-degree murder. The consequences of
Sharon’s death and Bobby’s conviction were that we now strive to
understand what drives unusual and even fatal, sexual fantasy and behaviour.
A controversial form of deviant sexual ‘play’ practiced by some
sadomasochists involves the use of sexual strangulation or asphyxiophilia,
the practice of controlling or restricting oxygen to the brain in order to
achieve sexual gratification.8 According to the American Psychiatric
Association, about 250 deaths occur every year in the United States involving
strangulation during sexual activity. It is generally held that these incidents
are accidental deaths. Psychologists and other professionals are at a loss to
explain what drove Sharon to fantasise about her own death in this manner,
as it was clear that is what she set out to achieve.
Contemporary liberal discourse suggests that we should be tolerant
of a wide range of sexual behaviours, if they are performed with consent. The
phenomenon of being murdered for pleasure problematises assumptions
about the legitimacy of consent and our view of victimological arguments.9
Parallels can be drawn in the current debate around assisted suicide for the
terminally ill. Consenting to murder for pleasure is behaviour outside the
terms of informed consent, or lack of it, as it is currently understood and
thereby presents an ethical and legal dilemma.
Sexual Deviancy and the Sex Police
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6. ‘You’re dying to meet me’
The other form of paraphilia, which attracts great attention
psychologically and legally, is erotophonophilia, commonly known as lust
murder. This is a murder in which the offender searches for erotic satisfaction
by killing someone. A lust murder begins with the obsessions of the offender.
The signature component of the crime, that which names it a lust murder, is
the killer acting out fantasies with victims and the bodies. The symptoms of
erotophonophilia include sexual arousal from killing, an abnormal amount of
time spent thinking about killing someone, recurring intense sexual fantasies
and urges involving killing
Thus, lust murder represents the integration of sexualised violence
and murder. Evidence of peri-mortem mutilation is common, with methods of
torture using a large range of weapons. Bite marks, vampirism or cannibalism
are sometimes reported. As might be expected the theories of psychology are
called upon to try and understand this most severe form of sexual deviance.
Freudian concepts of unresolved sexual conflict, infantilisation, and maternal
over-protection or rejection, are used in explanation. A conflict between the
id and the superego due to unresolved childhood experiences can result in
violent behaviour. Other psychodynamic positions suggest the murderer’s
guilt prevents him from full sexual satisfaction, and that he must inflict
suffering to the level that his victim is forced to ‘forgive’ him. Furthermore,
it may be that the serial murderer is ‘creating’ something by murdering,
which overcomes feelings of inadequacy and inferiority. The taking of
trophies from the victim and/or recording of the offence may serve to remind
the murderer of his ‘creation’. Hatred of a significant female and/or oedipal
complexes have also been reported by many serial killers (usually of the
mother). Ed Kemper maintained that if he had killed his mother first, his
other victims might have been spared. Displaced aggression is thus acted out
on other women. Other theories used in conjunction with the
psychoanalytical model may be more fruitful. For example, there is a fairly
consistent finding of serial killer research, the presence of the ‘MacDonald
Triad’ in serial killers. Enuresis (bed-wetting), fire-setting and torturing
animals are common in the background histories of multiple sadistic killers.
In psychodynamic terms, bed-wetting is thought to be a form of rebellion
towards parents. Fire-setting is associated with violence and torturing animals
is a further form of rebellion against the norm of keeping pets as cherished
friends. If the triad demonstrates the serial killer in training, then what cause
these acts to be displayed? Unconscious conflict in the first two years of a
child’s life has been further advanced as causing proneness to homicidal
behaviour. Hence, child abuse must assume a particularly prominent role in
the genesis of a serial murderer. The surprising finding here is that emotional
abuse correlates more strongly with later delinquent behaviour, but physical
abuse does not. There is also evidence to suggest that many bedwetting,
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animal torturing fire-setters can grow up to be psychologically healthy. An
alternative position is drawn from the therapeutic literature around
counselling. Impulse control disorders include things such as alcoholism of
drug addition, pyromania, and, of course, sex addiction. Tension builds; it is
only relieved by the act or the ‘fix’ of the addictive behaviour. Therefore, it
is posited that the erotophonophile may be addicted to his peculiar activity.
Also within a therapeutic framework, addiction theory suggests that
operant conditioning may play a part; the reward (pleasure) gained from the
offence causes positive reinforcement and increases the likelihood of a repeat
offence occurring. Access to violent pornography and subsequent orgasmic
conditioning appear to be the culprits here. Research suggests that murderers
share common attitudes and beliefs. Cognitive distortion remains an area of
research that we are currently considering in our project, together with
explorations of neurology.
7. Summary
This paper has covered a small part of the history of sex law, and
societal attempts to control sexual behaviour. We suggest that perspectives
on sexuality have changed little even in our new liberal world. The sex police
are still with us, they are still the arbiters of good sex.
We have also explored the concepts of victimology in sexual crime,
posing the question of what determines a victim-less crime, and informed
consent to the most extreme sexual acts. We conclude that sexual deviance
has no one psychological (or other) explanation, but the perception of it in
our work, and our own views is ever rooted in our cultural inheritance.
Notes
1 GR Driver & JC Miles, The Babylonian Laws, Wipf and Stock, Eugene,
2007.
2 R Rosenthal, ‘Of Pearls and Fish: An Analysis of Jewish Legal Texts on
Sexuality and Their Significance for Contemporary American Jewish
Movements’, Columbia Journal of Gender and Law, Summer 2006, pp. 1-46.
3 R Dalbiez, et. al., Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud,
Longmans Green and Co, 2008.
4 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, APA.
5 J Money, Love Map: Clinical Concepts of Sexual/Erotic Health and
Pathology, Paraphilia, and Gender Transposition in Childhood,
Adolescence, and Maturity, Prometheus Books, New York, 1986.
6 B Green, Psychiatry in General Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
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Trans Integration: Understanding the Value of
Trans­Identity from a Relational Stance
Claudia C. Lodia
Abstract
This paper is a formulation of a theory of value – an axiology – that addresses
the value of ‘trans-identity’ as a sexual identity in the continuum of sex-
gender differentiation. I begin by uncovering the politics of trans-identity. I
look at the extent to which trans-identity engages with the history of gender
and sexual oppression and show not only how society’s effortful construction
of the male and female sex binary accommodates the devaluing of trans-
identity, but also, how efforts to preserve such binary constructs deepen the
belief that the realm of sexual citizenship and sex identity categories are
limited only to females and males. As response to such dichotomous
constructs and sex identity regulations, queer theorists, feminists, and social
constructionists insist on the dissolution of the current sex-gender continuum.
Some suggest that if sex categories are oppressive, ‘why not dismantle
them?’1 In the second part of the paper, I argue that the notion of
‘dismantling’, although it sounds fitting and appealing, has detrimental
implications. A serious implication of dismantling is that, it fuels further
sexual intolerance and sexual inequality in a sense that it undercuts the spirit
of sexual diversity – i.e., self-determination. Thus, I conclude with a
proposition for a relational-based approach to trans-identity. Such an
approach is not only capable of appreciating the trans community and the
value of trans people, but one whose ultimate goal is the facilitation of the
conditions necessary for a more unified engagement with the world amongst
male, female, intersex, FTM, MTF, trans, and other(s). This relational
component fosters a sense of awareness, empathy, and respect for others, and
refines perception of the moral value of human diversity and uniqueness.
Key Words: Transgender, sex and gender continuum, identity, dismantling,
binary, value, relational.
*****
1. Trans-Identity
In matters of sexuality, the most penetrating debates centre on
concepts that are socio-political, psychological, and at times even
epidemiological, though rarely without any concern or connection with a
particular type of ethical theory. Transgenderism – now commonly dubbed
‘trans-identity’ – is an example of such a concept. It is a concept directly
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borrowed from the discourses of social and behavioural sciences, and is
sometimes grasped through the lens of value. Here’s how.
There is a good deal of discourse and inquiry that being ‘trans’ does
not necessarily mean that one is ‘affected’ by gender identity disorder (GID),
which is a mental disorder that manifests as psychological anguish in relation
to one’s natal sex and gender role of that sex.2 In fact, much of the narratives
shared to us by trans-identified individuals in the last decade or so, has
demonstrated trans-identity as an expression – an awareness and appreciation
of an individual’s sense of one’s own body and gender – rather than a
‘diagnosed’ internal conflict. Trans people understand their wish to live in
their preferred gender. As McKenzie points out, ‘trans-identity has now
become a term of empowerment.’3 Setting itself apart from the absolute
psychiatric labelling and identifications of disability, illness, or
disempowerment, trans-identity today is viewed by scholars of gender
studies, particularly Susan Stryker, as:
…an umbrella term that refers to all identities or practices
that cross over, cut across, move between, or otherwise
queer socially constructed sex/gender boundaries. The term
includes, but is not limited to, transsexuality, heterosexual
transvestism, gay drag, butch lesbianism, and such non-
European identities as the Native American berdache or the
Indian Hijra.4
(The term transgender is constantly in flux – these days
intersexed individuals, i.e., those born with both male and
female genitalia, are under the trans umbrella).
While Stryker’s definition brings to the fore a celebration of the vast
variations of people that exist in society today, its principal underlying force,
nonetheless, evokes the reality of a human experience where people define
themselves through playing against obstacles for identity and discovering
what it’s like to exist outside of the queer and the dominant cultures’
narratives and/or subjectivities.
The critical point that needs to be made here is that, despite the shift
in trans-identity’s definitional and categorical development, it still holds out
as an ‘abnormality’. In the current continuum of sex and gender
differentiation, trans-identified individuals are still fair game and trans-
identity is no more than a negative social value. What has allowed this to
happen may very well be the result, not merely of the recreations of the male
and female sex and gender roles in everyday experience; or the reinforcement
of the legitimacy and reality of such roles and constructs as constitutive of
sex and gender identities. Rather, trans-identity’s negative social value
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emerges from the societal tension that exists between those who want to
overthrow completely the female/male binary and those who want to reassert
its normality. And for those of us who raise the questions on building sexual
identities and sexual diversity, understanding the extent to which this tension
engages with gender and sexual oppression can shed light onto facilitating the
conditions necessary for elucidating trans-identity’s positive social value.
One side of the trans argument purports the binary model as ‘the
foundation on which transgender oppression depends.’5 Proponents of such a
view say that the sex and gender binary is a framework that is based on the
generally accepted belief that ‘male’/’man’ and ‘female’/’woman’ are the
only distinct human sexual and gender identities that comprise the so-called
‘natural order’ of human types. In keeping with such a belief are attempts to
regulate the visibility and development of cross-gender and cross-sexual
identities, practices, and narratives. One such attempt is seen in cases where
medical professionals and families seek surgical corrections for intersexed
babies or babies with ‘ambiguous’ genitalia as a way ‘to make one gender
fit.’6 In most cases, clinicians would advise the parents what gender they
think the baby would likely be and decide which sex, male or female, would
essentially be best to give the baby based on the more prominent genitalia.7
According to Kuhlne and Krahl, the invasive process of surgical corrections
typically leads to the intersexed baby’s confusion and low self-esteem as they
grow old. ‘Their sense of gendered-self is likely to be non-consistent with the
gender role of the sex chosen for them at birth.’8 Of course, the dangers in
these gender assignment decisions are many. One example is that it imposes
the limits of the traditional gender constructs on a human being who is born
absolutely capable of residing outside of them. Frankly, I am not convinced
that decisions to surgically modify intersexed babies come solely from a
heartfelt desire to prevent such babies from experiencing social stigma when
they grow up, as most clinicians that perform the procedure would say.
Compulsive efforts to recommend the need for surgical modification in order
to define someone’s sexual and gendered self, two days after birth seem to
me far-fetched from ideas of kindness and humanity. The decision to ‘make
one gender fit’ i.e., the decision to ‘normalize’ a child’s genital appearance,
however kind and humane it claims itself to be, implies a discounting of
individual liberty. Such a decision claims little regard to the uniqueness of the
individual. It is, in many ways, a decision drawn on the well-established
practices of upholding sex and gender roles – practices that are likely
undetached from efforts to valorise biological traits that fit the notions of a
traditional binary gendered reality.
As matters stand, pathologisation is another way to regulate the
visibility and development of trans-identity. Indeed, the ‘pathologisation’ of
trans-identity does not only aid in the protection and enhancement of the
belief in the normality of the binary system, it has at the same time, created a
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chasm within certain trans communities. In the US, for instance, many trans-
identified individuals disagree about the wholesale requiring of those who
seek sex reassignment to consign to the diagnosable condition of GID. The
fact is that much of the discomfort post-operated trans individuals, a.k.a.,
transsexuals have claimed to experience is ‘less with their gender identity and
more with their physical body, especially their genitalia.’9 This shows that
transsexualism exhibits a stronger link to anatomical rather than gender
dysphoria. The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that a GID is a required
diagnosis for everyone who wants to gain access to medical care and
treatment (hormones, therapy, and surgery) and to fully transition to one’s
preferred gender.10 Such pathologisation requirement doesn’t only run the
risk of an essentialist theorizing of trans-identity as a mental disorder. It has
also been invoked undoubtedly to imply that trans people are mentally
impaired, sick, and abnormal in comparison with non-trans people.
As a result of trans people’s awareness of the influence of
psychiatric labelling on perceptions of trans-identity, many often conceal
their trans-identity under the rubric of ‘mere approximations’ or try to pass as
a man or a woman. When asked to describe their transgendered selves, trans
people are often forced to refer to themselves as either ‘more man’ or ‘more
woman’ in order to make themselves more comprehensible to others. The
problem is that when we invite trans people to claim space within the binary
model, especially as ‘mere approximations’, we actually give them
permission to shun their gender-variant selves. By tolerating trans people’s
‘shunning’ of their identity, we as members of society diminish the reality of
the trans community in return. We aid in the subjugation of trans narratives
and trans experiences, which in many ways thwart the telling of a robust, all
inclusive human and social experience possible.11
The aforementioned regulatory attempts reaffirm and reassert the
normality of the traditional sex and gender binary. It is in light of these
attempts that radical feminists, social constructionists, and queer theorists
have taken the approach of dismantling the binary as the way to end trans
oppression. A prima facie reason for taking such an approach is wrapped
tightly in the following theoretical support. When we confront sexuality and
begin to imagine the possibilities of a world with three, four, or five sexes,
what is often given notice is how ingrained the sex and gender binary schema
is within people’s minds. We perceive sex and gender as organized through a
binary schema of female and male and femininity and masculinity. We define
individuals, as either woman or man, based on the way they operate the
connection between their sexed body and a gendered mind that corresponds
to it. This reliance on sex and gender binary is one that is hard-lined socially,
psychologically, and historically. And if not completely dismantled, it will
continue to lend substance to an ideology that onset the conditions of
possibility and disvalue for what are now known as ‘mistaken genders.’12
Claudia C. Lodia
______________________________________________________________
17
2. Trans-Identity from a Relational Stance
But, to what degree is ‘dismantling the binary’ the proper and
needed solution to end trans oppression? At the deepest level, dismantling
the binary is simply rejecting and denying the differences and distinctions
that exist between females and males. Denying those differences, however,
necessarily posits their reality, which essentially perpetuates the construction
and definition of the female and male sex dichotomy. The point is,
dismantling the binary isn’t an all-out adequate solution to the problem of
trans-identity because it ends up refuting the very thing it intends to
accomplish, i.e., the dissolution of the categories with a view to sexual and
gender equality. At the same time, denying the existence of such real
differences - whether they are sexual, evolutionary, cultural, or socially
constructed - simply affirms the view that sex and gender have little to do
with the differences in the way people live, or how people exhibit aggression
or empathy, choose jobs or clothes to wear, etc.. What should be clear at this
point is that we cannot dismantle the binary without actually overthrowing
the embedded individual practices, responses, identity positions, and
valuations that females and males have determined and established for
themselves within their own particular social locations and socio-personal
interactions. As Alison Jaggar puts it:
Prevailing norms of gender may be and often are
challenged by certain individuals in certain areas, but for
most people most of the time these norms are simply the
given framework of daily life.13
We need to be more cautious about our quickness to challenge the binary and
perhaps see its benefits to identity formation and social relationships. The use
of the binary and sex identity categorization are, perhaps, the simplest
classificatory, organizing method for sorting social reality with a view to
ourselves.14
Now, I am neither legitimising nor destabilizing the sex and gender
binary. Not at all. I simply want to show that although the binary is a major
component of trans oppression, it is only an instrumental condition used by
us to contribute to the societal tension between those who want to reassert the
binary’s normality and those who want to overthrow it completely. The
binary isn’t the problem here. What keeps the binary stable is not the position
it has in society or in the sex and gender spectrum, but our reliance on its
functionality, how we respond to it, how we delineate it, and how we actually
form and realize it as an ‘absolute’ sexual identification. With this view in
mind, changing the way we relate to the binary might seem as the most
plausible suggestion to end trans oppression. But that would require us, first
and foremost, to have a sense of openness and sensitivity to the reality of the
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existing cross-sexual and cross-gender identities and practices, particularly
trans identity. This is why I propose the relational approach. Unlike the
‘dismantling the binary’ approach, which focuses on an unabated dissolution,
disvalue, denial, and/or ‘levelling-off’ of the male and female identities, the
relational approach is a contemporary approach that broadens the sex and
gender continuum as it focuses on building trans-identity. It cooperatively
and constructively shapes trans-identity with all other sexual identities with
the aim to elucidate trans-identity’s positive social value.
The question now is, in what way does the relational approach to
understanding trans-identity elucidate its positive social value? Building
trans identity is largely relevant to forming connections with the trans
community. And, one way of experiencing value is through connections or
relations. To get a better sense of the relational account of value, let us look
into Robert Nozick’s concept of value.15
Nozick suggests three stances to value: egoistic, the absolute and the
relational. The egoistic stance sees value (or what is good, bad, positive,
negative) as primarily located within the self. ‘Things are important because
of how they enhance or develop or expand or benefit the self.’ In other
words, the value lies in you.16 The second is the absolute which locates value
outside of things, i.e., as ‘an independent domain.’17 We latch on to certain
things because they are independently valuable. The third is the relational
stance. As Nozick suggests, one way to locate value is in the connection or
relations between entities. ‘The value of helping someone lies not in your
being a helper (or solely in the other’s improved situation) but in the
relationship of helping.’18 In this case, the value of trans-identity is found in
one’s connection to the trans community.
The kind of value one finds is also contingent on the nature of the
connection one makes. Thus, forming actual and substantive connections
with the trans community result in a certain level of appreciation which
occasions recognition that brings with it positive feelings and positive regard
for the trans community. Appreciation is key here because it is a sort of
connection that is a higher degree of intentional activity more so than
tolerance, for instance. When one appreciates, one brings oneself closer to
and interrelated with the value of what is appreciated. When one tolerates, on
the other hand, one recognizes the other’s value but is farther from the
substantive connection that appreciation offers.19 Appreciation evokes an
understanding of trans identity based on a more complete, at the core, non-
clinical understanding of trans people’s lives. Ways of entering such
connections often are contingent on, among others, these: taking and offering
classes on transgender identity at community colleges and universities,
writing letters to your trans friends and neighbours at the local LGBTQQI20
magazines and reviews, supporting LGBTQQI businesses, maintaining and
supporting the existence of safe places for trans discussions, such as, online
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focus or forum groups and blog spots, and sticking up for that person who is
attempting to learn and engage in gender bending discussions.
In sum, forming connections with the trans community through
appreciation serves as a (causal) condition for at least two things: one is the
creation of trans visibility that is based on a more accurate understanding of
their lives. Such visibility broadens a society’s acceptance of the complex
and beautiful continuum of sex and gender differentiation. Two is that it
brings forth in us the felt experience of the indisputable values of self-
determination and sexual diversity. This is because when we appreciate trans
people, we don’t only enhance and develop the reality of trans people but the
reality of what trans people represent i.e. self-determination (or the playing
against obstacles of identity) and sexual diversity. This is precisely the
intention behind the relational approach. As we learn to appreciate and value
trans-identity and trans people through our connections, we, at the same time,
work toward appreciating a connection beyond gender. In a sense, we do not
just broaden our acceptance of cross-gender and cross-sexual identities. We
also facilitate the conditions necessary for a more comprehensive, all-
inclusive view of a world that integrates all human variation, i.e., MTF, FTM,
females, males, trans, and others.
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For the Love of Dog: On the Legal Prohibition of Zoophilia
in Canada and the United States
Brian Anthony Cutteridge
Abstract
Laws prohibiting zoophilia, human sexual interaction with non-human
animals, are present in many countries including Canada and the United
States of America. Current antizoophilia laws from these two countries are
examined to determine if they can be justified. I will first demonstrate how
such laws are unreasonably vague and thus subject to unequal and ad hoc
application, violating the rights of those accused of zoophilia to procedural
due process. By this, showing that some commonly-accepted animal
reproductive management practices are equally or more invasive to the
animals involved than acts of zoophilia are, I seek to establish that laws that
condemn zoophilia while permitting these practices are logically incoherent
and are therefore inherently unjust, violating the zoophiles rights to
substantive due process. Having established that antizoophilia laws in both
Canada and the US infringe upon fundamental individual freedoms
guaranteed in each country’s respective constitution, I will explore whether
such infringements are necessary to protect the welfare of the wider
community in a free and democratic society. Arguments favouring the
prohibition of zoophilia, ranging from the medical to the religious, are
examined, including the ‘gateway offence’ hypothesis, which suggests that
zoophilia leads to more serious criminal offences against humans. By
demonstrating the weaknesses inherent in these arguments, I demonstrate that
the prohibitionist stance taken in Canada and the US is unnecessary and that
animal welfare, the personal liberty of zoophiles and the need of the state to
promote order and social harmony need not necessarily be opposed to one
another.
Key Words: Zoophilia, bestiality, animals, law, morality, rights, equality,
due process, liberty, harm.
*****
1. Justice and the Right to Due Process
The practice of zoophilia,1 sexual interactions between humans and
animals, has been part of the human relationship with the animals for as long
as humans have kept animals domestically.2 Nevertheless, the practice is
legally and morally proscribed in many countries, including Canada and the
United States of America.
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The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the US Constitution prevent
the federal and state governments, respectively, from ‘depriv[ing] any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’3 Article seven of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms similarly provides that, ‘Everyone
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice.’4 Both of these provisions derive from the English common-law
principle of due process first formally codified in Article 39 of the Magna
Carta. According to the American Law Library, the right to due process
guarantees that all legal proceedings will be fair, that one will be notified of
the proceedings and provided ‘an opportunity to be heard before the
government acts to take away one’s life, liberty or property,’ and that the law
‘shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.’5 Laws prohibiting
zoophilia are in fact all three. They are unreasonable inasmuch as they
prohibit zoophilia but allow the sexual exploitation of animals for financial
gain; they are arbitrary inasmuch as the vague common-law wording that
most North American statutes employ fail to adequately define the essential
elements of the offences they proscribe, and are thus open to differing
interpretations by different judges; and they are capricious inasmuch as the
latitude these laws allow for interpretation can lead to two persons accused of
the same offence, conducted in a substantively similar manner, to be judged
differently as to their legal culpability.
2. Zoophilia and the Right to Procedural Due Process
Devlin argued that it was not the purpose of the criminal law to
guide the actions of the members of society, but rather to set outer limits on
what actions are permitted, writing, ‘Good citizens are not expected to come
within reach of it or set their sites by it, and every enactment should be
framed accordingly.’6 However, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the case of
R. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd. (1995),7 states: ‘The principles of fundamental
justice require that laws provide the basis for coherent judicial interpretation
and sufficiently delineate an area of risk and that ‘a law is unconstitutionally
vague is it is if it is so lacking in precision it does not give sufficient guidance
for legal debate.’ A similar principle, known as the ‘void for vagueness
doctrine,’ exists in American law. The Canadian and American statutes
under which zoophilia is prohibited suffer from exactly this sort of
unconstitutional vagueness, employing common-law terminology such as
‘bestiality’ (Canada) and ‘abominable and detestable crime against nature’
(Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Rhode Island).8 This
inadequacy in definition is compounded by inadequate precedent case law
from which the necessary elements of the offence may be deduced, inviting
ad hoc application of the law. The prejudicial effect of such imprecision in
law on the rights of the individual can be seen in two Canadian cases. In R.
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v. Ruvinsky (1997),9 the acts committed by the accused, ‘digital anal
penetration by a human of a dog and the licking of a human male’s genitals
by a dog,’ were found not constitute acts of bestiality under Canadian law. In
the case of R. v. Black (2007),10 however, the accused was charged with, and
plead guilty to, multiple crimes including one count of bestiality with a dog
in which ‘the dog licked the accused’s vagina and she attempted to stimulate
the dog’s penis,’ for which she was sentenced to one year of prison
concurrent with the sentences imposed for the other offences. In these two
cases, the elements of the putative offences are substantially similar regarding
the offence of bestiality, i.e., oral-genital contact between a dog and a human
and digital stimulation/penetration of a dog by a human for sexual purposes,
yet one person was exonerated while the other was punished. Such contrary
decisions violate the rights of accused persons to procedural due process and
equality before the law.11
Such miscarriages of justice can be further exacerbated by a judge’s
refusal to recognize that there are any essential elements to an offence,
instead leaving it to the jurors in any particular case to decide for themselves
what constitutes an offence. In Dawes v. Texas (2009),12 the appellant,
appealing his convictions for possession of child pornography including
images of bestiality, held that the trial judge had erred in his charge to the
jury inasmuch as it did not define ‘bestiality.’ Justice Mazzant, delivering the
verdict of the Appeals Court, held that, ‘Words that are not statutorily defined
are to be given their common, ordinary, or usual meaning... and jurors may
give them any meaning that is acceptable in ‘common parlance.’’ Allowing
each individual juror the right to make such determinations is to invite legal
mayhem in the adjudication of such cases and to destroy the right of those
who stand accused to procedural due process.
3. Zoophilia and the Right to Substantive Due Process
Laws prohibiting zoophilia also violate the right to substantive due
process inasmuch as the laws themselves or the courts that apply them go
beyond the facts in any particular case and pass judgement on the personal
and private motives of the individual. They seek to punish those who engage
in sexual contact with animals for their own sexual gratification, ignoring the
fact that animals are regularly subjected to sexual interference for
commercial purposes through such procedures as manual and electronic
semen collection and artificial insemination (AI).13 Such acts involve sexual
interference with the animal carried out for the benefit of the human owner
rather than for benefit of the animal involved, yet are untouched by the law.
In punishing those who engage in acts of zoophilia without harming the
animals involved while permitting the widespread commercial sexual
exploitation of animals, the law violates the zoophile’s right to substantive
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due process. It makes criminal a manner of conscience as opposed to a
matter of physical fact.
4. Can Laws Prohibiting Zoophilia be Justified?
Many legal philosophers, among them Aquinas,14 Locke,15
Mill,16and Hegel,17 hold that the purpose of law is to protect the personal and
property rights of individuals and that ‘Morality and moral commands
concern the will on its most private, subjective and particular side, and so
cannot be a matter for positive legislation.’18 This opinion was affirmed by
the Government of Canadian on December 21st, 1967 when then Minister of
Justice Pierre Elliot Trudeau sought to decriminalize homosexual acts
conducted in private between consenting adults, stating that, ‘There is no
place for the state in the bedrooms of the nation... What’s done in private
between adults does not concern the Criminal Code.’19 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed this opinion with equal force in the case of
Lawrence v. Texas (2003).20 Striking down the Texas state law prohibiting
homosexual conduct between consenting adults, the court held that, ‘The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime.’ For antizoophilia laws to be constitutional, they must serve
an important state interest, not merely enforce religious edict or the
prevailing moral attitudes of the public. Zoophilia, if it is to be punished by
law, must violate the rights of some assignable individual, including the
animals involved, or the interests of society as a whole.
A. Does Zoophilia Harm the Animals Involved?
Although Bentham suggests that animals hold certain natural rights
by virtue of their capacity to suffer,21 the manner in which animals are
actually treated in our society demonstrates that such rights are not
recognized either de facto or de jure. Addressing the consent issue, Daniels
writes, ‘[T]he truth is that animals, particularly domesticated ones, don’t
consent to most of the things that happen to them.’22 Animal sexual
autonomy is regularly violated for human financial gain through procedures
such as AI. Such procedures are probably more disturbing physically and
psychologically than an act of zoophilia would be,23 yet the issue of consent
on the part of the animal is never raised in the discussion of such procedures.
Should the day Bentham speaks of arrive when animal rights are recognized
by society and the law, an argument which speaks only to the zoophile’s right
to fair exercise of his property rights in the animals he owns may prove an
insufficient legal justification for acts of zoophilia. For the present, however,
to confine the ‘right’ of any animal to not be sexually violated strictly to acts
of zoophilia is to make law based not on reason but on moral prejudice and to
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breach the constitutional rights of zoophiles to due process and equality
before the law.
B. Does Zoophilia Harm the Interests of Society?
If zoophilia cannot reasonably be criminalized because it is a
violation of the animals involved, the only remaining rationale for such laws
is that zoophilia injures the common welfare of society. Such injury might
take a number of forms. Zoophilia might: (1) Pose a risk to society through
the potential for the introduction of animal diseases into the human
population; (2) be physically risky or harmful to the zoophile himself, (3)
threaten the moral foundation of society; (4) be a causal factor in incidents of
interpersonal violence; or (5) lead to the violation of the legal rights of other
members of society.
Addressing the first two of these points very succinctly, Daniels
writes:
If the vital interest is human safety, then anti-bestiality laws
do infringe upon autonomy interests... This leaves the
possible interest in disease control, perhaps the most valid
reason for regulating bestiality. However, the law can’t
prohibit all human contact with animals... So the diseases
to be controlled would have to be sexually transmitted
ones. Assuming that there is a risk of such diseases being
transmitted between species, there are still two problems.
The first is how to justify regulating the animal lover who
practices safe sex. The second is how to justify banning sex
with animals while still allowing humans who have an STD
to have consensual sex, when the risk of spreading disease
is so much greater.’24
The argument that personal ‘immorality’ can be disruptive or
damaging to society is raised by Devlin with respect to homosexuality when
he writes:
[The law] does not discharge its function by protecting the
individual from injury, annoyance, corruption, and
exploitation; the law must protect also the institutions and
the community of ideas, political and moral, without which
people cannot live together.25
‘The community of ideas, political and moral’ upon which Canadian
and American societies are based, however, are those which are enshrined in
those two countries’ respective constitutions, which guarantee a wide range
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of personal rights which have been deemed necessary for the preservation of
the liberty of the individual citizen. These rights include the right to the free
exercise of religion and conscience (including the right to not be legally
bound by the religious principles of others), and the rights to equality before
the law and due process. Although sexual self-determination is not
specifically guaranteed as a fundamental right in the constitutions of Canada
and the United States, it arises as a natural consequence of those rights that
are considered fundamental to the autonomy of the individual. As Justice
Kennedy noted in Lawrence, quoting from the court’s earlier decision of
Planned Parenthood of Southeatern Pa. v. Casey (1992), ‘These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.’ Similarly, in the Canadian
case of R. v. Sharpe (1999),26 Justice Southin writes, ‘Although the law of
Canada was rooted in its religious heritage, the words ‘the supremacy of
God’ in the preamble to the Charter had become a dead letter, and the court
could not breath life into them for the purpose of interpreting the provisions
of Charter.’
It has also been argued that zoophilia should be prohibited due to the
possible link between the abuse of animals and interpersonal violence.27
However, according to Beetz, ‘neither casual or chronological relations’
between animal abuse and interpersonal violence have been conclusively
demonstrated.28 If such a link has not been established in the broader case of
animal abuse involving a specific intent to inflict harm on the animal, then it
certainly has not been established in the case of zoophilia, which Beetz
acknowledges need not be harmful or violent in nature.29 Even if such a link
was established, it would only indicate that some zoophiles are likely to
commit a violent act against another human. Prohibiting zoophilia on this
basis amounts to social profiling based on sexual orientation and mass
preventive detention. It deprives zoophiles of the right to engage in a private
sexual activity without first proving them guilty of the act (interpersonal
violence) for which that liberty has been denied them.30
The final, and only compelling, argument for the criminalization of
zoophilia, is that zoophiles tend to violate the personal and property rights of
other members of the community. As Mill rightly points out, ‘As soon as any
part of a person’s conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society
has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general welfare will or
will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open to discussion.’31
The zoophile, while he should legally be permitted to engage in acts of
zoophilia in private, does not have any legal or moral right to impose his or
her lifestyle on the wider community. Committing an act of zoophilia in a
public place or on another individual’s private property without permission,
compelling another person to commit such acts, the commission of such acts
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in the presence of a child or the incitement of a child to commit such acts are
all serious offense against another person for which the zoophile can justly be
punished.
5. Conclusions
The prohibition of zoophilia, based on majoritarian morality rather
than on any real harm caused by such acts, is an unconstitutional
infringement on the individual liberty of the zoophile. The arguments that
such laws are necessary for the protection of both animals and the greater
good of society are not compelling. If animal protection was the goal of such
laws, it could be accomplished more effectively through strengthening laws
that address the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering on animals as has
been done in many European countries including Sweden and Denmark.
Laws prohibiting zoophilia are enforced even in the absence of any
discernible harm to the animal resulting from such acts. The argument that
zoophilia needs to be criminalized because of a possible link between animal
/abuse in the wider sense, including acts of intentional cruelty, and violence
against other humans, is equally deficient. Such a link is not only unproven
but is very probably unprovable given the wide range of factors that affect
human behaviour. Even if such a link was established, it would only indicate
that some zoophiles are likely to engage in violence against other people.
The criminalization of zoophilia on this basis is a form of social profiling
based on sexual orientation and mass preventive detention, which are
inexcusable forms of punishment in a modern democratic state.
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The Natural Order of Disorder: Paedophilia, Incest and the
Normalising Family
Elise Chenier
Abstract
How we think about paedophilia today is a little different from the way
homosexuality was understood in the cold war era when medical
explanations of sexually deviant behaviour converged with certainties that
homosexuals threatened the social order. Social anxieties about sexual
difference were expressed through an apocalyptic narrative which displaced
the spectre of sexual danger from the family onto ‘enemies within.’ By
drawing on the history of the pathologisation of homosexuality, this article
argues that in order to think differently about issues such as paedophilia,
child sex offending, and intergenerational sex, we must address the ways in
which the family can be the site of sexual danger and desire. In so doing, we
must not lose sight of how binary oppositions such as public/private,
adult/child, and normal/abnormal that structure our thinking about incest and
paedophilia are inextricably linked to a vast network of binary oppositions
including white/non-white.
Key Words: Paedophilia, homosexuality, incest, racism, normalisation,
nuclear family.
*****
1. Introduction
Sexual deviation treatment experts in the English-speaking world
have referred to paedophilia as a sexual orientation since at least the 1980s,
and paedophile and hebophile rights advocates soon followed. Describing an
enduring desire for pubescent or pre-pubescent people as an orientation
draws on the language of psychology and the social sciences to suggest that,
whether biologically driven or acquired in childhood, paedophilia is fixed
and immutable. The language of orientation implicitly calls for tolerance and
understanding, not condemnation. Distinct from both ‘identity’ and ‘sexual
preference,’ ‘sexual orientation’ has been mobilised by gay rights activists to
oppose the criminalisation of same-sex sex and to normalise homosexuality
as a benign variation. Sexual orientation implies immutability; it shifts public
debate from the permissibility of the desire to the morality of acting on that
desire.1 As homosexuals were once advised, present-day paedophiles are
encouraged to sublimate deviant desire.
Few people consider paedophilia a benign variation, of course, but
that the language first used to describe homosexuality has been transposed to
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paedophilia is neither an accident nor a mere convenience. The frame
through which the English-speaking worldviews paedophilia in popular
culture, in the psychological, psychiatric and social sciences, and in the law,
is the same frame constructed more than half a century ago to explain
homosexuality.
This article draws on the history of criminal sexual psychopathy and
deviancy to show how contemporary discourse about paedophilia is a
reiteration of an earlier discourse about male homosexuality. Secondly, it
demonstrates that discursive repetition and slippage between homosexuality
and paedophilia is key to understanding how these discourses have
functioned to maintain ‘the natural order of disorder.’2 In twentieth century
discourses, homosexuals and paedophiles function as an ‘enemy within.’ In
the bio political state, the family is ground zero for sexual normalisation; by
externalising threats to childhood innocence, ‘stranger danger’ maintains the
fiction of the family as a safe haven from sexual danger. Recently scholars
have suggested that rethinking paedophilia and the sex offender necessitates
the deconstruction of childhood innocence.3 This article argues that to begin
this work we must first attend to the ‘tiny, sexually saturated, familial space’
and grapple with incest.4
2. Apocalyptic Narratives
Homosexuality and paedophilia existed as separate entries in
foundational sexological texts like Krafft-Ebing’s Psychopathia Sexualis and
were transposed into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. Although initially characterised as distinct in their deviation, by
the 1930s it became increasingly difficult to tell them apart.5 In public
discourse, this was aided by the popularisation of words like ‘pervert’ and
‘deviant’, which referred to shadowy male figures threatening women and
children. Since the early 1970s the paedophile has all but displaced the
homosexual as the object of socio-sexual anxiety, but the two figures share
virtually the same perceived features:
1. Arrested development, immature.
2. Uncontrollable, insatiable desire; lack of moral judgment;
psychopathic.6 Consequently, they lack empathy. Driven by
their infantile fixations, indifferent to the impact their
actions have on others.
3. Threaten innocence/corrupting influence. At the root of the
notion of corruption is the belief that homosexual sex and
pre-pubertal sexual activity are dangerous and harmful; that
an absence of desire and corporeal curiosity constitutes
innocence; that homosexual or pre-pubertal desire is
produced by way of introduction; and that the result of such
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an introduction is necessarily corrupting and traumatic,
even if the ‘victim’ does not experience it in negative
terms.7
4. The homosexual/paedophile is everywhere; Stranger
Danger. There is a rich literature exploring this aspect of
the construction of sexual danger and sex deviants. The
point to emphasise is the post-WWII shift of the source of
sexual danger from immigrants and the poor who are
visible in their difference from the middle-class norm, to
the everyday white man.
5. Deviation is produced during childhood. In the post-war
era mothers were blamed for causing male homosexuality
by loving their sons too much. Contemporary theories of
paedophilia privilege childhood sexual victimisation as
causal.
6. There is an escape hatch. Since at least the 1920s sex
experts made a distinction between ‘situational
homosexuality’ (would have sex with a woman if one was
available) and the ‘true’ homosexual (prefer sex with men).
The current literature on paedophilia distinguishes between
those who commit ‘opportunistic’ sex crimes against
children (would have sex with an adult if one were
available) and the ‘fixated’ (prefer children) paedophile.
These distinctions are critical in determining who will be
treated as pathologically deviant, and who will be treated as
a person who simply violated the criminal law. The former
are subject to indefinite incarceration, treatment, and sex
offender registration laws; the latter are less likely to be
subject to sex offender laws.
7. Discourses about sexual deviants are apocalyptic
narratives. If we permit homosexuals to marry, if we are to
contemplate intergenerational sex in terms other than
monstrous, then surely all other prohibitions, including sex
with young children and animals will wither away.
Sexual prohibitions upholding same-generation heterosexual
relations as expressive of the natural order are widely believed to be the
mortar holding the civilised world together. The story we tell ourselves about
paedophilia is only one of many discourses that affirm this belief. Another is
the narrative about AIDS-infected African men who have sex with
prepubescent girls. In this narrative, the savage male African sexual subject is
reasserted, providing us with a foil to the West’s civilised subject.8 To say
that the othering of non-whites, homosexuals, and paedophiles is part of the
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same tactic of rule is not to say that the specific acts attributed to each group
are morally or ethically commensurate. It is, rather, to say that as tropes these
‘types’ exist in complementarity and that critical interventions against
exclusionary constructions of the society which give life to apocalyptic
narratives must account for the full range of characters who populate the
sexual margins of social life.
3. The Historical Origins of the Contemporary Type
Laws allowing for the indefinite incarceration of sex offenders were
first conceived in the USA in the 1930s and popularised in that country and
in Canada in the 1950s.9 Criminal sexual psychopath laws allowed the state
to impose an indefinite sentence on men who had committed a sex offence in
which the victim was anything or anyone other than an adult female. If a
psychiatrist testified that an offender was unable or unlikely to control his
sexual urges, the court assumed he was likely to reoffend and sentenced him
to an indefinite term either in prison or in a state psychiatric facility.
These laws criminalised a psychiatric condition that did not actually
exist.10 For this reason, many psychiatrists were opposed to this legislative
innovation. There was no cure for ‘sexual deviation,’ experts argued, and
singling out sexual offenders as distinctly disordered had no foundation in
modern psychiatry. In Canada where legislation was introduced in 1949,
most psychiatrists regarded sexual deviant behaviour as an effect of a deeper
problem, not a cause. Moreover, they believed mental health treatment
should be prioritised according to individual prisoners’ psychological needs,
not the type of criminal behaviour. With the support of the public behind
them, local legislatures forged ahead anyway. As a consequence, laws and
statutes put in place a treatment regime within the criminal justice system,
and in so doing invented an entire multi-disciplinary field of specialisation.
Although mental health experts had long operated as an extension of
disciplinary and punitive systems, with these laws the faint line between the
promotion of health and the punishment of criminalised behaviour dissolved,
and we now take for granted the combination of indefinite incarceration and
treatment as a response to sex crimes in which the victim is the same sex as
the perpetrator and/or below the age of eighteen.11
Psychiatrists were never able to cure homosexuality, of course, but
the treatment field that had emerged was transformed to respond to an
‘epidemic’ of child sex abuse. Just as North Americans grew weary of the
post-war homosexual panic, battered child syndrome was discovered, and
child abuse emerged as a major social problem. By the end of the 1970s,
public interest shifted to child sexual abuse. Whereas child abuse drew the
eye into the family, child sexual abuse displaced the gaze onto a very familiar
figure: the Stranger. The specifics of the object of concern changed just
slightly, but the tactics deployed to preserve the nuclear family did not.
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The slippage and overlap between homosexuals and paedophiles,
and the central role childhood sexual innocence plays in this discourse is
lucidly illustrated by American actress Anita Bryant’s 1977 ‘Save Our
Children’ campaign which opposed legislation prohibiting discrimination
against homosexuals on the grounds that it ‘discriminates against my
childrens’ rights to grow up in a healthy, decent community.’12 By constantly
characterising homosexuals as child molesters, Bryant’s enormously
successful campaign pulled homosexuality, paedophilia, and the corruption
of children into an even tighter embrace. Three decades later the ‘stranger
danger’ narrative continues to play in a seemingly endless loop because,
throughout the twentieth century, it has served the same, essential function: it
affirms the status of the nuclear heterosexual family as the idealised site for
the production and reproduction of social and political norms.
Because the proliferation of discourses about certain types of crime
is never prompted by a rise in crime rates, historians of twentieth-century sex
crime panics look to the contemporary cultural currents to explain why these
panics occur. Estelle Freedman argues that anxiety about men unhinged from
normal family life was the driving force behind the invention of criminal
sexual psychopathy during the Great Depression.13 In post-war America,
concern that demobilised soldiers and economically-liberated wives would
not return to home and hearth led to the overwhelming stigmatisation of
homosexuals, and unmarried people in general.14 In his examination of the
child sexual abuse panics of the 1970s and 80s, Angelides cites changing
ideas about masculinity as causal, whereas Okami and Jenkins argue that the
expansion of child molestation rhetoric and research during the same period
is due to anxiety about the late 1960s and early 1970s emergence of a more
sexually permissive culture.15
Contemporaneous social anxieties may help explain why particular
sex panics occur when they do, but they can only suggest that the panic is
misplaced and the construction of the ‘monster’ is based on sexually-laden
social prejudices. But adult-child sex does, of course, occur, and some argue
it should be given greater license to happen without criminal or social
sanction.16 Ascribing moral panics to social anxieties does not help us
disassemble the meanings given to adult-child sex, to its
‘perpetrators’/participants, or to its presumed causes and effects, and can
therefore make only a limited contribution to rethinking contemporary
medical and legal responses to child-adult sex, to our understanding of child
sexuality, and to our interpretations of adult-child sex in general.
That the same monster has haunted the West since at least the 1930s
suggests we need to situate contemporary discourses about paedophilia as
one point on this longer historical trajectory; to approach the discourse as
evidence of historical continuity, not historical change. To do this we can
draw on Stoler’s 1995 explication of how during the seventeenth-century
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emergence of the biopolitical state, social relations came to be conceived of
in binary terms. ‘Technologies of power nurtured in [the emerging] ‘society
of normalization,’’ drew on these binary terms to construct ‘internal enemies,
from whence modern racism was conceived.’ When viewed as a vector of
normalisation processes, it becomes clear that racism is not an effect of
modern technologies of power, but ‘a tactic in the internal fission of society
into binary oppositions, and means of creating ‘biologised’ internal enemies,
against whom society must defend itself.’17
This formulation can be extended into the nineteenth century to
deconstruct apocalyptic narratives of sexual deviancy. Like race, sexuality
also came to be seen in binary terms. First, the paedophile as a species is a
product of the psychiatrisation of perverse pleasures, one of Foucault’s four
‘domains’ where power and knowledge are related to sex. Second, just as the
homosexual defined an emergent heterosexual norm, the paedophile defined
childhood sexual innocence.18 Both the homosexual and the paedophile serve
as a ‘‘biologized’ internal enem[y], against whom society must defend itself.’
Children might be the victims, but it is the integrity of that ‘tiny, sexually
saturated, familial space,’ so essential to processes of normalisation, which is
attacked. And because the family is the main instrument of modern
technologies of power in the biopolitical state, an attack against a (white)
child is an attack against the entire social body. It is for this reason that the
state mobilises some if its most expensive resources (behavioural scientists,
psychiatrists, and other treatment experts) and most coercive powers (the
police, the prison) to manage the threat of paedophilia.
This has not always been so. In fact, the preservation of the private
family through the externalisation of public danger had its beginnings in the
adventures of the senile octogenarian who groped little girls in exchange for
a chocolate bar and the local simpleton who pulled down his pants behind the
mulberry bush. Developments in the world of bacteriology made necessary
the transformation of these (harmless) acts into fixed identities. Bacteriology
made it possible to accurately diagnose gonorrhoea infection of the vagina in
prepubertal girls (gonococcal vaginitis). Suddenly, doctors were confronted
with incontrovertible evidence that an extraordinary number of young girls
had had genital-to-genital contact. Because so many cases involved girls
under five, fathers seemed the most likely source of infection. Yet, most
doctors refused to accept this possibility. When early twentieth century
sexologist Krafft-Ebing argued it is ‘incomprehensible that an adult of full
virility, and mentally sound, should indulge in sexual abuses with children’
and declared men who had sex with children ‘not ordinary,’ he
simultaneously enabled the medical denial of incest and created a new
subject upon whom the problem could be displaced.19
Incest, as it turns out, was quite ordinary indeed. To address it
requires that we pull apart public/private and parent/child binaries. This alone
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is not enough, however. These binaries cannot be isolated from the unified
social field in which a whole host of binary oppositions, including
man/woman, homo/hetero, white/black, civilised/savage, and abled/disabled,
operate. As a brief illustration, when the paedophile (and the homosexual)
emerges into public discourse, he is always white. This is because in the
Western sexual domain, the racial ‘other’ already signifies either sexual
excess or lack. Consequently, the sexual abnormality of the ‘other’ is
normalised in white Western culture. Because the normative family is white,
only the white paedophile can define the outer limits of the norm. To put it
more simply, if the victim of a sexual crime is a person of colour, and his or
her assailant is also a person of colour, the incident is typically read by the
white mainstream as at worst, a reflection on their ‘race’, or at best, a
problem within a particular community. If the victim is white, and the
assailant a person of colour, the crime is read through the lens of racial
conflict and difference. Only when both the assailant and the victim are white
is the assault read as a broad social problem affecting ‘everyone.’
Contemporary responses to adults who engage in sexual acts with
youth and children are filtered through an apocalyptic narrative about
civilisation and sexual difference, the entire weight of which rests on the
presumption that the nuclear family is a safe haven from sexual and other
dangers. To begin thinking differently about paedophilia, hebophilia, and
intergenerational sex requires us to address this fiction directly. Only by
doing so will the need to displace sexual danger onto an ‘enemy within’
dissipate. This project, however, requires us to see how the family is
saturated not only by sex, but by race. To address both race and sex requires
a broader frame that that provided by either sexology or sexual rights
activists. It requires us to simultaneously investigate the full range of
inclusions and exclusions that organize social life. This task, which is
becoming increasingly urgent as debates within the United Kingdom, the
United States, and the European Union about gay and immigrant rights
intensify, is well within our capabilities.
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PART II
Ethics and Principles in Sexual Conduct
 
Images of Childhood, Adolescent Sexual Reality and the Age
of Consent
Kieran Walsh
Abstract
This paper will address society’s responses to sexual activity among
adolescents. All countries have minimum ages of consent above which a
person may lawfully engage in sexual activity and below which they are
deemed incapable of making an informed choice as to whether to do so and
hence any other person engaged in sexual activity with the child can be
prosecuted. Society has an image of the virginal child, and any sexual activity
on their part is deemed to be unnatural and the fault of some corrupting
influence. Yet children, especially older adolescents, engage in various forms
of sexual experimentation from a relatively early age as part of their normal
developmental process. Legal responses to the age of consent are in flux.
Deeply rooted in the historic desire to control sexuality, current age of
consent laws struggle to take account of adolescent sexual reality. In
particular, the law does not realise or recognise the manner in which
decisions to engage in sexual activity are made. The final section of the paper
will address one particular model of age of consent legislation that it is hoped
will be the focus of discussion at the conference.
Key Words: Adolescent, sex, consent, constructions of childhood, decision
making.
*****
1. Introduction
This paper will address the age of consent and the law’s responses to
the reality of adolescent sexuality. We currently tend to think of the age of
consent within the framework of child protection. We see it as essential in
protecting children from sexual abusers and at times from themselves.
Ultimately, however, this may be an inappropriate framework to adopt. A
growing consensus has arisen highlighting the limits of law’s response. This
paper will explore why this is the case, focussing on the historic development
of age of consent laws and the images of childhood that underpin them.
Finally, the reality of the adolescent sexuality will be examined through
empirical evidence shedding light on adolescent decision-making. Some
tentative conclusions will then be made.
It is necessary to clarify one point – this paper will focus on
consensual sexual acts. While ‘consent’ and its derivatives are legal terms of
art, it is worth differentiating these acts from ones that are clearly coercive. It
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can be claimed that all sex involves some element of pressure or bargaining.1
Here we are examining those acts where a person freely agrees to sex and any
pressures brought to bear are no more than those ordinarily associated with
sex. The terms child and adolescent will also be used interchangeably. The
paper does not seek to explore the abolition of the age of consent, thereby
exposing young children to significant harm. Rather it seeks to interrogate the
interaction between older children – adolescents – and the law.
2. Why have Age of Consent Laws?
Before we examine constructions of childhood, it is worth
explaining the main reasons offered for age of consent laws.
It has always been a societal aim to regulate inappropriate sexual
contact with children. Laws against sexual activity with minors are said to be
found in the Code of Hammurabi.2 The punishment of those who abused the
young remained an imperative throughout Europe in medieval and early
modern times,3 as exemplified by an English law from 1275 that made it a
criminal offence to have sex with prepubertal girls.4 Until extraordinarily
recent times, the law tended to criminalise activity with underage girls but
not boys, highlighting that the virginity of women was a ‘special property in
need of protection’.5 It may be more accurate to say that what was at issue
was not really an age of consent but an age of liability, as the emphasis was
on setting a barrier to sexual conduct against children under a specific age.
Historically, the age of consent/liability was commensurate with the
physical ability to procreate as demonstrated by the onset of puberty and
presumed to occur at age 12. As Baroness Hale stated when reviewing
English legislation, ‘the law was slower to recognise that even consensual
sexual activity with children who might well have reached the age of puberty
was both harmful and abusive.’6 It was only in Victorian times that the age of
consent was raised to 16, by the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885,7 and
indeed that the concept of consent itself began to be an issue. The aim of the
legislation was ostensibly to ‘protect girls, sometimes from themselves’8
having grown out of campaigns reflecting public concern for children who
were entering prostitution and early feminist concern for social and moral
purity in areas with high prostitution rates. It ignored the reality that children
were sexualised from a relatively young age and that young teenagers
sometimes acted out of sexual desire.9 Victorian society was heavily
concerned with the image of the family and the control of children by their
parents. Graham makes this clear when arguing that ‘many of the provisions
of age of consent legislation were designed to protect a guardian’s right to
control a girl’s sexuality, rather than prevent harm to the girl’.10
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3. Constructions of Childhood
A. Philosophical Constructions on Childhood
Archard makes the point that ‘the philosopher’s child is an
unfinished human,’11 as the child is defined in negative terms by what it lacks
rather than what it is – it is becoming rather than being. An inclination
towards paternalism is the result – ‘[i]f children were regarded by law as the
equal of adults, the result would be something infinitely worse than
barbarism. It would involve a degree of cruelty to the young which can
hardly be realized even in imagination’.12 One of the weaknesses of the claim
that children are simply bereft of adult capabilities is demonstrated by the
staged theory of development. If the child develops gradually, then surely the
absence of adult capabilities is not total for the duration of childhood. This
allows the child to progress towards full moral agency. How can this staged
process be reconciled with the competing philosophical strains of liberalism
and paternalism, each with their own inherent flaws? Freeman argues that
liberal paternalism is a viable mechanism for the exercise of legal rights – it
is possible and valid to reach an outwardly paternalist outcome if that
outcome has been reached with the benefit of engagement with the child and
an understanding of how their proposed outcome furthers their goals and
values. He argues that we need to ‘confine paternalism, without totally
eliminating it’.13 We should intervene in a way that allows children to mature
into independent adults. The intervention must be such as to ensure that child
will eventually come to see the correctness of the intervention.
B. Legal Models of Childhood
Law has an inconsistent approach to children. On the one hand, it
refers to a wide group of individuals, from newborn babies to seventeen year
olds, by a single collective noun, ‘children’.14 On the other hand, law
recognises that there are significant differences between individuals under 18,
such as their capacity to engage in different types of behaviour.15 This
graduated approach is also represented in the UN Convention on the Rights
of the Child when it speaks in Article 5 about ‘evolving capacities’. Evolving
capacity is also recognised as crucial by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child16 who recognise that:
The more the child himself or herself knows, has
experienced and understands, the more the parent, legal
guardian or other persons legally responsible for the child
have to transform direction and guidance into reminders
and advice and later to an exchange on an equal footing.
This transformation will not take place at a fixed point in a
Images of Childhood
______________________________________________________________
50
child’s development, but will steadily increase as the child
is encouraged to contribute her or his views.17
This demonstrates that law realises that growing up is a complex
process, not marked by a single rite of passage but by a series of staged
transitions characterised by the acquisition of growing responsibility and self-
sufficiency. This concept of self-sufficiency is important because it brings us
closer to an area where the law is beginning to resile from its insistence on
age-based distinctions – the concept of capacity. This concept revolves
around the ability to make rational choices, an issue to which we will return.
C. Social Models of Childhood
Images we use to describe children include the evil child, innocent
child and the immanent child.18 The evil child model shows the child as
inherently sinful, needing surveillance and discipline whereas the exact
opposite view is taken by the concept of the innocent child; they are angelic
and pure. The immanent child is viewed as a tabula rasa, waiting for
experiences to shape their lives. In debates about the interaction between
children and sex, it is clearly the model of the innocent child that is
predominant. We no longer regard it as appropriate to see the child who
engages in sex as evil. Nor do we see them as learning from the experience –
this would merely be a licence for abusers to claim that they are preparing the
child for adult life. Yet there is a problem with the innocence representation.
It fixes in our minds the image of the virginal child when this does not
coincide with reality. From that image of the virginal child, we have the
image of children as dependent – they depend on others for support and
protection, meaning that when we construct laws regulating their sexual
action, this false image dominates. It is important to remember that the
falsehood is most acute for adolescents – they are biologically quite mature,
legally developing full capacity and engaging in psychologically advanced
decision-making.
D. The Sacred
As mentioned above, we have a tendency to view children through
the lens of innocence. As a result, they are virginal, sacred. This particular
construct means that everything law does in relation to children must protect
that sacredness. This is especially true of children and sex. Let us
acknowledge that it is harmful for very young children to engage in sexual
activity. So the focus shifts to adolescents. Traditionally discussion of
adolescent sexuality takes place in the context of so-called deviant or risky
behaviour.19 What is missing from this discourse is any consideration of
adolescent’s sexual partner. This should be included as a more accurate
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indicator of whether the adolescent concerned is really engaging in deviant,
risky behaviour that is abnormal or damaging. All sex has certain risks –
disease, crisis pregnancy, the possibility of exploitation between people of
unequal power. Sexual activity among peers is less likely to involve risky
behaviour than sometimes thought. This will be explained later in the paper
when we focus on decision-making by sexually active adolescents.
E. The Profane
Typically, we think of age of consent legislation being designed to
protect the young from inappropriate sexual advances by older people. This is
now firmly associated with the fear of the stranger who may harm our
children, the paedophile.20 One of the interesting things to have occurred in
sexual offences policy is the move towards the concept of dangerousness.
Nash makes the point that when we examine the targets of sex offences
policy throughout the decades, the emphasis has always been on the danger
they pose to society and particularly to the young.21 This is based on
Garland’s dichotomy between the criminology of the self and the
criminology of the other.22 The former of these approaches sees the criminal
as something normal to be controlled while the latter argues that the criminal
is an evil person who does abnormal things and demanding punishment. A
medicalised view of paedophilia is also present in legal discourses. A
problem with medicalisation of sex offender issues is that it can obscure
societal factors and the causes of sex offences. Cowburn and Dominelli point
out that a truer reflection of the paedophile can be gained by assessing the
concept of hegemonic masculinity.23 Here, masculinity is a concept defined
by a set of diametric opposites – the normal man who protects women and
children from harm and the deviant male predator who preys on the
vulnerable. At the centre of this concept of deviance is the fear of the
stranger-danger, a belief that those unfamiliar with the victim pose a greater
danger than those acquainted with them. This medicalised and othered sex
offender informs a significant part of our policy on the age of consent. It
presupposes that one particular group – paedophiles – are a risk to children.
Yet this construction of dangerousness should play a minimal role in the age
of consent debate. Why do we further criminalise adolescents who exhibit
none of these characteristics and merely wish to engage in normal sexual
activity with members of their peer group? We need to construct a legal order
that is not dependent on Durkheimian imagery.24
4. Why and how do Adolescents make Sexual Decisions?
Why do young people engage in sexual activity? As a child grows
towards adulthood, sex and sexuality play increasingly important roles in
their lives. Physical and hormonal changes have taken place that almost seem
to compel sexual expression. Young people are becoming increasingly
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sexualised due to a variety of influences including media.25 Recent research
indicates that adolescents make sexual decisions on a model of planned
behaviour.26 This is based on the theory of reasoned action which states that
‘a decision to engage in a behaviour (e.g., to have sex) is directly predicted
by an individual’s intention to perform the behaviour.’27 Beadnell’s study
indicates that intention to have sex in the near future is the central
determinant of whether this will happen.28 While it may not sound revelatory,
it does make clear that adolescent decision-making is planned. We should
now consider the range of factors that go into establishing that intention.
Six factors are seen as heavily influential in adolescent decision-
making: ‘contextual factors, consideration of risks and benefits, boundaries,
boundary communication, the sexual event, and evaluation.’29 What this
demonstrates is that decision-making is a dynamic process and not dependant
on risk factors leading to sex.30 While these studies are based on American
adolescents, the same reasoning is found internationally. When Russian
adolescents were asked ‘what is the most important thing in sexual
relations?’ the most common answer from both males and females was
‘love’.31
5. Recommendations
It is clear that one of the most difficult issues for law is to strike ‘an
appropriate balance between protecting children from sexual abuse and
exploitation, on the one hand, and permitting the sexual expression of young
persons as they proceed through adolescence into young adulthood.’32
Freeman’s philosophical model of liberal paternalism offers a solution.
Archard posits that the abolition of a single age of consent may be a way to
achieve liberal paternalism in the context of adolescent sexuality.33 Canada
has achieved a quite sensible balance. The age of consent in Canada is 16.34
However, two exceptions apply. First, if the complainant is between 12 and
14 years of age, it is a defence to a criminal charge to show that the
complainant consented if the accused is not more than two years older than
the complainant or in a position of trust or authority or the relationship is not
exploitative.35 This provision is replicated for 14 to 16 year olds with the
permissible age gap between partners increasing from two to five years.36
6. Conclusion
At first sight, the Canadian position seems complicated, but so is
sexuality. The issues raised in this paper are reflected in the balance it
achieves between protection of the young based on our social constructions
of the child. It does away with the idea that dangerousness and risk are the
key issues for teen sexuality, rather than planned behaviour and the
development of intimate relationships.
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The Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons with
Mental Disabilities
Suzanne Doyle
Abstract
This paper seeks to examine the notion of consent to sexual activity as it is
applied to situations involving persons with mental disabilities both by both
medical professionals and the law. This will be achieved by analysing
sexuality and consent through the lens of disability theory and subsequently
by including feminist theories on the notion of consent and of sexual activity.
Generally, where this serves to assist in coming to a genuine assessment of
the nature and existence of consent to sexual activity for persons with mental
disabilities. It is concluded that in order to ensure that genuine substantive
consent to sexual activity on the part of the persons with mental illnesses is
accurately assessed, a fusion of both feminist and disability theory into such
assessments is vital.
Key Words: Mental Disability, Sexual Activity, Consent, United Kingdom,
Ireland, Disability Theory, Feminist Theory.
*****
1. Disability Theory Regarding Sexuality
Although the last two decades have seen the application of the social
model of disability transform societal perceptions of disability, the issue of
sexuality and sexual behaviour, particularly for persons with intellectual
disabilities, has not been subject to the same level of debate and advocacy.
This can perhaps be explained by the fact that the latter part of the 20th
century, persons with intellectual disabilities were perceived by society and
professionals alike as falling on one end of the either extreme of sexual
behaviour. Either they were believed to be asexual and therefore had no
interest in sexual activity, types of ‘eternal children’ or, alternatively, they
were viewed as being potentially dangerous due to the fact that they were
unable to control themselves and could not easily be controlled by others due
to their supposed ‘super-human strength’. 1,2
The application of the social model of disability prima facie serves
to highlight and remove such marginalisation and discrimination. By
revealing the fact that impediments and prohibitions on any aspect of the
lives of persons with disabilities is in fact a reflection of the barriers and
discrimination imposed by society, an ideological position which refuses to
recognise the sexual rights of persons with disabilities becomes untenable.
Yet the application of an ‘unembodied’ social model of disability is not
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without its difficulties. The characterisation of disability, and the resultant
discrimination faced by persons with disabilities, as being solely a
consequence of ‘social oppression’ implicitly denies the existence of any
impairment, either physical or mental, and means that such impairments are
either ignored or deemed to be irrelevant to the question of substantive
equality for persons with disabilities. In particular, the application of the
social model to issues of sexuality as they occur in persons with disabilities
results in an analysis of the sexual rights of such persons and, in particular,
the issue of consent to sexual activity which belies the multi-faceted realities
of engaging in sexual activity.
It is to be acknowledged that commentators within the disability
movement, such as Tom Shakespeare, have advocated for a social model
which fully incorporates the very real implications of impairment for persons
with disabilities, particularly as they apply to issues of sexuality and sexual
activity for persons with disabilities. Shakespeare’s analyses have very much
focused on persons with physical disabilities, yet is submitted that when the
alternative cognitive functioning which persons with mental disabilities
experience is classified solely as an ‘impairment’, the application of even a
renewed social model of disability to the issue of consent to sexual activity
results in a view of both of sexual activity and consent to such activity which
does not incorporate or indeed accept the real perspectives and
understandings of either of these concepts as they are experienced by persons
with mental disabilities. The reality of mental disability and its implications
for diverse levels of capacity and the exercise of that capacity in terms of
decision-making regarding sexual activity requires a theoretical model which
accounts for factors such as power dynamics, gender differences and sexual
knowledge.
2. First Feminist Theory on Sexuality and its Relevance for the
Construction of a Feminist Disability Theory of Consent to Sexual
Activity
Wendell, in analysing the general failure on the part of disability
theorists to reflect the multifarious perspectives of persons with disabilities,
suggests that this problem is analogous to the oft cited ‘Otherness’ principle
in feminist theory, where the differences of the ‘Other’ when compared with
the dominant group are emphasised. She suggests that the utilisation of
established feminist standpoint epistemologies, which support the proposition
that the ‘positionality’ of persons with disabilities results in different
experiences to those without disabilities, is a necessary consideration for the
formulation of authentic theories of disability.3
Of relevance to both a feminist perspective on sexuality and sexual
activity for persons with intellectual disabilities, Wendell refers to the
standpoint epistemology of Black women developed by Patricia Hill Collins
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which includes an expectation of diversity, even amongst identical or similar
groups. Collins therefore does not assume that similar experiences always
produce similar points of view or similar issues to be addressed.4 Such a
framework is useful when extended to the multiplicity and variation of issues
experienced by persons with mental disabilities, as opposed to persons with
physical disabilities, in relation to sexual activity. This can be as a result of
the level of intellectual disability from which they suffer; from minimal to
severe, fluctuations in functioning and capacity as a result of their psychiatric
condition or even external factors such as their environment, i.e. whether they
live independently, in a community setting or in a healthcare institution or
changes in medications and therapies.
A standpoint epistemological framework also highlights the fact
that very unique and distinct issues arise for people with mental disabilities in
relation to sexual activity which may not correspond to those issues which
people without mental disabilities or even people with physical disabilities
face. In order to adopt a theoretical structure which adequately analyses and
incorporates the lived experiences of people with intellectual disabilities in
relation to sexual activity and therefore ensure substantive equality for such
people, both the historical and contemporary socio-political experience of
that group of people must be examined and linked to the social and legal
issue of consent to sexual activity.5
3. A Legal Perspective on Consent and the Capacity to Consent of
People with Mental Disabilities
In general, the following core requirements are present in criminal
sexual assault legislation regarding the capacity of a person with an
intellectual disability to consent to sexual activity:
 An ability on the part of the individual to understand the
sexual nature of the act and the establishment based on
evidence that the person’s decision to engage in the sexual
behaviour is/was voluntary;
 An understanding on the part of the individual of the
consequences of decisions to engage in sexual activity;
 An ability on the part of the individual to communicate a
decision to engage or not engage in sexual activity.6
The most striking aspect of these criteria is the fact that they focus
exclusively on the cognitive functioning of the individual with the mental
disability. They are applied without any consideration given to the variety of
pressures and influences that people with mental disabilities may have faced
and which may be unappreciable from a cognitively ableist perspective. The
implications of such an approach are especially concerning in cases of rape or
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sexual abuse; the central question within which is the presence or absence of
consent. Consent will often be interpreted very simplistically, with no
account being taken of why a person with learning disabilities may have
‘consented’.7
Feminist commentators have developed and expanded this theory of
the power dynamic and its impact on the notion of consent. Lacey rejects the
standard liberal view of autonomy and consent as individualistic and the view
that they can be evaluated outside of their social context. She states that ‘[i]n
focusing on an individualised notion of consent, rather than the conditions
under which choices can be meaningful, the prevailing idea of sexual
autonomy assumes the mind to be dominant and controlling, irrespective of
... circumstances.’8 The recognition of this distinction between a superficial
analysis of the existence of consent as opposed to the reasons for the
existence of said consent is fundamental to the development of a concept of
consent to sexual activity by persons with disabilities. Cowan cites
McKinnon in holding that the law presents consent as a free exercise of
sexual choice under conditions of equality of power without exposing the
underlying structure of constraint and disparity.9
4. Conclusion - A Feminist Disability Theory of Consent to Sexual
Activity by Persons with Mental Disabilities
The acceptance by society of the sexuality of people with mental
disabilities is a progressive step, the value of which should not be
diminished. However, as a consequence of the liberal environment in which
these advance were made, an embodied theory of ‘mentally disabled
sexuality’ was not formulated. Instead, the assessment of consent and/or the
capacity to consent of a person with a mental disability has occurred through
the prism of cognitive ableism which makes assumptions about the nature of
voluntariness and exploitation and imposes a normative ideal of sexuality and
sexual activity. As a result, the risk and occurrence of sexual abuse against
people with mental disabilities is heightened.
It is there suggested that a more nuanced concept of capacity to
consent to sexual activity is employed. One that combines the body of
knowledge and research present within both the disability and feminist
movements.
The social construction theory which is central to both the social
model of disability and feminist theory is of particular relevance in that both
theories emphasise the fact that conventional understandings of sexuality and
disability fail to include the unique perspectives and experiences of women
with mental disabilities. In particular, the application of these theories
exposes the lacuna which the normative model of consent fails to recognise
in respect of the question of why a person with a mental disability might
consent to sexual activity.
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A feminist standpoint framework allows an analysis of previously
occluded issues such as the impact of gender and power relations on the
nature of consent to sexual activity by persons with a mental disability.
Crucially, feminist theory recognises that the definition of consent in such
situations is usually determined not from a female perspective but from a
male one, e.g. whether he ‘reasonably believed’ that the woman was
consenting, and that non-consent is usually inferred from evidence of
resistance, which is often difficult to prove.10 Traditional notions of consent
also fail to take into account repeated psychological coercion to engage in
sexual activity, yet psychological coercion is not classified as criminal or
seen to vitiate consent to such activity on the woman’s part.11 In that sense,
the well-worn slogan of the feminist movement that ‘the personal is political’
should be more fully adopted by disability advocates in the realm of sexuality
and sexual behaviour in order to emphasise the relevance of the politics of
difference combined with the valuing of subjectivity and relativity.12
Feminism and disability theory both advocate for the recognition of
the realities of differential power relations which exist between both men and
women and disabled and non-disabled individuals. As outlined above, the
issue of ‘consent’ to sexual activity by persons with mental disabilities has
largely rested on the perceived voluntariness and mutuality of both parties.
This ableist perspective fails, at both a social and legal level, to appreciate the
relevance that commonly enforced and encouraged characteristics of people
with mental disabilities such as reticence and subservience can have on the
perceived existence of consent and/or acquiescence to sexual activity. It is
therefore proposed that power relation assessments analogous to those
imposed by feminist theorists in the context of gender be applied to situations
in which it is contended that a person with a mental disability has consented
to sexual activity. The existence of an underlying structure of inequality,
should it be present in a particular relationship, will then become evident.
What may prima facie have appeared to be a consensual sexual relationship
between one or both partners who have an mental disability may ultimately
prove to be based on an unequal power dynamic which strongly influences
the decision of one the partners to ‘consent’ to sexual activity.
It is to be acknowledged that such an analysis of consent, if taken in
isolation, may give rise to accusations of paternalism on the part of both the
professions and the legal system. It is not to be concluded from this analysis
that feminist theory should entirely subsume the emphasis which the
disability movement and the social model has placed the definition of
‘disability’ as a form of social oppression which gives rise to unjustifiable
discrimination. Indeed, the social model of disability offers advantages for
the representation of the persons with disabilities because it demonstrates the
falseness of any claim of identity based on a ‘natural’ kind. It reveals that
gender, race, sex, nationality and ability are heterogeneous, indeterminate
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and artificial categories represented as stable or natural by people who want
to preserve their own political and social advantages.13 It therefore provides a
clear model within which to advocate for and promote the right to sexual
expression of persons with mental disabilities.
Recognising the limitations and difficulties, what she calls
‘impairment effects’, that impairment can have on an individual, Carol
Thomas has sought to expand the social model to take account of this using
what she terms a ‘social relational’ perspective. She explains her thesis as
follows:
‘Once the term ‘disability’ is ring-fenced to mean forms of
oppressive social reactions visited upon people with
impairments, there is no need to deny that impairment and
illness cause some restrictions of activity, or that in many
situations both disability and impairment effects interact to
place limits on activity.’14
It is therefore suggested that in establishing the existence of consent
to sexual activity by persons with mental disabilities, the utilisation of
feminist theory and disability theory in conjunction with one another
provides the optimum circular framework within which to evaluate the nature
of the consent being given by the individual. The application of a feminist
analysis of the power relations in conjunction with the enabling provisions of
the social model of disability will be tempered by the former’s emphasis on
the realities of gender distinctions and impairment as well as the latter’s focus
on the tendency of non-disabled law and society to impose unilateral
standards of behaviour and identity. In this way, the notion of consent to
sexual activity for persons with mental disabilities is informed by a more
textured and realistic concept of both sexuality and consent to sexual activity
which can both adequately protect persons with mental disabilities from
sexual abuse and exploitation while conversely exposing discriminatory and
unequal barriers to the full realisation of their sexual rights.
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Comprehending the Distinctively Sexual Nature
of the Conduct
Jami L. Anderson
Abstract
Intellectual impairment raises serious problems for U. S. sexual assault law.
On the one hand, the state must take seriously its obligation to ensure that
intellectual or cognitive impairments do not render someone a ‘perfect
victim.’ On the other hand, U.S. courts have a well-established history of
explicitly declaring that mentally retarded individuals have the
constitutionally protected rights to marry and have children and, one would
therefore assume, consent to sexual acts.1 To discuss these issues, I will
explicate the analysis offered by the New Jersey Supreme Court addressing
the sexual assault of a cognitively impaired young woman. I will then suggest
that we should shift the analysis away from standards of consent to one based
on harms.
Key Words: intellectual impairment, mental retarded, sexual assault.
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1. In the Interest of B.G., C.A. and P.A. Juveniles
At the time of the events described below, M.G. was 17 years old,
classified as ‘educably mentally retarded,’ she had an overall I.Q. of 64, a
verbal I.Q. of 70, and a performance I.Q. of 59 (though previous school
records had her I.Q at 49). She was classified as neurologically impaired.
The New Jersey Supreme Court described the events that took place on
March 1, 1989:
[M.G.] was approached by C.A. and enticed into a
basement because she liked P.A. who was there. In the
basement, she found a group of boys whom she knew for
‘at least six years.’ M.G. said that she was in that basement
for about an hour…M.G. said B.G. asked her to ‘suck his
dick.’ When she refused, ‘he forced me by grabbing the
back of my head and forcing it down.’ K.S. said, ‘let’s play
a joke [illegible] on her.’ He got a bat and broom, put a
plastic bag and Vaseline on each. C.A. proceeded to insert
the broomstick into M.G.’s vagina. ‘It was scary,’ then K.S.
‘put the bat up my vagina. It hurt.’ Others encouraged the
conduct, yelling, ‘[p]ut it up further.’ …She then said that,
although she performed fellatio on B.G. and her head was
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pushed down, she also was asked to masturbate him,
saying, ‘This I did. I wasn’t forced. While I was performing
oral sex on [B.G.], [C.A., K.S., P.A.] were saying how far
can you go & if I swallowed cum [sic].’ She said that C.A.
inserted the broomstick before the bat, while he and K.S.
both laughed, and ‘[K.S.] put the bat into my vagina, it was
a regular size bat. He forced my legs open, saying how far
could I go in.’
In a May 18, 1989 statement, M.G. said that before the
fellatio, B.G. and C.A. asked her how many fingers she
could insert into her vagina. She inserted five fingers while
the boys cheered her on. When asked if she was forced to do
this, her answer was ‘no.’ She also described other sexual
activity which she said she was not forced into
doing…M.G. said that after ‘they used the bat &
broomstick,’ R.C. ‘put a stick up my vagina. It hurt. I told
him that it hurt but he didn’t stop. He was asking me if it
made me feel good. Everyone was laughing…The stick hurt
because it was up me further than the bat and broomstick.’
This was followed by several instances of M.G.’s
masturbating the boys, including P.A., at their instigation,
before M.G. was told to ‘keep this a secret, not to tell
anybody,’ and to ‘hurry up & get out of here.’
Much of the courtroom discussion focused on the question of whether or not
M.G. was capable of giving legally binding consent. If she can give consent
then her statements that she was not forced provide sufficient evidence to
show that she was not sexually assaulted. If she cannot give consent, then
she was sexually assaulted.
To determine her capacity to give consent, the New Jersey court
considered three factors:
1) I.Q scores
2) Mental age
3) Level of understanding of the nature of sexual acts
2. I.Q. Scores
Intelligence Quotient tests have been criticized since their creation
in the early 20th century. For present purposes, it is questionable that an IQ
test determines whether or not a person can consent to engage in a sexual act.
The presumption is always that the score directly correlates with the capacity
to give consent. Yet a single number such as M.G.’s score of 64 is a
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composite of a variety of abilities and limitations. It is not at all obvious how
an I.Q. score provides any insight into a person’s capacity to give legally
binding consent. Indeed, M.G. repeatedly informed police officers
questioning her that she was not forced. Yet, when asked to explain the term
‘force,’ M.G. understood this concept to mean ‘physical pressure.’ Thus it
seems plausible to assume that she understood the question to mean ‘Were
you held down or physically restrained in a way that prevented you from
acting otherwise?’ And given that understanding of the concept ‘force,’ her
answer is correct: she was not forced. But M.G. seems to not understand the
concept of ‘force’ as coercion, as an act that is against a person’s will.2
M.G.’s score of 64 is relatively high, placing her in the category of ‘mild
mental retardation.’ Yet, no matter how developed (or not) her daily living
skills, communication skills or social skills are, if she cannot comprehend the
concept ‘force’ as anything other than physical pressure or physical
resistance, then a court cannot assume that she freely consented to sexual
acts.
3. Mental Age
A person’s ‘mental age’ is often used to describe a person’s level of
development. In court, the prosecution claimed that M.G.’s mental age was
8. The implication is that in all respects M.G. has the decision capacity
comparable to a normal, or typical, 8 year old. Since a typical 8 year old
cannot give legally binding consent to sex it was argued that M.G. could not
consent to sex. Yet, as with an I.Q. score, a ‘mental age’ is a poor measure of
a person’s capacities. First, it implies that a person with a mental age of 8 is
in all ways just like a typical 8 year old. Indeed, the prosecution said of
M.G.’s cognitive capacities that ‘at age 8, [M.G.] became frozen in time.’3
Her high school guidance counselor testified that she had ‘the body of a
woman and the mentality of a first-grader.’4 The idea that a person with a
chronological age of 16 or 17 would ‘freeze’ at age 8 and in all relevant
respects and would develop no abilities or cognitive capacities beyond that
developmental age is a grossly inaccurate way to describe intellectually
impaired individuals.5 The (for many people uncomfortable) fact is that such
individuals will likely have the sexual desires and interests of an adult, which
are decidedly unlike a typical 8 year old. M.G. stated very clearly that she
‘liked’ one defendant’s older brother. Because M.G. believed that were she to
go to the basement with one defendant that a date with his brother would be
arranged for her, she agreed to go into the basement. Indeed, M.G. stated that
after the events described above took place, she still expected that she would
later have that date. Thus, even if it is the case that M.G.’s intellectual and
cognitive capacities are below normal for her age, it is not inconceivable that
she genuinely wanted to meet with and have sex with someone she knew.
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Simply knowing a person’s mental age (whatever that means) does nothing to
inform us of their sexual desires or interests.
4. Understanding the Nature of Sexual Acts
The most important standard for determining a person’s capacity to
give consent is their capacity to understand the nature of sexual acts. In his
opinion, Justice Ashbey wrote that ‘a ‘mentally defective’ person is one who
does not have sufficient relevant sexual understanding.’6 Although a
reasonable enough claim, establishing an objective test for determining
whether or not a person has ‘sufficient relevant sexual understanding’ is
problematic. The defense made clear that M.G. knew the ‘mechanics’ of
sexual reproduction. She knew and could accurately use terms to refer to
both male and female sexual parts including ‘penis’ (as well as the slang term
‘dick’) and ‘vagina.’ She was knowledgeable about the fact of ejaculation
and ejaculate. Dr. Gerald Meyerhoff acknowledged that that M.G. knew that
‘she was engaging in sexual conduct.’7
Nonetheless, the prosecution insisted that M.G. did not really
understand sexuality. Dr. Meyerhoff claimed that:
… owing to her diminished ability to be assertive or
exercise the ordinary judgment expected of a nondefective
person (who would refuse to comply and who would
attempt to flee) [M.G] was ‘unable’ to resist. A
nondefective person would have, finally, registered alarm,
and displayed prudence, and left, or would have attempted
to leave.8
Dr. Meyerhoff argued that a nondefective person would have left or, at the
very least, attempted to leave the basement and, since M.G. did not, we can
be certain that M.G. is mentally defective.
In response, the defense offered testimony by Dr. Kern who claimed
that M.G. did understand social standards for sexual behavior. Indeed, M.G.
stated that she believed that her mother would disapprove of the events in the
basement; she stated that she believed doctors would think what happened
‘was sick;’ she also stated that she was aware that ‘everybody…was making
such a big deal’ about it.9 The defense argued that M.G. was savvy enough
to know that the actions that occurred that day are socially taboo and that,
therefore, the fact that she made no effort to leave the basement is evidence
that she understood what was happening, understood how others would
regard those actions. Therefore, it was argued, we can infer that she chose to
stay.10
Yet Dr. Susan Esquillin, testifying on behalf of the prosecution,
stated that M.G. ‘felt bound by a pledge of silence’ to not tell anyone what
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happened. M.G. told Dr. Esquillin that she ‘did not want to get anyone in
trouble.’ Dr. Esquillin argued that, although M.G. knew social expectations
regarding sexual behavior, M.G. ‘did not seems to have the concept that she
should be able to choose what to do with her body sexually and should not be
subject to the whims of ‘friends.’’Dr. Friedland, testifying for the
prosecution, testified that M.G. ‘did not have the capacity to say
‘no’…causing her to have poor judgment and making her susceptible to
manipulation and control by others.’ Friedland testified that M.G. ‘knew the
acts were wrong’ and that her primary motivation for tolerating the sexual
acts was to cause the boys to like her. Judge Ashbey stated in the court
opinion that the defendants exploited M.G.’s ‘history of believing in the
sanctity of secrets in relation to peer acceptance.’ Ashbey concluded that
M.G.’s flawed notions of friendship and her failure to value her own physical
well-being above her desire to submit to the wills of the defendants provided
sufficient evidence to show that M.G. was mentally defective and that she
was not, therefore, capable of consenting to sex. The defendants were then
found guilty of sexual assault.
I have strong misgivings about the lines of reasoning used in this
case. First, the efforts undertaken to measure M.G.’s knowledge of sexuality
is highly questionable. Courts are correctly unsatisfied with discussions of a
person’s knowledge of sexual reproduction yet evaluating a person’s
knowledge of social and cultural sexual attitudes is no better. Equally
problematic is the discussion of M.G.’s moral values. Several witnesses
testified that M.G. regarded promises made to friends as sacred. M.G.’s
reluctance to tell authorities about the sexual acts stemmed from her
discomfort in breaking a promise made to the individuals in the basement and
who instigated the sexual acts. M.G. also made very clear that maintaining
her friendships was extremely important to her, worth maintaining even if it
required experiencing physical pain caused by baseball bats being inserted
into her vagina. The court assumed, without argument, that non-cognitively
impaired individuals would not prioritise the maintenance of friendships over
their own physical well-being nor would they regard individuals who wished
to cause them pain as friends worth keeping. Apparently they also would not
regard the secrets of such individuals as worth protecting or the promises
made to such individuals as worth keeping. Yet it is not at all obvious that
these undefended assumptions are defensible. It is not at all clear to me that
the moral values espoused by M.G. are flawed and evidence of cognitive
impairment.
5. A Better Way to Go: Being Hurt and Hurting Others
The problem lies not so much with the tests used but with the idea
that it is possible to design such a test. Once we decide that some, but not all,
cognitively impaired individuals can consent to sexual activity, such a test is
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necessary. But is such a capacity measurable? What, after all, are we really
looking to measure?
What if we shift the focus away from consent to harms. Once we
know a person, X, fits the label ‘intellectually impaired’ and once we know
that someone has engaged in sexual activity with that person, I think it is
more profitable to ask ‘Was X significantly harmed by such sex acts and, did
Y (the non-intellectually disabled person)?’ rather than ‘Did X consent to the
sex act?’11 I find it telling that much of the court opinion, in fact, focused on
that question as a roundabout way of gaining insight into the question of
consent.12
There are two interesting and perhaps hopelessly problematic
implications of this suggestion. First, if we focus the conversation on whether
or not the person who is intellectually impaired has been hurt by the sexual
activity, then sex that resembles consensual sex , in the way that the events
involving M.G. resembled consensual sex, may nonetheless be criminal.
Contrariwise, it may be that sex acts that are in no way consensual but caused
no harms, may not be criminal. Although shifting rape law in this fashion
would require us to radically alter how our courts think about sexual
activities involving intellectually impaired persons, I think that the current
practice of treating such cases as analogous to sexual assault cases that
involved non-intellectually impaired persons is doing a grave disservice. It
perpetuates harmful stereotypes about such individuals with intellectual
impairments; it requires courts to distort the experiences and viewpoints of
the intellectually impaired so that they fit better with current rape law
structures and courts are refusing to acknowledge the weight actually
afforded considerations of harms inflicted or not inflicted by sexual acts done
with intellectually impaired individuals.
Notes
1 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U. S. 432 (1985).
In this case, U. S. Supreme Court Justice Marshall emphasized the fact that
mentally retarded individuals have ‘one of the basic rights of man,’ the right
to marry and to procreate. See Skinner v. Oklahoma 316 US 535 (1942). In
this decision, the U.S. Supreme Court protected the constitutional right to
procreate. In State v. Olivio, 589 A.2d (N.J. 1991), the court expressed
‘concern about unenlightened attitudes toward mental impairment and about
the importance of according the mentally handicapped their fundamental
rights.’
2 See S Esquilin’s testimony, 247 N.J. Super.403; 589 A.2d 637.
3 In the Interest of B.G., C.A., and P.A., Juveniles (247 N.J. Super.403;
589A.2d 637 (1991).
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4 Ibid
5 Denno, fn 346.
6 In the Interest of B.G., C.A., and P.A., Juveniles (247 N.J. Super.403;
589A.2d 637 (1991).
7 Ibid
8 Ibid
9 Ibid
10 Ibid
11 This conversation concerns only those instances of a non-intellectually
disabled person engaging in sexual activities with an intellectually disabled
person. It is not only certainly the case that an intellectually disabled person
could sexually assault an intellectually disabled person, I would not assert
that such cases are less important than, or cause less seriously consequences
than the kind of cases I am can considering here. I do believe that the cases
do differ enough that they need to be addressed separately.
12 In the Interest of B.G., C.A., and P.A., Juveniles (247 N.J. Super.403;
589A.2d 637 (1991).
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Sexual and Gender Motivated Harassment at Czech
Universities: Incidence, Perception and Implications for
Sexual Ethics
Petr Pavlík, Kateřina Kolářová, Irena Smetáčková 
Abstract
The paper presents research into incidence of sexual harassment in the Czech
university context. The presented research is first of its kind in the Czech
context and the paper introduces its key findings as well as offers a reflection
on the definition of “sexual harassment”. Specifically, we focus critically on
the subjective component of the generally used definition of harassing
behaviour. Relying on the agency of those affected by harassment to define
specific forms behaviour as harassing proves especially problematic, we
argue, with respect to student-professor relationships.
Key Words: Sexual harassment, university, gender motivated harassment,
gender.
*****
1. Introduction
Sexual harassment has been so far largely neglected by Czech social
scientists. With the exception of a study mapping the incidence of harassing
behaviour at the workplace, there are no studies on the topic available in the
Czech context. This holds true also for sexual harassment in education where
it presents potentially even greater dangers than in the workplace.
This has been generally recognized in elementary and high school
environment. However universities and colleges have been – as our
experience from the Czech Republic demonstrates – considered a different
case. It is usually assumed that the students’ adult status and their presumed
agency to protect themselves against harassing behaviour make them less
vulnerable than children and youth.
However, we would argue otherwise. University students might be
formally adult, but they do not enjoy equal standing with their professors.
The professors not only hold formal power over the students’ academic
careers, they also command considerable informal respect (and power) based
on expertise, academic acuity, social status, and age difference. These power
asymmetries must be recognized and taken into account with regard to sexual
harassment in the university setting. Both professors’ formal and informal
power may influence students’ agency to protect themselves. Furthermore,
the power asymmetries can also interfere with their ability to recognise
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and/or acknowledge that they might have been a target or a witness of
harassing behaviour. In other words, sexual harassment can have a damaging
impact on university students and their academic careers. It may negatively
affect their academic performance, student-professor relationships, as well as
student peer bonds.1
With this in mind, we carried out a project Sexual Harassment in the
University Setting: Incidence and Perception,2 which consisted of two parts.
The first part involved primary research mapping the incidence of harassing
behaviour and students’ experience with harassment at Czech universities.
We also examined students’ understanding of the phenomena and how they
deal with potentially harassing situations. To this end, the research combined
quantitative and qualitative methods (survey and semi-structured interviews).
The second part was practically oriented. Drawing inspiration from
the world leading universities,3 we produced two handbooks presenting
procedures and measures to prevent sexual harassment and to deal with the
concrete cases both institutionally, and individually. The handbooks have
addressed university officials, staff and administrators and the students,
respectively.4 Both handbooks provide their respective readership with basic
information about the phenomenon, explain the power dynamic involved in
the relationship between teachers and students, and address specific features
of sexual and gender motivated harassment within the university setting.
The following text presents main findings of the survey research. It
also discusses briefly one of the central methodological issues we faced while
designing the research.
2. Survey Design
The survey included 832 students from 11 out of the 26 Czech
Republic’s public universities. The male-to-female ratio was 30:70 and the
average age was 22 years. The average length of study was three years.
It should be noted that originally we did not aim for a representative
sample. Instead, we planned to study whether the gender composition of
study groups influences the students’ perception of sexual harassment as such
dynamics were reported for the workplace.5 Therefore, we divided the target
population in three groups of disciplines based on the male-to-female ratio
(female-dominated, male-dominated, and equal representation). The sample
was to consist of 200 students from each group.
However, some of the faculties were more willing to cooperate and
we did not want to pass on the opportunity to enlarge the sample and to
collect more questionnaires. This concerned mostly humanities and social
sciences, i.e. disciplines with higher representation of women students.
Nonetheless, a subsequent random division of the questionnaires into three
200-student groups, as was the original research design, did not show any
significant differences in response patterns, therefore we present results for
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the whole sample. Nonetheless, one of our findings is that gender
composition of the study group does not influence students’ perception of
sexual harassment.
Overall, at least three faculties, and a wide spectrum of disciplines
represented each of the participating universities. Social sciences and
humanities made up for 46 % of the sample, natural and technical sciences
for 22 %, economic sciences for 20 %, representation of other disciplines
equals to 12 % of the sample. The women-dominated disciplines were
represented with 54 %, man-dominated disciplines with 24 % and disciplines
with equal representation with 23 %. Data collection took place from
December 2008 to April 2009. Trained members of our research team
distributed the questionnaires during lectures and seminars.
The questionnaire combined the two traditions in the sexual
harassment survey research. The first one works with the so-called objective
definition of sexual harassment and focuses on students’ experiences with
professor behaviour so defined. Students’ subjective definitions do not come
into play. To this end, we employed the modified Sexual Experience
Questionnaire (SEQ) of Fitzgerald et al.6
The second tradition is interested in students’ own understandings of
sexual harassment and their definitions of such behaviour. We also included
scenario questions7 presenting eight situations in which professors displayed
potentially harassing behaviour. Students were asked to comment on the
situations and provide their reasoning why they did or did not consider
behaviour harassing.
3. Survey Results
The most important finding is that almost 78 % of the respondents
encountered behaviour, at least once, that, according to the objective
definition, can be classified as sexually harassing. Only 22 % of the
respondents indicated that they had never experienced or witnessed harassing
behaviour. This finding conforms to results of studies carried out abroad.8 As
Brandenburg summarizes in her review of literature:
When the definition is confined to forced or coerced sexual
advances (including quid pro quo sexual harassment)
incidence for women is generally reported to be between 15
and 50% (…) When the definition includes hostile
environment and less severe forms of sexual harassment
(such as leers, remarks, etc.), the numbers range from 50 to
90%.9
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Our results show a similar pattern with respect to different types of
harassing behaviour. The following types of behaviour were indicated most
frequently:
1. differential treatment based on sex/gender;
2. improper, mocking, and/or degrading commentaries about
women and men;
3. belittling, even offensive behaviour motivated by the
person’s gender;
4. sexually connoted jokes (including ‘humorous’ and joking
remarks directed at homosexuals and homosexuality);
5. materials depicting women or men as sexual objects.
More than 50 % of the students indicated that they have experienced the first
two types of behaviour. The incidence for the following three types was
higher than 10 %.
Overall, different types of harassing behaviour can be placed on a
scale with explicit sexual proposals or extortion attempts on one end and
general comments based on gender stereotypes which are not necessarily
about sex and which are not usually targeted at a concrete person on the other
end. Our research shows that students most frequently encounter the later –
the general comments that are not targeted at a concrete person, but at the
whole group. On the other hand, behaviour that has direct physical or sexual
content is relatively rare. Only 2 % of the respondents encountered these
types of behaviour. However, this relatively small number represents more
than 7,000 students if related to the whole Czech student population.
When asked directly, only 3 % of the respondents experienced
sexual harassment personally. None of them indicated that it happened
frequently. For 1.7 % of students, they were occasional experiences, for
1.2 %, they were solitary incidents. However, almost 80 % of the respondents
know someone who was sexually harassed. In 71 % of cases, they know
more than one person.
In spite of this, only 16 % of students reckon that sexual harassment
occurs in Czech universities. With respect to a perpetrator(s), 35 % of the
respondents think that it is usually a single person in a given institution, 8 %
think that it can be more than one person. Overall, students tend to think that
sexual harassment is a rather rare phenomenon resulting from ethical failure
of individual professors.
It is apparent that students’ statements are inconsistent, even
contradictory. The majority (78 %) scored positively on the SEQ, the
minority (3 %) interprets their experiences as sexual harassment. Most of
them (80 %) know someone with a first-hand sexual harassment experience,
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but only some of them (16 %) agree that sexual harassment occurs in
universities.
These contradictions point to small interconnection between the life-
experience level and the abstract-symbolic level, which includes a personal
“theorizing“ of social phenomena, or between personal experiences and
mental representation of general categories. The students do not seem to
apply a definition of sexual harassment to their own experiences and to be
able to generalize from the experience of others. This can happen for various
reasons. They may not be familiar with the definition or may resist
self-identification as a victim. In any case, 3 % is significantly lower than the
numbers reported for other countries. 10
It is thus not surprising that students consider second-hand
experiences with sexual harassment to be exceptions that do not reflect on the
overall character of the university environment. They conclude that sexual
harassment is not endemic to the university environment. In fact, they think
that it is much more frequent on the high-school level (81 %), where it
happens occasionally (72 %) or even often (9 %).11
4. Defining Sexual Harassment
While there is a great variety in definitions of sexual harassment
throughout the literature, policies, and laws, most of the existing definitions
assume that it must be unwanted and/or unwelcomed.12 In other words, these
definitions rely on a subjective perception of a given behaviour. Accordingly,
to define a situation as harassing, we depend on the ability of the harassed
person to perceive it as such. In the light of our research findings, we
consider this assumption problematic, and even more so in the context of
student-professor relationship. A clear and significant divergence in the
incidence of sexual harassment when we contrast the so-called objective
definition with the subjective perception of a harassing situation indicates the
inadequacy of subjective definitions.
First, we should not forget that labelling a situation as sexual
harassment implies locating oneself in the position of a ‘victim’, which might
conflict with the (wished-for) self-perceptions and identifications. Being a
‘victim’ implies losing one’s agency over the situation and over the inter-
personal interactions. This may be particularly meaningful in the specific
context of student-professor relationships.
The position of a ‘victim’ – not to forget – has specific gender
implications for all genders. While its dramatic clash with masculinity might
mean that men find it next to impossible to see themselves as ‘victims’, the
gender-stereotypical ascriptions of femininity might confer moral
responsibility upon women, and thus lead to (self-)blame for failing in
rejecting the unwanted advances.
Sexual and Gender Motivated Harassment at Czech Universities
______________________________________________________________
82
Second, the inability to perceive a link between one’s subjective
experience and an (established) theoretical reflection of specific phenomena
may be further supported by the effect of structural (gender) as well as
institutional (university) hierarchies. We also need to account for less formal,
less visible but equally important aspects of student-professor relationship
(i.e. respect derived from professor’s knowledge, fame or age difference) that
may interfere with one’s ability to recognise/name a situation as displeasing
or harassing.13 And, the student-professor relationship is a par excellence
example of a relationship riddled with various and multiple hierarchies.
Arguably, the very symbolic hierarchies that define relationship between the
professors and the students can affect the students’ ability to recognise the
behaviour as improper or harassing.
In practice, this might not only mean that the burden of evidence
remains with the person subjected to harassing behaviour, but also that s/he
will have to prove that the behaviour was indeed unprovoked. Thus, we feel
that the emphasis on the subjective definition of sexual harassment has
significant ethical implications. It confers the responsibility for identifying a
situation as harassing on the one who is being harassed and the one who is
hence multiply disadvantaged.
Besides all above, students may be initially pleased by teacher’s
behaviour bending the usual standards of student-professor relationship.
Their feelings can however change and they might increasingly perceive the
same behaviour as unpleasant, confusing, or even improper. This does not
though mean that teacher’s behaviour was not harassing in the first phase.
With this in mind, we suggest that the definition of sexual
harassment in the university setting should also cover acts that transgress
institutional boundaries of the student-professor relationship and redefine
roles of participants along gender lines. In other words, when a professor
approaches a student not as a professor, but primarily as a man or a woman,
s/he violates the code of professional ethics, takes advantage of his/her
position, and trifles with sexual harassment. This suggestion is also supported
by our interview-research findings that reveal that the issue of respecting
professional boundaries is of particular importance to students.
All these points, we feel, are the more relevant in a context, where
the discussion of sexual harassment14 concretely and of gender inequalities
and gender power hierarchies more generally is both relatively new as well as
continually ignored, trivialised or ridiculed (see below).
We further find problematic the current conceptualization of gender
(as a category of difference) in relation to sexual harassment. We believe that
despite significant changes the definition of sexual harassment has gone
through since its first phrasing, we still need to go further with thinking and
theorizing the relevance of gender to sexual harassment. It does not suffice to
acknowledge gender difference as a basis for harassing behaviour; gender
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harassment cannot be understood as a subtype of sexual harassment as is the
case now.15 We need to rethink and perhaps reverse the order of things. We
wish to argue that the gender order is the very basis for all the types of sexual
harassment. However, elaboration of this argument goes beyond the scope of
this paper and we shall leave it for later.
Another reason for rethinking the relation of gender to sexual
harassment is the translation of the term into Czech language. The word
“sexual” has a different meaning in Czech than in English where it connotes
both sexuality and biological differences. In Czech, it evokes only sexuality,
which makes all types of sexual harassment, which do not involve sexuality,
invisible.
5. Some Conclusions
As we indicated, our research is first of its kind in the Czech context
and thus opens a whole new field. Based on previous experience with
research and academic projects on gender relations, we anticipated that the
project and its findings would not be accepted with great enthusiasm by the
academic community. Still, we did not foresee the swell of animosity and
outright hatred it elicited. In reaction, our expertise and academic integrity
have been openly questioned and the research results ridiculed. Strong
reaction came especially against the handbooks that were seen as an attempt
to curtail academic freedom, rather than a contribution to a debate opening a
new issue of conceptualization and a suggestion at practical solution of
sexual harassment at universities. Some of our faculty went so far as to
publish defamatory articles in the daily press.16
It has been a chilling experience, but at the same time, it indicates
that the project and the issue it raises have touched a raw nerve. Obviously,
we stand here before a serious debate on the nature of student-professor
relationship, its ethical aspects, as well as before a debate upon gender
equality and gender relations within the context of university education.
Notes
1 I Smetáčková & P Pavlík, ‘Skupinové aspekty sexuálního obtěžování na 
vysokých školách [Group Aspects of Sexual Harassment in Universities]’,
Pedagogika (under review), 2010.
2 The project was carried out by the Department of Gender Studies of the
Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague. It was financed with a
grant from the Czech Republic’s Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports
(National Research Program, No. 2E08058). The research team consisted of
three main researchers: K Kolářová, P Pavlík, I Smetáčková (listed 
alphabetically) and five assistant researchers: K Cidlinská, E Juračková, L 
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Slavíková, L Vrbová, and for a part of the project: M Fucimanová and M
Hynková.
3 E.g. the University of Oxford, Harvard University or Humboldt-Universität.
4 I Smetáčková, P Pavlík, K Kolářová, Sexuální obtěžování na vysokých 
školách: proč vzniká, jak se projevuje, co lze proti němu dělat [The
Handbook on Sexual Harassment for Teachers and University
Administration], Faculty of Humanities, Charles University, Prague, 2009.
K Kolářová, P Pavlík, I Smetáčková, Co se je sexuální obtěžování a jak se 
mu bránit [The Handbook on Sexual Harassment for Students], Faculty of
Humanities, Charles University, Prague, 2009.
5 RM Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation, Basic Books, New York,
1977.
6 LF Fitzgerald, MJ Gelfand & F Drasgow, ‘Measuring Sexual Harassment:
Theoretical and Psychometric Advances’. Basic and Applied Social
Psychology, vol. 17 (4), 1995, pp. 425-445.
7 BA Gutek, ‘How Subjective Is Sexual Harassment? An Examination of
Rater Effects’. Basic & Applied Social Psychology, vol. 17 (4), 1995,
pp. 447-467.
8 M Paludi, et. Al., ‘International Perspectives on Sexual Harassment of
College Students‘, New York Academy of Sciences, 1087, 2006, pp. 103-120.
9 BJ Brandenburg, Confronting Sexual Harassment: What Schools and
Colleges Can Do, Teachers College Press, New York, 1997, p. 13.
10 Brandenburg, p. 13.
11 Further details of the perception and extent of, and gender differences in
sexual harassment can be obtained from the authors.
12 Brandeburg, p. 1. See also MA Paludi & RB Barickman, Sexual
Harassment, Work and Education, State University of New York Press, New
York, 1998. BW Dziech, & MW Hawkins, Sexual Harassment in Higher
Education: Reflections and New Perspectives, Garland Publishing, New
York, 1998.
13 We need to consider seriously the ways in which forms of behaviour can
be acknowledged and changed. Moreover, we wish to pose a context-
specific claim and argue that within the context of Czech universities it is of
immense importance to recognise the conditionality of one’s agency to say
‘no’ and/or to express one’s displeasure with a behaviour of one’s superior.
We fear that the belief in ‘free will’ disregarding the structural and/or
institutional trappings contribute significantly to the fact that sexual and
gender motivated harassment has been invisible so far. As well, we are
perfectly aware that teachers may (and are) also vulnerable and may become
targets of harassing and/or discomforting behaviour. Again, this project has
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only opened up a field for future investigation and both theoretical as well as
practical engagement.
14 It is of note that the first (non-feminist) attempts to translate the term into
Czech language in the early 1990s were not motivated by a serious effort to
accommodate the term/concept into the Czech context, but were attempts to
discredit it as a product of the overbearing and hysterical feminism of the
Western (and specifically American) context. See Ota Ulč’s term  “sexuální 
harašení” 1993 significantly changing the meaning. However, it is Josef
Škvorecký who is mistakenly credited for the word switch and his status as a
famous exile writer and publisher contributes to its dubious popularity.
15 See e.g. LF Fitzgerald, S.Shullman, N Bailey, M Richards, J Swecker, Y
Gold, M Ormerod & L Weitzman, ‘The Incidence and Dimensions of Sexual
Harassment in Academia and the Workplace, Journal of Vocational
Behavior, vol. 32, 1988, pp. 152-175.
16 We were outed as communist demagogues, inquisitors and Stalinist
commandos which has very strong meaning in post-communist environment.
It shows that there was no interest to engage in a true academic discussion
because such discourse stops any scientific arguments.
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Criminalising the Possession of Extreme Pornographic
Images: A Critical Examination of the Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act (2008)
Allison Moore
Abstract
With effect from 26th January 2009, the possession of ‘extreme’ pornography
has been criminalised under the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (CJIA)
(2008) and is punishable by up to three years imprisonment. Although the
purview of the Act covers much of what is already illegal under existing
provisions, it broadens criminal responsibility from the producers and
distributors of ‘extreme’ pornography to the consumers. This paper will argue
that the CJIA (2008) is a fundamentally flawed law in a number of ways.
Firstly, the central tenets of the Act are vague and imprecise, lacking
definitional guidelines regarding ‘pornography’, ‘extreme’ imagery and
‘serious injury’. Secondly, it will consider the extent to which the
criminalisation of possession of extreme pornography rehearses and reinforces
gendered constructions of sexuality and, in particular, notions of female
passivity and male activity. Finally, because of its focus on pornography
depicting acts that appear to lead to serious injury or represent a threat to life,
it will, disproportionately criminalise the possession of sadomasochist images
and, by extension, criminalise and further pathologise those individuals whose
sexual identity or behaviour includes the eroticisation of consensual power
exchange.
Key Words: Extreme pornography, CJIA (2008), public / private.
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1. Introduction
Ostensibly, the CJIA (2008) was introduced as an attempt to update
the existing legislation regulating pornography, which was seen as ineffective
in controlling the production, distribution and consumption of so-called
‘extreme pornography’ on the internet. As pornographic websites are
frequently hosted outside of the UK their regulation does not fall under the
jurisdiction of existing law and, consequently, consumers are able to view
images online that would be otherwise illegal to purchase or import in the
UK. The CJIA (2008) would, therefore, appear to be a specifically twenty-
first century response to a uniquely twenty-first century problem; one that
attempts to rise to the challenges posed by the rapid advances in
communications technology. However, despite the apparent novelty of this
88 Criminalising the Possession of Extreme Pornographic Images
______________________________________________________________
legislation, the underlying assumptions have much longer lineages and serve
to reinforce and reproduce heteronormative constructions of sexuality. This
paper will explore three areas of continuity in discourses of sexuality
identifiable in the debates over extreme pornography. Firstly, it will be
suggested that the CJIA (2008) and the consultation leading up to its passing,
rest on the assumption that sexuality is a private matter and that
representations of sexuality in the public realm must be controlled or
censured. Secondly, it will consider the extent to which the criminalisation of
possession of extreme pornography rehearses and reinforces gendered
constructions of sexuality and, in particular, notions of female passivity and
male activity. Finally, it will argue that because of its focus on pornography
depicting acts that appear to lead to serious injury or represent a threat to life,
the CJIA (2008) pathologises those individuals who fantasise about, engage
in and enjoy sexual practices based on the eroticisation of consensual power
exchange.
Under UK law, an image is deemed to be pornographic if ‘it is of
such a nature that it must reasonably be assumed to have been produced
solely or principally for the purpose of sexual arousal’.1 The CJIA (2008)
defines an extreme pornographic image as one that is ‘grossly offensive,
disgusting or otherwise of an obscene character ... [and] ... portrays, in an
explicit and realistic way, any of the following:
(a) an act which threatens a person’s life,
(b) (b) an act which results, or is likely to result, in serious
injury to a person’s anus, breasts or genitals,
(c) an act which involves sexual interference with a human
corpse, or
(d) a person performing an act of intercourse or oral sex with
an animal (whether dead or alive), and a reasonable person
looking at the image would think that any such person or
animal was real.2
2. Maintaining the Public / Private Divide
Without doubt, the easy accessibility to pornography that the
internet affords has fundamentally changed how pornography is consumed,
where it is consumed and by whom, leading Paterson to state that ‘[w]hat was
previously a marginal behaviour is emerging as a mainstream practice’.3 How
far the consumption of pornography represented a marginal behaviour before
the development of the internet is debateable but what is irrefutable is that the
internet has made pornographic material available to a much wider audience.
Whilst there has always been a relationship between advances in technologies
and growth in the production and distribution of pornography, the increase in
its availability through the internet is thought to present unique challenges.
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Prior to 2009, the main legislative tool in the regulation of
pornography was the Obscene Publications Act (1959). Under the OPA
(1959), criminal liability for obscenity rests with the producers and
distributors of sexually explicit material. Whilst what is now classified as
extreme pornography has not suddenly emerged with the development of the
internet, its circulation was prohibited by ‘[c]losing down sources of supply
and distribution’.4 Even materials that were not deemed to be obscene under
the OPA (1959) and, therefore, granted approval for distribution, were only
accessible via licensed and legitimate sex shops and porn cinemas and,
consequently, only available to a restricted audience of, predominantly men
over the age of eighteen. These commercial venues existed and were
contained within ghettoised sex zones, semi-public spaces5 that came under
constant regulation and surveillance. In this way, the public/ private divide is
maintained, knowledge about sex and its representation in the public sphere
is controlled and restricted and sexual minorities, in this case individuals who
consume pornography, remain on the margins of society, ‘excluded from
public view’.6 However, with the development of the internet, ‘[p]ornography
has gone truly public’7 and, arguably, the boundaries between the public and
private are being transformed. The proliferation of pornographic images that
can be directly downloaded on to the consumer’s hard drive; the blurring of
the boundaries between consumer and producer, evidenced, for example, in
the growth of amateur and interactive pornography on the internet and; the
exposure to new subjectivities, new sexual stories and new ways of being
sexual mean that sex can no longer be relegated and confined to the private
sphere nor can who has access to sexual knowledge and who has the
authority to speak about sex be easily controlled.
Whilst the CJIA (2008) is focused specifically on extreme
pornography, its expressed and explicit concern over the internet highlights
broader fears over sexuality and the blurring of the public/ private divide that
internet pornography represents. Nowhere was this more evident than in the
comments made by Martin Salter, MP, during the consultation stage of the
bill. He stated, ‘No-one is stopping people doing weird stuff to each other but
they would be strongly advised not to put it on the internet’.8 This is
reminiscent of the debates over the decriminalisation of homosexuality that
led up to the Sexual Offences Act (1967) In a similar tone, Lord Arran, one
of the supporters of the campaign for decriminalisation of homosexuality,
said in the final reading of the SOA (167) bill in the House of Lords,
‘Homosexuals must continue to remember that, while there may be nothing
bad in being homosexual, there is certainly nothing good’.9 The 1967 Act
was based on a minority, liberal rights approach, and did not represent an
acceptance of homosexuality as a legitimate lifestyle. It merely stated that,
except under certain conditions, the State had no business to intervene in the
private life of its citizens. There are parallels here with the CJIA (2008). Just
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as the SOA (1967) reinforced the liberal ideology of a public/private
dichotomy, whereby gay men were to be tolerated as long as they remained
within the private boundaries of the divide,10 the clear message in the CJIA
(2008) encapsulated in Martin Salter’s comments is that the State will not
intervene in the ‘weird things’ that people do consensually as long as they do
not transgress the bounds of the private realm and in so doing outrage public
decency.
3. A Gendered Reading of the Criminalisation of Extreme
Pornography
Not only do the discourses that underpin the criminalisation of
extreme pornography serve to reinforce the public/private dichotomy, they
also perpetuate essentialist understandings of heteronormative sexuality. The
assumption, both implied and explicitly stated throughout the consultation
and reading of the Bill, is that the viewers of extreme pornography are males
who eroticise and are aroused by female submission. Through consumption
of extreme pornography, said males will normalise female subordination and
become desensitised to the victimisation of women. Indeed, such is the power
of extreme pornography that all those exposed to it are seen as vulnerable to
its reach. The authors of the Rapid Evidence Assessment commissioned
during the consultation stage justified their decision not to provide explicit
descriptions of extreme pornographic material for fears that they may
produce ‘sexual arousal and orgasm’.11 In other words, such is the extreme
nature of these images that their mere description in written form is
something we need to be protected from. This is, in part, based on unfounded
and unproven assumptions about the relationship between pornography and
violence towards women, but it is also based on a view of sexuality that sees
sexual arousal itself as potentially dangerous. This is reminiscent of
nineteenth century sexological discourses of sexuality that conceptualise
male sexuality as volcanic, powerful and uncontrollable; as ‘naturally’ and
‘normally’ aggressive.12 In contrast, women, and female sexuality, are
portrayed as being in need of protection from pornography.
The CJIA (2008) rests on two notions of harm to women; direct and
indirect. With regards to direct harm, the Consultation on the Possession of
Extreme Pornographic Material clearly expressed the Government’s
commitment to ‘protect those who participate in the creation of sexual
material containing violence, cruelty or degradation, who may be the victim
of crime in the making of the material, whether or not they notionally or
genuinely consent to take part’.13 To conflate consensual and non-consensual
participation and to offer protection irrespective of whether consent has been
given is problematic. To suggest that female participants in pornography,
extreme or otherwise, do not have the ability to consent is to deny them any
agency in sexual decision-making.
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It is perhaps the concern over the indirect harm of extreme
pornography that was most explicitly articulated during the consultation
stage.14 In keeping with the arguments of anti-porn feminists like Dworkin,
McKinnon and Russell, the indirect harm rationale posits that extreme
pornography does not just cause harm to women participating in it, it is harm
to all women because, it is argued, it legitimates and perpetuates violence
towards women. If we were to accept the indirect harm theory about the
relationship between representations of sexualised violence and the
prevalence of actual violence towards women, the logical, if impractical,
response would be the criminalisation of a good deal of what classes as
mainstream entertainment. What is perhaps more problematic about a reading
of extreme pornography that positions the viewer as always and necessarily
male is that it leaves very limited scope for women to be able to consume and
enjoy such material, rendering them ‘incompetent readers’ 15 of pornography.
It silences women who fantasise about erotic power play and are aroused by
its representation in pornography.
It is ironic that some of the material that falls under the CJIA (2008)
and its means of distribution have provided women with an easy access to
pornography and a new medium through which to explore their sexuality and
their sexual desires.16 In so doing, they are able to challenge, to some extent,
heteropatriarchal constructions of female passivity and sexual dependency.
Women are able to access and consume pornography in their own home and
the growth of amateur porn sites has allowed them to be the producers of
their own pornography. The internet has provided women with ‘an
anonymous, private space [...] to explore their sexual fantasies without fear of
shame or reproach’,17 including their fantasies of sexual subordination and
domination, sadism and masochism. It is here, in the extreme pornography
that eroticises SM that there is space for women to reject the narrowly
prescribed sexual roles they have been given. Not only do some women
fantasise about sexual submission, others fantasise about the sexual
domination of others. SM, both as a practice and as representation in
pornography can transgresses socially constructed categories of gender and
sexuality and position women in a dominant role. This is something that the
CJIA (2008) has paid scant attention to. In the words of Linda Williams,
‘activity and passivity have been too rigorously assigned to separate gendered
spectator positions with little examination of the male and female spectators’
adoption of one or the other subject position and participation in the
(perverse) pleasures of both’.18
4. Insider/Outsider and the Pathologisation of SM
Underpinning the CJIA (2008) is the premise that representations of
some sexual practices are so extreme that there is no justification for their
reproduction, distribution or possession. Under the provisions of the Act,
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such material includes depictions of consensual SM. In other words, it
conflates and treats as equally serious non-consensual acts of violence and
abuse with consensual SM. In so doing, it delegitimises SM as a fantasy,
practice and identity; ‘in condemning the representation, you condemn the
reality’.19 As such, the binaries of insider / outsider, civilised / uncivilised are
maintained. Those individuals who engage in, or even fantasise about SM are
portrayed as dangerous, unrestrained and, therefore, outside the bounds of
civilised society. Eleanor Wilkinson (2009) has suggested that against these
pathologising discourses and a culture where, paradoxically, representations
of SM are becoming increasingly mainstream, albeit it in a sanitised,
desexualised and commodified form, the internet is an important medium for
SMers. The internet provides community sites dedicated to the celebration of
the SM lifestyle, educational sites that provide information and advice on
how to do SM safely, as well as the space to share pornography that has been
made by and for SMers. Whilst such pornography would depict some acts
that fall under the jurisdiction of the CJIA (2008) they should not be
mistaken for or conflated with material that portrays actual abuse.
The internet acts as a space within which the sexual stories of SMers
are told, shared and consumed. According to Ken Plummer telling sexual
stories are central to the development of intimate citizenship, which he
defines as ‘the control (or not) over one’s body, feelings, relationships:
access (or not) to representations, relationships, public spaces, etc: and
socially grounded choices (or not) about gender identities’.20 Plummer
argues that there has been a proliferation of sexual stories and, for him, their
significance lies in the fact that they challenge who has the authority to speak
about sex. Telling sexual stories, the making public of hitherto private and
intimate details of one’s life, serves two separate, but interlinked, functions.
Firstly, sexual stories should be understood as symbolic interactions, in so far
as they are narrated, given meaning and consumed through social interaction.
The second function of telling sexual stories is a political one. The ability (or
not) to tell one’s sexual story involves the exercise (or not) of power. To have
control over how to tell one’s story, first to the self and then to others, under
conditions of one’s own making, is seen as both powerful and empowering.
Conversely, to be silenced, unable to speak out, is thought of as ‘damaging,
and it signposts a relative powerlessness’.21
Denying SMers the control over how to tell their story and
criminalising the production and possession of consensual acts of SM is to
silence them and render them invisible. As Eleanor Wilkinson argued, ‘SM
pornography becomes inseparable form its wider history of oppression; it
becomes political as well as sexual speech’.22
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5. Conclusion
Despite the fact that, as yet, there have been very few prosecutions
for the possession of extreme pornography under CJIA (2008), and even
fewer stand alone possession offences, it’s symbolic significance cannot be
underestimated. Far from being a new response to the challenges posed by
advances in communication technology, the CJIA (2008) rehearses and
reproduces heteronormative sexuality and maintains the public / private
divide. Whilst the availability of extreme pornography on the internet does
present unique legal, ethical and moral dilemmas, it is problematic and
ultimately defeating to criminalise the possession of all extreme imagery,
unless it can be proven that they have been produced without the consent of
the participants or are the product of coercion. Without wanting to have an
overly optimistic view of the opportunities afforded by the internet or to
uncritically present it as a democratising space, it does offer the means of
challenging, or at least beginning to challenge, dominant constructions of
sexuality. The internet ‘opens up questions of autonomy and choice and
points to new forms of exploitation’.23 Focusing only on the potential for
exploitation through extreme pornography prevents any consideration of its
liberatory potential.
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Pornography as Crime and in Crime: A Response to Recent
Feminist Arguments
Amy E. White
Abstract
There are two anti-pornography feminist claims that have emerged in recent
work concerning pornography and crime. These claims are often invoked in
support of pornography regulation. One of the claims is that pornography
leads to crimes against women. The other, perhaps more profound claim, is
that pornography is a crime against women. This crime, some authors assert,
amount to subordination, sexual discrimination and a silencing of the speech
of women. This paper is an attempt to address both feminist claims. I argue
that neither of the feminist claims is sufficient to justify pornography
regulation. According to current research, pornography does not cause
significant violence against women. Also, I argue that the claim that
pornography is an act of violence is misguided.
Key Words: Pornography, feminism, censorship, Rae Langton, sexual
violence.
*****
1. Introduction
To claim that there is a feminist position on pornography is rather
dubious. Feminist positions are as varied and complex as the feminist writers
who advance them. Nevertheless, there are two distinct claims in the writings
concerning pornography and crime that are often made in support of
pornography regulation. One of the claims is that pornography leads to
crimes against women. The other, perhaps more profound claim, is that
pornography is a crime against women. This crime, some authors assert,
amount to subordination, sexual discrimination and a silencing of the speech
of women. This paper is an attempt to assess these claims.
2. Pornography as a Cause of Crime
A common argument for restricting the availability of pornography
centres on the claim that men tend to commit violent acts against women
after viewing pornography. Often this argument involves the claim that
pornography causes negative attitudes about women and acceptance of rape
myths. These attitudes then become a causal factor in sexual aggression.
Despite these assertions, there is little reason to believe that pornography is a
significant causal factor in sexual assault.
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Several studies have examined the role of pornography in sexual
offense. These studies comprise both experimental and field research.
Recently several authors have also utilized the technique of meta-analysis on
this vast body of research.1 In general, laboratory experiments show a small
correlation between viewing pornography and displaying aggression. On the
other hand, studies in the field have mostly shown no correlation or a
negative correlation between viewing pornography and sexual violence.
The results of controlled laboratory experiments are not
homogenous. Some studies conducted have failed to show any correlation
between sexually explicit material and aggression towards women.2
However, other studies report that pornography slightly increases aggressive
attitudes towards women and leads to the acceptance of rape myths. In this
later group of studies, mostly male college students are exposed to
pornography then asked questions concerning views towards women or
questions to assess rape-myth acceptance. In general, these studies show a
small increase in negative attitudes concerning women, rape-myth acceptance
and aggression.3 However, extreme caution should be exercised in
interpreting these results.
Controlled experimental studies examining pornography and
aggression suffer from many flaws and. Also likely alternative explanations
for the results of these experiments have emerged. Excitation transfer can
explain at least part of the findings. When subjects are aroused or excited by
violence, that excitation can transfer and make them, temporary, more
aggressive. Excitation transfer is also consistent with findings concerning
studies on aggression where subjects are shown violent films without a
pornographic component. In several studies simply watching a non-
pornographic ‘slasher’ film increased aggression towards women.4 If any
violence can produce results similar to those achieved when subjects view
violent pornography, the sexual content of the material is irrelevant.
These results are also consistent with social learning theory.5 This
would be problematic for violent pornography if a person were only exposed
to women through this type of media. Any social learning that occurs in
controlled laboratory experiments is likely to be undone by real world
encounters. In fact, this is exactly what field experiments indicate. Meta-
analysis of the experimental research in this area generally concludes that
while there is a small positive increase in rape-myth acceptance in controlled
priming experiments, non-experimental researched shows no correlation
between rape myth acceptance and exposure to pornography.6
Currently, it does not appear that any attitudes observed in the
laboratory translate into the real world.7 This data is only strengthened when
we consider that, in many countries, the availability of pornography is at an
all-time high, and sexual aggression has declined. Victimization rates for
rapes in the United States have, generally, shown an inverse relationship
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between pornography consumption and rape rates.8 In fact, most
industrialized nations are currently experiencing a decrease the rape and
sexual assault rates despite large increases in the amount of available
pornography.9 There have been numerous studies done in countries where
there is a high rate of pornography and a low rate of sexual assault. For
example, in the Netherlands and Scandinavia, where there are few restrictions
on pornography, the rate of sex-related crime is lower than in the United
States.10 Japan provides yet another example to consider. From 1972 to 1995,
the availability of pornography in Japan increased notably while the
incidence of rape and other sexual assaults decreased substantiality.11 This is
especially notable as Japan has, perhaps, the most sadistic pornography in the
world. Thus, the claim that pornography is a significant cause of sexual
violence is not supported. While there may be other factors causing sexual
assault rates to decline in some of the countries studied, if pornography were
a major causal factor in sexual violence, we would expect more sexual
violence in countries where pornography is most abundant.
In sharp contrast to a positive relationship between pornography and
sexual violence, many studies have been conducted that point to the possible
cathartic effects of pornography. One such study concluded that many sexual
offenders have used pornography to relieve the impulse to commit a sexual
offence.12 Also, several studies examining the correlation between
pornography and sexual violence have reached the conclusion that
pornography may help protect the consumer against committing acts of
aggression. While evidence for this cathartic effect is mixed, it is noteworthy
that many studies have made this conclusion.13
Even if a correlation could be shown between pornography use and
sexual crimes, it would be insufficient to prove causation. It may be the case
that those who commit sexual crimes are attracted to pornography, not that
pornography causes sexual crimes. Faulty relationships of this sort often
emerge in claims of correlation. One of the most common mistakes made in
formulating correlations is ignoring a common cause. It could be that both
pornography and sexual aggression could have a common cause. This is
similar to the conclusion drawn by Joel Feinberg. Feinberg suggests that
sexual aggression and pornography are caused by what Feinberg labels, ‘the
cult of the macho.’ This cult consists of ideals of masculinity and domination
of women.14 This suggests that it is pervasive gender inequality that is the
true cause of sexual aggression.
Feinberg’s theory is supported by current empirical evidence. An
adherence to the ‘cult of the macho’ would explain why one of the leading
predictors of rape-myth acceptance is the reported social conservatism of
men.15 In general, men with more conservative attitudes, especially
concerning traditional gender roles, tend to score higher on rape-myth
acceptance questionnaires. Convicted rapists also tend to hold strong social
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conservative values concerning the proper roles of men and women.16 On the
other hand, research suggests that men who have less violent predispositions
are less affected by exposure to pornography. Men who hold less
conservative gender roles assessments also seem to be less attracted to
violent pornography than those who express more macho and aggressive
attitudes.17 Thus, as Feinberg suggests, those who indentify with the ‘cult of
the macho’ are those most likely to be attracted to violent pornography and
commit sexual assault.
Pornographers make pornography because there is a market for it in
a society whose ideas about sexuality are influenced by multiple sources.
Unfortunately, one of these influences is macho stereotypes and attitudes and
social norms and media often serve to perpetuate patriarchal control. While it
is only reasonable to assume that social media influences the attitudes of
viewers, such media does not exist in a vacuum. To address the real causes of
sexual violence it would be wise to examine the pervasive ideals of gender
inequality that saturate many societies.
3. Pornography as Crime: The Silencing of Women
Following previous work by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, Rae Langton argues that pornography is an act of sexual
discrimination and subordination. Pornography, Langton argues, silences the
speech of women, and makes sexual refusals by women unspeakable.18 If
Langton is correct and pornography is a discriminatory action, it should
rightly be considered a crime in any society that values equality. I will be
specifically considering the work of Langton in this section. It should be
noted, however, that much of my critique of Langton’s work could be applied
to other authors who have formulated similar arguments.
Following the framework outlined by J.L. Austin, Langton argues
that pornography is a speech act. According to Langton and Austin, speech
consists of more than mere locutionary acts. Speech, according to Langton,
involves more than locutionary and perlocutionary dimensions. We can do
things with our speech. By using speech, we can refuse, marry, warn, etc. In
this cases Langton claims that speech is an illocutionary act. While a
perlocutionary act is an act performed by saying something, an illocutionary
act is an act performed simply in saying something. Langton claims that
pornography is an illocutionary act that subordinates women.
Langton holds that the powerful can prevent the speech acts of the
powerless from counting as speech. In particular, she argues that
pornography interferes with and silences a women’s ability to successfully
perform the speech act of sexual refusal. She believes that pornography
makes some potential speech acts ‘unspeakable’ for women. This is because
the intention to perform an illocution of a certain kind is not the only felicity
condition that needs to be met for that illocution to occur. Speech can, in
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Langton’s words ‘misfire.’ As an illustration of such misfiring, Langton
claims that pornography silences the refusals made by women to unwanted
sexual advances.
Langton’s case that pornography is an illocutionary act of
subordination is unsatisfactory in a number of ways and has been criticized
by numerous authors.19 One potential criticism is that the framework of
Austin’s that Langton uses may be flawed. It is possible that that speech does
not involve illocution. Strawson has argued that speech merely consists of
locution and perlocution.20 Speech may be a necessary component of an
action but not amount to an action in and of itself. Even if Austin’s
framework is correct, there are still serious problems with the assertion that
pornography is an illocutionary act of subordination.
In order for pornography to be an act of subordination, Langton
acknowledges that certain conditions need to be met. The first condition is
that the pornographer would have to be in a position of authority. The second
condition is that the speech acts would have to be taken as verdictive and
exercitive acts. Finally, pornography would have to have certain
perlocutionary effects on the beliefs and behaviour of the population.
Langton uses an example of a legislator proclaiming that ‘blacks or not
permitted to vote’ as an example of how speech can be an illocutionary act of
subordination. While Langton’s example fulfils her three criteria that speech
much meet to be such an act, pornography does not.
Langton’s argument that pornography is authoritative has faced
numerous criticisms.21 One concern is that pornography is fantasy and is not
recognized as an authority. Pornography may be attractive in part because it
is fantasy and an escape from reality. However, Langton argues that
pornography can still authoritatively say something about women even if it is
fantasy. This claim is doubtful, as it is unlikely that pornography has a
unified message. There is common heterosexual soft pornography, violent
pornography, lesbian pornography, gay pornography, erotic and loving
pornography and even pornography that portrays women as dominate. Each
of these different types of pornography could say something different.
Langton assumes that pornography has a unified voice and is not contradicted
by other pornography. Given the wide variety of pornography available, it is
implausible to suggest that any clear authoritative message emerges. The
examples Langton uses to illustrate her claim about what pornography says
are also questionable.
In arguing against the claim that pornography doesn’t say anything
because it is fictional, Langton offers the example of the Orson Welles’s
‘War of the Worlds’ radio broadcast. The broadcast was a fictional portrayal;
however, many people believed it to be true. While it is true that many people
believed the broadcast was really describing an alien invasion, their beliefs
were changed as soon as contrary information came to light. Contrary
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evidence can also contradict anything that pornography says, if it says
anything at all. Even if someone believes the fantasy and accepts that
pornography says something negative about women, its fictional nature is
brought to light rather quickly. Often when someone persistently believes a
fantasy, it indicates a defect in that person, not the fiction. Langton claims
that a reader ignorant of women and their desires may be unable to clearly
distinguish background from fictional propositions in pornography. This
could result in viewers learning ‘what should not be learned.’22 A person
would have to be completely isolated from all women to believe that they are
mere objects.
Even if pornography is considered fantasy and not recognized as an
authority, Langton believes it is still possible that it subordinates. Langton
claims that pornography can be authoritative even if a person, or group of
persons, does not recognize its authority. Langton claims that when an
authority ranks a person, this ranking is often self-fulfilling. The illustrative
example she offers is when a child is ranked as having a lower than average
intelligence. Sometimes when this happens, the ranking becomes self-
fulfilling. This is certainly true but the entity doing the ranking needs to be a
legitimate accepted authority. For example, occasionally fundamentalist
religious groups come to speak on the campus where I work. If such groups
tell me that I am an evil sinner and less moral than those around me it is
unlikely that these assertions would become self-fulfilling. My acceptance of
the authority of the group is important and it is highly unlikely that their
views will have any verdictive force.
To Langton’s credit, she rightly claims that pornography need not be
required to have the powers of divine command in order to subordinate and
silence. However, she dismisses a crucial point too easily. It’s not clear what
makes the authority that Langton claims pornography possesses so much
stronger in constructing reality than other authorities. Usually, one of the
first authoritative figures a person encounters is his or her mother. As a child
advances they encounter other women in authoritative roles. It is unlikely that
pornography has such an impact that it can negate all positive representatives
of the female gender.
Not only is pornography not authoritative, the empirical evidence
concerning its perlocutionary effects, as previously argued, is not solid.
Langton claims that pornography legitimizes sexual violence and deprives
women of certain liberties; however, there is little empirical evidence that
pornography does either of these things. If pornography is illocutionary
disablement and silences the refusals of women, there should be higher rates
of rape in places where more pornography is available. As previously
argued, this has not been shown to be the case.
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4. Conclusion
In review of the evidence, it is unlikely that any of the anti-
pornography feminist L arguments are sound. Pornography does not appear
to be a significant cause of sexual violence. Lacking any real power of
authority or unified message, it is also clear that pornography is not an
illocutionary act of subordination.
By focusing on pornography, attention is drawn away from forces
that create a market for violent pornography. If the energy that some
feminists have focused on pornography could be focused on the underlying
attitudes that create a market for pornography, we would be well on the way
to social change. Trying to help women by censoring pornography would be
similar to taking an aspirin to cure cancer. While the aspirin may provide
temporary relief of some pain, the larger cause of the pain remains
untouched.
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Sexual Exposure to and Transmission of Sexually
Transmitted Diseases: A Belgian Substantive Criminal Law
Point of View
Bjorn Ketels
Abstract
Witness the fact that throughout the world a good deal of HIV patients have
been prosecuted and/or convicted for sexual HIV exposure and transmission,
whether under HIV specific criminal law or under general criminal law
provisions, the criminal law is increasingly used in this field. Up to now, no
convictions have been reported in Belgium. Recently however, the alleged
first criminal complaint was filed, charging a gay man with attempted murder
for concealing his HIV positive status from his sexual partner of two years
while repeatedly having practiced unsafe sex with him. This paper aims at
outlining the main findings of the first thorough study into the applicability
of the prevailing Belgian substantive criminal law provisions to sexual
exposure to and transmission of HIV and, more broadly, other sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs) (specifically paying attention to actus reus -
including causation - and mens rea) and the meaning thereof (especially
having regard to punishment and criminal attempt). I will argue that there is
some scope within the existing Belgian substantive criminal law provisions to
address sexual STD exposure and transmission.
Key Words: STDs, sexual exposure and transmission, Belgian substantive
criminal law.
*****
1. Introduction: From Hospitals to Criminal Courts
People have sexual needs. Though their fulfilment usually does not
pose any problems, sex sometimes entails risks for the partners and even for
the community. Thus, all sorts of sexual behaviour that can be called ‘risky’
in the light of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) and, as a result, all sorts
of infections with these STDs often occur.1
Emphasizing this issue’s predominantly medical nature is holding a
candle to the sun. HIV and AIDS as well as many other STDs indeed cause
major public health problems all over the world:
Chronic in the patient, persistent in the population, easy to
prevent in principle but not in practice, sexually transmitted
diseases (STDs) present some of the greatest challenges
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faced by applied biological science. STDs were in fact
among the first diseases to be attacked by pharmacology
and to attract the interest of public-health officials. While
modern medicine has reduced the societal impact of many,
such as syphilis, particularly in developed countries, they
still present serious problems worldwide. And today’s most
notable STD, human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), the
virus that causes AIDS, has become one of the greatest
health threats to arise in modern times.2
Logically, a public health approach with among other things
surveillance, screening, testing, education, counselling, prevention and
treatment has always been of account in combating STDs.
In addition, or more accurately, connected to this, STDs are also of
legal importance. They indeed give rise to several vital questions concerning
civil law, insurance law, labour law, social security law, medical law and so
forth. The present paper will take a Belgian substantive criminal law point of
view on the sexual exposure to and transmission of STDs.3
This decision does not appear out of thin air. Infections with the
larger part of the STDs can severely harm one’s (physical) integrity and as a
rule the criminal law considers the legal good of human integrity of
paramount importance. Is it any wonder then that some countries have in fact
criminalized the actual sexual exposure to and/or transmission of STDs? In
recent years, the enactment and use of such criminal law seems to show an
upward trend. Some countries have enacted ad hoc legislation (with a scope
that is frequently limited to HIV/AIDS), others use the existing ‘untypical’
criminal law statutes. As the case may be, the criminal law can merely extend
to actual transmissions or already to the risk thereof. One time, dolus has to
be proven, another time a mere culpa will do. Be that as it may, prosecutions
and convictions concerning the sexual exposure to and transmission of STDs
in Europe and worldwide seem to be on the march. A UNAIDS-funded report
of Global Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS Europe and Terrence
Higgins Trust has shown that at least one HIV patient has been prosecuted in
Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway,
Azerbaijan, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia and the UK.4
Regarding Belgium, this issue is also gaining in importance. As is
the case for most populations in the greater part of the world, a substantial
part of the Belgian population still practices unsafe sex. Though the criminal
law has up to now played a highly marginal part in combating STDs, things
could be about to change. In May 2007, a homosexual man filed the first
criminal complaint on this account with constitution de partie civile for
attempted murder. The complainant himself had not been infected but argued
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that since his former boyfriend (the defendant) had concealed his seropositive
status from him while they had repeatedly practiced unsafe sex, he had to be
brought to justice. However, last January 13th the raadkamer of Bruges, the
investigating jurisdiction of first instance, has dismissed the charges. Since an
appeal has been lodged with the kamer van inbeschuldigingstelling in Ghent
and the case is now pending, leave to inspect the judgement and preparatory
documents has not yet been granted. Seeing there is barely any jurisprudence
and authors have not published extensively on this topic, up to now it has not
been established to what extent prevailing Belgian substantive criminal law
provisions can be applied to the actual sexual exposure to and transmission of
STDs. This paper aims at outlining some of the main findings of the first
thorough (and to a large extent proactive) study in this field.5
2. The Applicability of some Belgian Substantive Criminal Law
Provisions to Sexual Exposure to and Transmission of STDs: A Bird’s-
Eye View
A. Introduction
In this paper I will not discuss the bill that has been put forward in
the Flemish parliament more than once and aims at amending the Flemish
decree of 21 November 2003 concerning the preventative health policy.6 It
specifically tends to criminally sanction the individual legal commitment to
prevent the spread of incurable, possibly life-threatening contagious diseases.
Yet, up to now this bill has not been passed. Its most recent introduction of 2
July 2008 has been lapsed by the regional elections held in Belgium on 7
June 2009.
Since Belgium currently seems to have no STD specific penal law, I
will be focussing on the ‘untypical’ prevailing Penal code and - due to the
limited writing space - specifically on the provisions concerning assault and
battery, administration of noxious substances and manslaughter, murder and
poisoning. These indeed are the penal qualifications that were mentioned by
the then vice-premier and minister of Justice Laurette Onkelinx in answering
a question on conscious HIV transmission that was raised in the Chamber of
Deputies.7 From a legal dogmatic angle, the aforementioned existing criminal
offences will only be analysed on account of their constitutive components as
laid down in the specific penal qualifications (in other words: the actus reus -
if need be including causation - and mens rea). As a consequence, causes of
justification, of exclusion of guilt and of excuse will not be put on the screen.
B. Manslaughter, Murder and Poisoning: The Odd Man Out in the List?
(Attempted)8 manslaughter, murder and poisoning seem the least
likely offences to be used regarding exposure to and transmission of STDs.
This becomes quite clear when considering their requirements. Manslaughter,
punished by twenty to thirty years’ imprisonment, is a killing with the intent
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to kill. Murder can be circumscribed as manslaughter with the aggravating
circumstance of premeditation (punished by life imprisonment). Poisoning is
manslaughter with the aggravating circumstance of the employment or
administration, no matter how, of substances that can more or less swiftly
bring about death (likewise punished by life imprisonment).
Their core actus reus therefore is the killing of another human
being, implying material causation between death and the material act of
exposure or transmission. In accordance with the doctrine of equivalence a
causal connection is established when a certain behaviour cannot possibly be
thought away without this having an influence on the particular outcome.
Causes do not have to be unique. On the other hand they do have to be
judicially certain. Under the doctrine of adequacy, an antecedent can only be
qualified as a cause of the ensuing damage if its occurrence was not
completely implausible. Given a certain degree of foreseeability is required,
this theory is milder than the sheer conditio sine qua non principle of the
doctrine of equivalence. In practice, however, the latter seems to have a
dominant influence. In this respect the use and limits of phylogenetic analysis
in criminal trials as evidence of responsibility for STD transmission deserves
mentioning. In the complex scientific process of phylogenetic analysis, small
differences in - for instance - HIV’s genes are examined. Yet, given that HIV
is not unique to a particular individual, such a test can only be used to rule
out defendants. In and of itself, it cannot prove that transmission occurred
directly between two individuals, nor does it provide information on the
direction of a transmission.9
In order for the mens rea to be present, the defendant has to
knowingly and willingly aim at realising the fatal consequence of his act
(direct intent), or at the very least accept its inevitable (indirect intent) or
probable occurrence (dolus eventualis).10
C. Intentional and Unintentional Infliction of Injury
Various criminal law provisions on the subject of infliction of injury
could provide for more practicable qualifications on the subject of the actual
sexual exposure to and/or transmission of STDs.
1. Assault and Battery
In order for the constitutive components of assault and battery to be
present, an injury (or a stroke) has to be caused intentionally (for intentional
assault and battery) or by a lack of prudence or precaution (for unintentional
assault and battery). The Penal code does not define the concept of injury.
Hence, Belgian jurisprudence and doctrine have come to the rescue. Can thus
be qualified as an injury, any internal or external harm, no matter how minor
and irrespective of the way and the means applied, that is inflicted on the
human body by an outside chemical or mechanical factor influencing the
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physical condition. The detection of disease symptoms does not seem to be
required. Ergo, even the mere infection with an STD as a consequence of sex
may fall within this definition. With regard to HIV, for instance, the actual
infection already seems to imply the necessary harmful effect on one’s
physical integrity as it results in pathological changes in the organism by
inducing phased immune deficiency. As for mens rea, intentional assault and
battery require general (i.e. direct, indirect or eventual) intent.11 Evidence for
such intent can however be expected to be conclusive in rather exceptional
circumstances. Unintentional assault and battery require a lack of prudence or
precaution, established by comparing the act in question to the way a prudent
man (bonus ac diligens pater familias) in that particular case properly would
have acted.12 Consequently - and although sharply criticised - in practice, a
so-called culpa levissima in abstracto often seems to suffice.
With regard to intentional assault and battery the Belgian Penal code
provides for a series of relevant aggravating circumstances, amongst other
things on the basis of premeditation and on the basis of the outcome of the
injury (or stroke), i.e. a temporary illness or incapacity for personal labour, a
seemingly incurable illness, a permanent incapacity for personal labour, the
total loss of the use of an organ or a severe mutilation or unintentional death.
Aside from the latter aggravating circumstance (unintentional death) - where
(should a fatal case occur) establishing the required causal connection with
the initial injury can be expected to be extremely difficult - the majority of
these provisions seem to be applicable to the sexual transmission of STDs.
Although being challenged, a substantial part of jurisprudence and doctrine
still stands firm that aggravating circumstances on the basis of the outcome of
the intentional injury (or stroke) can be applied if the potential defendant did
not want the consequences to occur and even if he did and could not foresee
them.
Relating to the unintentional counterpart, the Penal Code separately
penalizes s/he who unintentionally causes another person’s death.
The above qualifications will only exceptionally be applicable to the
mere exposure to STDs. An attempt to intentional or unintentional assault
and battery indeed is not criminalized. Ergo, all their constitutive components
will have to be fully established.
2. Administration of Noxious Substances
Those who cause another person to become ill or incapable for
personal labour by, wilfully but without the intent to kill, administering
substances that can bring about death or that can gravely damage health are
liable to punishment (intentional offence), as are those who unintentionally
cause another to become ill or incapable for personal labour by administering
the aforementioned substances (i.e. unintentional offence).
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As for mens rea, reference can be made to the above observations on
assault and battery.
With regard to both offences’ actus reus, Belgian legal doctrine
characterizes the administration of the noxious substances as making one, no
matter how, ingest substances that are lethal or that can severely harm health.
Given these general terms, the view can be taken that these offences could
apply when it comes to voluntary administration through sexual transmission
of STD infected bodily fluids.13 Some of them could indeed bring about death
or at the very least gravely damage health.14 In order for these offences to be
committed, the law requires an - intentional or unintentional - consequence,
specifically an illness or an incapacity for personal labour. Concerning for
instance HIV, this certainly would be the case if the potential complainant
develops AIDS. Yet, prior to that, patients generally do not feel ill.
Nevertheless, since a psychological trauma that causes suffering has already
been classified as an illness, and seeing that one could become traumatized in
this way simply by being informed of his or her HIV-positive status, the
crime could in my view be fully established, even without the manifestation
of any typical AIDS symptoms. Apart from that, the intentional
administration of noxious substances is also punishable if attempted.
Possibly, the transmission of an STD could be designated as the
manifestation of the intent to commit the misdemeanour, determining a
commencement of execution. If the required illness or incapacity fails to
occur, one could argue that this is solely because of circumstances beyond
the perpetrator’s control and that the conditions for criminal attempt have
therefore been met. The mere exposure to (i.e. without an actual transmission
of) an STD might also qualify as such an attempt, provided that one accepts
the exposure as the commencement of the execution of the offence. In this
respect, it has to be noted that the Penal code does not prescribe any relevant
benchmarks.
Commensurate with intentional assault and battery, the Penal Code
contains some aggravating circumstances, specifically if the intentional
administration of noxious substances has produced a seemingly incurable
illness, a permanent incapacity for personal labour or the total loss of the use
of an organ or if they have unintentionally induced death (see above).
3. STDs and the Criminal Law: Where Do we Go From Here?
Throughout the world, the criminal law is increasingly being used in
the delicate field of sexual exposure to and transmission of STDs. Belgium
too has recently seen the alleged first criminal complaint charging a gay man
with attempted murder for concealing his HIV positive status from his sexual
partner with whom he repeatedly practiced unsafe sex. The above outline of
the first thorough study into the applicability of existing Belgian substantive
criminal law provisions to sexual STD exposure and transmission indicates
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that although it is questionable whether such a behaviour could be qualified
as an attempted murder, it could nevertheless fall within the range of some
other criminal offences. In short, there seems to be some scope within the
existing Belgian substantive criminal law provisions to address sexual STD
exposure and transmission.
The key question remains whether, on this account, the criminal law
should confine itself to barking rather than proceed to actual biting. In recent
years, the state apparatus has become more and more interested in issues of
sexual violence and exploitation. On the one hand, criminal law surely plays
an important part in conveying society’s indignation toward those engaging
in reprehensible and life-threatening behaviour. On the other hand, several
subjects for debate arise in reference to sex that carries the risk of STD
transmission. First of all, it is entirely unlikely that legal intervention will
ensure that most people will only have safe sex. Moreover, the question
presents itself as to whether actions to which all parties involved freely and
fully consent, justify invoking such a drastic response and, more broadly,
whether the possible or actual sexual STD transmission should under any
circumstances be criminalized, given it will probably fundamentally impede
the goals of STD prevention, treatment and care. But that is another matter,
relating to the question whether or not such legislation is solely constituted
and/or used in a culture of fear for what many might consider ‘risky others’.
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& G Vermeulen (eds), Maklu, Antwerp, 2009, p. 203 et seq.; B Ketels,
‘Who’s Afraid of … Risky Sex? Criminal Law Perspectives on Sexual HIV
Exposure and Transmission’, Controlling Security in a Culture of Fear, M
Hildebrandt, A Makinwa & A Oehmichen (eds), Boom Legal Publishers, The
Hague, 2009, p. 169 et seq.
6 Voorstel van decreet (E. Tack et al.) houdende wijziging van het decreet
van 21 november 2003 betreffende het preventieve gezondheidsbeleid wat
betreft de individuele verplichting om de verspreiding van ongeneeslijke,
mogelijk levensbedreigende besmettelijke ziekten te voorkomen, Parl.St.
Vl.Parl. 2007-08, nr. 1.781/1.
7 Vr. en Antw. Kamer 2003-04, 4 May 2004 (Vr. nr. 2673 Y. Avontroodt),
where Laurette Onkelinx has confirmed that there is enough scope within
existing legislation to prosecute and punish HIV transmission.
8 It is questionable whether sexual exposure to or even transmission of STDs
could be qualified as an attempted manslaughter, murder or poisoning. The
Penal code indeed provides that an attempted offence is committed if the
intent to commit a felony or a misdemeanour has manifested itself by means
of external acts which determine a commencement of execution and which
are discontinued or do not have the intended effect, solely because of
circumstances beyond the perpetrator’s control.
9 See E Bernard, Y Azad, A-M Vandamme, M Weait & A Geretti, The Use of
Phylogenetic Analysis as Evidence in Criminal Investigation of HIV
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Child and Youth Sexualities, the Law and the Regulatory
Apparatus of Child Protection Policies in Canada in the
Early 21st Century
Robert D. Teixeira
Abstract
In the first decade of the 21st century, Canadian lawmakers have intensified
legal regulation in the arena of child protection, primarily with Bill C-2, an
omnibus bill that increased the basic age of consent in Canada from 14 to 16
and placed tighter restrictions on child pornography. I seek to understand
how the regulatory scope of legal and governmental discourses, especially as
represented by the age of consent statutes and child pornography laws, draws
on conceptions of the child at risk from sexual malfeasance as a pre-eminent
way of envisioning child protection today. Drawing on the work of Foucault
and others, I seek to understand the social organization of governmental
practices and legal regulation as they pertain to safeguarding the young from
sexual danger. I investigate how these laws (and the discussions surrounding
them) serve to construct objects of thought about the child as a site of social
regulation that draws on normative conceptions of bodies, sexualities, gender
and families and shifting relations between the law, the state, expertise, and
policing practices. This paper aims to uncover how discourses of child/youth
sexualities and the social, psychological, and sexual/erotic dimensions of
experience have become a discursive formation that is constitutive of an
intensification and reach of regulatory power into the lives of children and
youth. My paper provokes questions pertaining to the ethical substance and
discursive practices that attend to how the child becomes an intensified site of
social and sexual regulation and the costs of pursuing such governmental
strategies.
Key Words: Age-of-consent, youth, sexuality, governmentality, Foucault,
sexual regulation.
*****
1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the age of consent debates surrounding the
most recent round of legislative activity in the years 2006-2008 in Canada.
These years saw a series of public discussions, media reports and intensified
activity of the legislature, House and Senate committees that produced an
imperative for child protection tied to the age of consent to sexual activity
represented by the eventual passing of Bill C-2 on February 2008. A
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centrepiece of the governing conservatives led by Canadian Prime Minister
Stephen Harper, Bill C-2, entitled, ‘Tackling Violent Crime,’ sought to
increase the age of sexual consent in Canada from 14 to 16 years, the first
formal increase since 1890.1 This paper seeks to understand how
configurations of governmental practices, legal regimes, and expert and
popular knowledge constitute specific political rationalities that assemble
political technologies that take youthful sexualities as an object of
governance.
2. The Age of Consent as a Problem of Governance in the 21st
Century
I draw upon Foucault’s work on governmentality and its elaboration
with law as I employ a discourse analysis of government documents
represented by the Justice Committee Minutes for Bill C-22 (Age of Consent)
and Bill C-2. I seek to uncover how a set of governing concepts and
discursive strategies articulate specific ways of enabling law, youth and adult
subjectivities as a field of governable objects that construct child and youth
sexuality as it mandates specific interventions. Knowledge of populations and
subpopulations, mediated primarily through expert discourses, constitute an
aspect of governing identifiable populations through specific political
rationalities. These discussions are embedded in a culture of liberal
democratic governance represented by professional bodies ranging from
social workers, child welfare administrators, legal council, police officials,
members of Parliament, statisticians and autonomous citizen’s groups. These
groups produce the construction and reproduction of the problem of child and
youth sexuality as a governable problem. Although politicians from across
the mainstream political spectrum have mobilized the issue of child
protection in public discourse for the past 20-30 years in Canada, the recent
campaigns to raise the age of consent represents a shift in the social and
moral regulation of adolescent sexuality.
3. Governmentality and the Production of Ethical Subjects
My analytical approach in this chapter will draw from Michel
Foucault’s studies on ‘governmentality’ (1991) and its development by
others, mainly Dean (1999) and Rose (1999). These studies have become an
important analytical tool used to investigate a complex terrain of discourses
and practices that produce and reproduce relations of governing and patterns
of domination. A governmentality approach enables a focus on the specific
knowledge producing practices that construct specific truth claims regarding
the nexus of age, gender and sexuality.
A governmentality approach seeks to connect questions of power,
politics and a wide range of enabling practices to the space of lives, self-
fashioning and subjectivity. Importantly, this concept of governance concerns
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the shaping of human conduct that posits the individual as a locus of freedom
of action. In addition, liberal modes of government are exemplified by trying
to work through the freedom and capacities of the governed.2 As such, a de-
individualizing perspective on governance focuses on relations of force and
assemblages of practice, rather than identities or value-orientations. In my
ensuing analysis of youth sexualities in law, this approach is very useful for
uncovering another perspective on the movement of power and knowledge in
the social organization of sexual regulation, as it circumvents the tendency to
relate questions of legal regulation solely to moral claims about the character
and telos of identity claims and the production of harm. This approach
focuses on the epistemological battle over identity claims and its normalizing
solicitude vis-à-vis youthful sexualities as an aspect of the strategies of
governance.
4. Making Youth Sexualities an Object of Governmental
Knowledge
Key questions that guide my reading of my empirical data include:
how is it that sexuality and age relations are made a subject of calculable
knowledge in the arena of governmental relations? What can the discursive
productions of a ‘knowable’ population of children and youth reveal about
the nature of governing relations in the early 21st century in Canada? What
can a close reading of the text of the committee discussions reveal about the
claims to truth and the calculative reasoning that are employed in the
technologies of government that take child protection as field of
governmental action?
My research uncovered three sets of interlocking domains of
discourse that framed the issue of youthful sexualities, gender, families,
parenting and law in Canadian society. Together they form a template of
permissible discourses given authoritative scope within the committee
proceedings, setting parameters on legitimate knowledge and the ethical
substance and authority of the person who is positioned to make claims to
truth. These three identifiable regimes of discourse are:
a) parent-child relations and the government of familial space
b) securitizing hegemonic child/youth and adult/parent
identities
c) the figure of the dangerous sexual ‘other’
A. ‘Give power back to the parents’: Parent-Child Relations and the
Intensification of Sovereign and Normalizing Power
Calls for the protection of children are produced as fundamental to
the reproduction of social and national life, where the maintenance of
normative family arrangements becomes a cipher for the reproduction of the
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nation cast as a universal social good. Part of the government’s strategy of
manufacturing social consensus on the issue is to frame its legislation under
the new moniker, ‘age of protection’, in an attempt to forestall potentially
divisive political discussions attendant on the legal category of ‘consent’,
which exists as evolving case law in jurisprudence.3
We witness a shift in the relations of power that constitute family
formation as a mode of regulating the public and private spheres. Along with
an intensification of parental authority tethered to criminal law, comes a
corresponding dispossession of both young people and parents’ autonomous
or discretionary patterns of relating. Criminal legal sanctions become an
adjunct to parental authority, as the state furthers its reach into the
discretionary ‘private’ arena characteristic of parenting. Some Members of
Parliament interpret the change in law in tones that imply ‘giving power back
to the parents’ as simply a self-evident claim of a state of affairs in which the
‘stable’ configuration of authoritative relations in family life has gone awry.
In the neo-liberal era, the family is increasingly regarded as a
privileged site for the social economy and for the proper reproduction of
norms fitted to a new economy of lean production and restraint. Seen as a
generative centre of social harmony, the family’s task was enacted by
‘forming a partnership that is at once consensual and tutelary between the
family and social expertise’.4 The intensification of power at the micro-site of
parent and child relations tethered to sovereign power can be read as a
symptom of the self-regulating family undergoing transformation. The
intensification of power is embodied by socio-legal changes that permit a
kind of ‘outsourcing’ of criminal/legal practice that deputizes parents as
authoritarian agents of state power under the law.5 In this sense, the
government of the middle-class family is undergoing a shift in its biopolitical
organization, once a site of self-regulation and normalizing expectations, to
one that now includes the sharp end of sovereign power. Thus what Rose
refers to as a ‘therapeutic familialism’,6 a form of self-regulatory normalizing
process that aligns itself with experts, is now giving way to what can be
described as ‘biopolitical familialism’ where practices, closely tied to a
dispersal and intensification of norms, function as adjuncts to sovereign
power and its normalizing patterns reflected in criminal law.
Although parents are able to exercise a form of augmented
sovereign authority linked to legal sanctions, young people’s ability to
develop autonomous decision-making practices suffers from a further
retrenchment vis-à-vis legal, state-based and normalizing authority. This
functions paradoxically to centre both the parent and the law as the absolute
guarantor (‘protector’) of the young person’s sexuality, while evoking the
figure of the non-familial adult as the ‘predator’, with the result of
dispossessing the young subject of desiring capacities. When they do appear,
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youthful desires are rendered irrelevant and perhaps dangerous to social
order.
The intervention of legal and criminal sanctions in the context of the
failure of normalizing restraint highlights the way securitization of
generational identities and hegemonic parent-child relations are undergoing
intensification and transformation. The ensuing shift in the familial economy
of relations between parents and children is constituted by the ramifying
effects related to discounting the needs, voices and agency of those aged 14-
and 15-years-old and now placed under constitutive ban: ‘We don’t take
consent into account anymore’.7 Practices and discourses that criminalize
specific relations between a youth and adult that exist outside the immediate
family circle disproportionately affects the lives of young females, queers and
racialized others as subjects whose choices are disproportionately scrutinized
as they fall outside of gender and sexuality norms.
B. Securitizing Hegemonic Childhood and Generational Identities through
Scientific Discourse
Under intensive consideration in the age of consent debates are the
dispositions, capacities and erotic activity of an age group bounded by just a
few years, being from 14 to 16 years of age. Our knowledge of this age group
with respect to their social and erotic life comes to us through increasingly
specific channels of professional and popular discourse that shape our
understanding of the conduct of life of subject populations. For example, the
committee considers an avalanche of statistical analyses that frame incidence
rates for sexual assault and victim ages, along with the ‘psy’ discourses
marking out the developmental stages whereby teens are deemed to reach an
‘age of reason’. These expert discourses govern discussions of youthful
sexualities as ‘factual’ accounts purporting real and material limits of
youthful agency.
Patterns of discourse that variously privilege biological science,
psychiatry, statistics, individual pathologies, and normalized family and
gendered relations converge in discussions of child sexual abuse. The
practical and symbolic field of age relations is colonized through a
configuration of the presumptively heterosexual adult responsibilized as
parent. These parental identities are configured as mature, competent, rational
thinkers and responsible caretakers of childhood, deputized within
normalized bounds of acceptable behaviour reproducing the normative
relations of authority between adults and youth. A certifiable adult/parent is
one in a hierarchical position of institutionalized authority with a youth; other
relations that may exist between adults and youth are deemed automatically
suspect. Discussions about the legal parameters of competent action, and the
domain of legal protection attendant on the young, mark out specific
available subject positions with respect to child, adult and parent identities
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and draws upon discourses that impute a form of ethical subjectivity to adult
actors produced as mature, responsible and presumptively heterosexual
parents.
Committee discussions reveal that representations of private child-
parent relations come to colonize public discussions reproducing normative
models of family life and youthful sexualities. Adult identities are reiterated
through these patterns of interactions that obtain between adults hegemonized
as parents and young people signified exclusively as ‘children’ through the
meanings assigned to the privileged private sphere of the family.
C. ‘To Catch a Predator’: Producing the Hegemonic Man-monster8
The social reproduction of the discourse of the ‘predator’ is a
governing principle and a powerful symbolic lever for the direction and shape
of social policies in an era of neo-liberal governmentality. The power of
criminal legal sanctions replace the ability for pedagogical relations where
the subtle art of discriminating relations are preempted and made a police
matter, where discretionary relations become colonized by criminal law. In
the arena of parenting, the tendency toward an increasing criminalization of
non-normative behaviour is evident. Whereas the ‘unusual friendships’9 and
non-normative practices that young people exhibit would, at one point be
considered merely socially unacceptable or perhaps inappropriate, now they
are deemed criminal. These kinds of distinctions between moral/ethical
norms and determinations of harm evince a curious ambiguity during the
committee proceedings. What with one breath is described as an abominable
practice of child abuse and predatory behaviour is, in another context,
narrated in as undesirable or merely unusual, a form of rebellious or
unseemly behaviour. Fourteen and 15-year-old youth are discussed as being
capable of entering into consensual relationships (albeit ones that parents
may vehemently abjure) and at other times young teens are cast as vulnerable
children who are victims of unscrupulous men. A sliding signifier of threat is
conjoined with an admitted discomfort with what is seen as ‘unusual
friendships’, the result of ‘poor choices’, and/or defiance to parental
authority. These images of a grudging recognition of agency in youth
compete with ones that locate youth as dupes, whose subjectivity is colonized
by the rapacious behaviour of a predator. Consequently, parents are never
depicted as subjects capable of abusing their power, or as capable of exerting
undue influence on the minds and bodies of their children.
Members of the committee and various witnesses invoke their own
positioning as a parent of a child in that age group as a way of securing a
speaking authority and personal urgency to the matter at hand. Their
imaginings of youthful sexualities, being wholly caught up in the parent-child
relation, excludes the possibility that intergenerational sexualities may
function as mutual and reciprocal relations.10 Their proximal relation as a
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parent to the adolescent age group is cited as an undisputable grounding for
moral/ethical claims to speak the truth of protection, thereby naturalizing the
threat that the older non-familial partner presumably represents. The
frequency with which this wide age gap is invoked belies a deep sense of
unease or dread that the predator and the parent may not be such mutually
exclusive figures after all, and also points to how ‘private’ parenting relations
radically attenuates the ability to imagine the social organization of childhood
and youth as public issues that relate to wider questions of citizenship and
democratic participation.
5. Concluding Thoughts
The formal public discussions that attend the age of consent
continue to reveal a deep unease with the idea of the expansion of autonomy
to young people. These discussions reveal a tightly weaved set of discourses
pertaining to the status of families and parental authority, gendered power,
the reach of the law, policing practices, medicine and the ‘psy’ discourses in
setting out conceptions of age relations and the social and legal status of
young people. These regimes of discourse function as disciplinary narratives
enforcing normative parameters on gendered age relations, sexuality and the
status of families, parenting and criminal law.
The shape of governmental relations in the arena of child protection
discussed here is constituted, in part, by moral disciplinary regimes
productive of the child in need of protection as an object of social and
scientific knowledge in service of national security. Ways of comprehending
youth sexualities are driven by a set of assumptions and value orientation that
come to constitute a certain measure of force, regulating the permissible, the
said and unsaid, and the untellable narratives of youthful sexualities in the
culture.
My investigation outlines the dissemination of sovereign and
normalizing power within a nexus of familial relations organizing relations
between young people and adults/parents. Relations of governmental power
advance along the fault line created by traditional lines of authority
maintained between parents and children. In an era of the contraction of
social services and child welfare programs this shift represents the
criminalization of social relations and the intensification of governmental
power within a greater sphere where relations of trust, pedagogical practices
and autonomous decision making by youth are deemed variously as
insufficient, risky or inadequate.
The intensification of governmental power into everyday social life
and sexual behaviour is marked by effects that harbour social and psychic
consequences for youth and the regulation of sexuality. It further distances
young people from a potential to develop and augment social and erotic
skills, intensifies gender, sexuality and age discrimination, and lends itself to
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a social and political agenda that legitimizes a radical disregard for questions
pertaining to children and youths’ democratic participation, sexual rights and
citizenship.
Notes
1 Bill C-22, An Act to amend the Criminal Code (age of protection) and to
make consequential changes to the Criminal Records Act, was introduced
into the House of Commons on June 22, 2006. It was referred to Justice
Committee on October 30, 2006 where hearings continued into March and
April 2007. Bill C-22 failed to pass before the end of the first session of the
39th Parliament in September 2007. It achieved three readings in the House of
Commons and was heading for a third and final reading in Senate before this
session of Parliament was prorogued. It along with five other separate pieces
of crime legislation was reintroduced on October 27, 2007 during the next
Parliamentary session as the omnibus Bill C-2, ‘Tackling Violent Crime.’
2 M Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, Sage,
London, 1999, p. 15.
3 It is interesting to note that the first person to suggest that the bill embody
this shift in terminology from ‘age of consent’ to ‘age of protection’ was
Detective Sergeant Paul Gillespie of the Toronto Police Force.
4 N Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p. 178.
5 On the intensification of power available to parents and the state under Bill
C-2, we find a curious parallel in a text on the ancien regime that Foucault
published with the French historian, Arlette Farge. In their work, Le
Désordre des familles: Lettres de cachet des Archives de la Bastille
(Gallimard, 1982) Foucault and Farge outline a practice where the absolute
monarchy in France had made power available to parents, referred to as the
letters de cachet, which consisted of an appeal to the Royal Court to lock up
family members who they considered to be leading a life of profligacy and
debauchery. See D Macey, Michel Foucault: Critical Lives, Reaktion Books,
London, 2004, pp. 136-7 and Macey, The Lives of Michel Foucault, Vintage,
New York, 1993, pp. 453-456.
6 Rose, Powers of Freedom, p. 180.
7 R Nicholson, Justice Committee Minutes, Bill C-22, March 21, 2007, p. 20.
8 My subtitle refers to the NBC Dateline ‘reality television’ show of the same
name, which popularizes the online vigilante group, Perverted Justice, who
seek to entrap men by posing as underage minors online into sexual contacts.
This show popularizes police entrapment techniques, valorizes vigilante
justice and names and shames those who are alleged to seek sexual liaisons
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with young people. See D McCollam, ‘The Shame Game’, Columbia
Journalism Review, 45(5), (January/February 2007), pp. 28-33.
9 I borrow this phrase from Cohen’s (1995) masterful biography of Charles
Dodgson, nineteenth century Oxford Mathematics Don, more popularly
known as Lewis Carroll the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland.
Cohen approaches the topic of Carroll’s ‘unusual friendships’ with children
judiciously, referring to his passionate attachment to young girls in the
context of the constraints and privileges of his class, which included his
expansive social contacts and friendships, his social activities, photography,
writing and his religious vocation and pedagogical practices.
10 There is a studied silence on qualitative studies on youthful sexuality and
intergenerational sex that does not simply start from the assumption that
cross-generational encounters are always and everywhere exploitative or
abusive. There is never the suggestion that the committee consider looking at
some of the social science research that considers intergenerational
relationships outside of the dominant child abuse model. For examples of this
research see: Sandfort, 1982, 1984; Leahy, 1992; Rind, Bausserman,
Tromovich, 1998.
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PART IV
Sex Law and Its Agencies
 
The Rights (Boxing) Ring: Australian Rape Trials
Jessica Kennedy and Patricia Easteal
Abstract
In this paper we use the metaphor of a boxing match to describe sexual
assault trials in Australia. In one corner - the accused’s right not to be tried
unfairly. There are many jurisdictions in which the right to a fair trial is
preserved, either through a Constitution or a statute of general application;
however, this is not the case in Australia. In the absence of any legislation
providing for the right to a fair trial in Australia, the courts have identified
some implied rights under the Constitution and developed common law
doctrines of due process. In the other corner - fairness of proceedings: the
victim/witness’s right not to be retraumatised by the criminal justice process.
Victims of sexual assault often feel scared, anxious, angry, shameful,
responsible and unconfident after the assault. The criminal justice process can
re-trigger these emotions and augment victim trauma. The relevant legislative
evidence and procedure provisions are thus the equivalent to boxing rules and
regulations, and the judge, the referee. These ‘rules’ have been altered in the
last three decades, with much law reform aimed at mitigating the trauma of
the trial for victims (but generating controversy from the accused’s rights
corner). This paper examines how many ‘referees’ have continued to interpret
the indeterminate provisions in ways that have restricted the impact and
effectiveness of these reforms. In this way, we describe how the notion of a
fair trial for the accused and the many myths about sexual assault and male
and female sexuality have consistently served to ‘knockout’ victim witnesses.
Another ‘round’ of reforms has recently (2009) taken place. These reforms
alter trial procedures to better protect victim witnesses’ rights to safety from
‘punches below the belt’. This paper speculates about the effect of these laws
on the rights of the victim in future ‘matches’.
Key Words: Sexual assault, rape, mythology, law reform, justice, fair trial,
victim trauma.
*****
1 . Introduction
In this paper we use the metaphor of a boxing match to describe
sexual assault trials in Australia (with a special focus upon the Australian
Capital Territory - the ACT).
In one corner - the accused’s right not to be tried unfairly. In the
other corner - fairness of proceedings: the victim/witness’s right not to be
retraumatised by the criminal justice process.
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The relevant legislative evidence and procedure provisions are the
equivalent to boxing rules and regulations, and the judge, the referee. These
‘rules’ have been altered in the last three decades in Australian jurisdictions,
with much law reform aimed at mitigating the trauma of the trial for victims
(but generating controversy from the accused ’s rights corner).
In rape and sexual assault cases in Australia, the victims are not a
party to the proceedings, but the primary witness to the crime. Cross-
examination of complainants in sexual assault trials often involves an arduous
test of their credibility. The Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) defines credibility as
including ‘the witness’s ability to observe or remember facts and events
about which the witness has given, is giving or is to give evidence.1 However,
it appears that these are not the only factors that are taken into consideration
when assessing a victim’s credibility. One Australian study found that
defence counsel were often permitted to ask questions during cross-
examination that attacked the credibility of the complainant and appeared
substantially irrelevant to the facts in issue at the trial.2
We describe here how many ‘referees’ have continued to interpret
the indeterminate provisions in ways that have restricted the impact and
effectiveness of these reforms.
2 . In One Corner: The Principle of a Fair Trial in Australia
There are many jurisdictions in the world in which the ‘right’ to a
fair trial is preserved, either through a Constitution or a statute of general
application,3, 4 however, this is not the case in Australia. In the absence of any
legislation providing for the right to a fair trial in Australia, the courts have
identified some implied rights under the Constitution and developed common
law doctrines of due process.5
The Australian Constitution does not provide any express fair trial
protections, except for a narrow guarantee of a jury trial under section 80.6
However, it is argued by many that Chapter III of the Australian Constitution
implies some form of protection of procedural rights.7 Recently there have
been many debates in the High Court as to whether or not this is the case, and
it seems quite likely that Chapter III does imply some protection to certain
aspects of the principle of a fair trial; however, there has been no clear
majority effect 8 decision to that.
Whether or not there is a constitutionally implied right to a fair trial,
the right of an accused to receive a fair trial according to law is a fundamental
element of our criminal justice system in Australia; however, the High Court
has made it clear that the fairness requirement must depend upon the facts of
the particular case.9
As the constitutional status of the right to a fair trial in Australia is
implicit at best, the right is instead based on the ‘inherent power of a court to
control its own processes and, particularly, on its power to prevent abuse of
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its processes.’10 As a result, the term ‘principle’ rather than right’ is often
used in Australia as this term recognises that the weight given to fair trial
considerations in our legal system may vary depending on the circumstances
of the case.11
Additionally, there are two international human rights treaties that
Australia has ratified, and which are often referred to in human rights
debates.12 Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights13 (ICCPR) and Article 6 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms14 (ECHR) outline
the principle of a fair trial for accused persons. However, Article 8 of the
ECHR also provides for a ‘right to respect for private and family life,’15
which, in sexual assault trials, may appear to conflict with parts of Article 6
and Article 14 of the ICCPR. As Australia has ratified these treaties,
Australian judges may look to them ‘as an aid to the explication and
development of the common law’16 however, without clear expression in
Australian legislation, these rights have no legal force.
Furthermore, two of Australia’s eight jurisdictions now have human
rights legislation, which codify to some extent the rights contained in these
treaties.17 For example, section 21 of the Human Rights Act 18 ACT(HRA)
provides for the right to a fair trial, and section 22 refers to other ‘rights in
criminal proceedings.’19 However, section 28 of the HRA states that ‘human
rights may be subject É to reasonable limits set by Territory laws that can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.’20
This means that the rights provided for by the HRA may be limited
or overridden by other legislation, provided that it is ‘reasonable’.21
However, the HRA does not confer legally enforceable rights on individuals
as such; rather, it requires the courts to interpret other ACT legislation in such
a way that is compatible with the HRA.22
The HRA is now the legal instrument to turn to in human rights
debates in the ACT, however, section 7 states that ‘this Act is not exhaustive
of the rights an individual may have under domestic or international law’:
other rights that are not contained within this statute may still be referred to.
This means that in regards to the principle of a fair trial in the ACT, the HRA
will apply, however, international and constitutionally implied rights such as
those discussed above may also still be referred to.
3. In the Other Corner: Fairness of Proceedings
We know that following a sexual assault, victims often feel scared,
anxious, sad, angry, shameful, responsible and unconfident, and may
experience Rape Trauma Syndrome (RTS)23 or Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD).24 Given their psychological fragility, there is an enormous
potential for re-traumatisation of sexual assault victims through their
involvement with the criminal justice system and its processes. Of particular
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concern is when victims testify and are cross-examined.
Studies outside of Australia have shown that, as a result of their
contact with the legal system, survivors felt bad about themselves (87%),
depressed (71%), violated (89%), distrustful of others (53%), and reluctant to
seek further help (80%).25 Another (Irish) study reported that 80% of victim
witnesses had negative feelings towards testifying, including feelings of
loneliness, humiliation and embarrassment, which increased their levels of
angst and trauma.26
Although legislation does not expressly provide for it, it has been
noted that the right of an accused to a fair trial must be balanced with the
needs of the interests of the other parties involved, including the interests of
the victim witness to not be exposed to such retrauma:
The trial judge is É obliged to have regard not only to the
need to ensure a fair trial for the defendant, but also to the
reasonable interests of É witnesses, particularly those who
are obliged to re-live by describing in the witness box an
ordeal to which they say they have been subject. It is the
clear duty of the trial judge to do everything he can,
consistently with giving the defendant a fair trial, to
minimise the trauma suffered by other participants.27
É it is not the position whereby fairness to the complainant
reduces fairness to the accused – both can sit comfortably
together.28
This means that the loss of an advantage normally held by the
accused will not necessarily result in an ‘unfair’ trial, if the interests of the
other parties involved are being considered.
4. The Boxing ‘Rules and Regulations’
There have been numerous legislative amendments in Australia,
which were intended to better protect victims of sexual assault from traumatic
cross-examination.
For instance, changes in consent laws more clearly defined what
consent is and every Australian jurisdiction ‘expanded and clarified
circumstances which vitiate consent through non-exhaustive lists of contexts
in which consent is not legally recognised.’29 Such provisions have the
potential to shift the focus of the trial and of cross-examination away from
the victim’s behaviour.
Another area of reform implemented has centred on the admission of
evidence of the victim’s sexual reputation and sexual history.30 However, the
laws in all States and territories actually provide ‘little guidance on
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distinguishing between ‘sexual reputation’ and ‘sexual experience/history’
(which is potentially admissible).’31 For example, in the ACT, evidence of the
sexual activities of the complainant is allowed if it is deemed to have
‘substantial relevance to the facts in issue’32 or ‘be a proper matter for cross-
examination about credit.’33
In addition, the other ‘corner’ of the ring weighs into the judge’s
decision-making about allowing such evidence if, according to the
legislation, the judge’s refusal would prejudice a fair trial.34
5. The ‘Referee’s’ Interpretation of the Rules
The ‘rules’ are being applied with a very broad and diverse
interpretation of the plethora of statutory ‘grey’ areas, including ‘substantial
relevance’ and ‘the right to a fair trial’.
Consequently, despite the change in consent laws, sexual assault
trials and cross-examinations of victim witnesses continue to focus on the 35
complainant ’s actions, rather than on that of the accused.
Furthermore, although the admission of such evidence is generally
impermissible, evidence of sexual reputation is still being admitted, often
without reference to the relevant legislation,36 and applications for its
admission are routinely approved.37
In many Australian jurisdictions, it appears that ‘the only
material question is whether the exclusion of sexual history
evidence would be unfair to the defendant’. Any relevance
to the complainant’s credibility, no matter how slight, may
be seen as requiring admission of the evidence to ensure a
fair trial.38
Sexual history evidence was admitted without the use of the legally-
mandated procedure in 38% of cases reviewed in Tasmania; and 35% of
cases reviewed in NSW.39 Some barristers have also managed to get sexual
history evidence admitted by arguing that the complainant’s evidence may be
unreliable because of prior sexual assaults. 40
This is facilitated by a lack of clarity in some of the laws about
‘whether evidence of non-consensual prior sexual activity falls within the
scope of sexual history provisions.’41
6 . Victim Knock Outs
Given the indeterminacy of the ‘rule book’ and the referees’ diverse
interpretations of the ‘rules’, it is not surprising that the Victorian Rape Law
Reform Evaluation Project found that ‘complainants frequently were
subjected to lengthy cross-examination about matters such as the clothing
they were wearing at the time of the alleged rape and the amount of alcohol
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they had consumed, in order to ... attempt to show that they are the kind of
person who was likely to agree to sexual penetration.’42
Further, a NSW research project, which looked at the effectiveness
of legislative provisions to protect the rights of these victims, found that
cross-examination of victim -witnesses was often extensive and distressing,
on average lasting more than twice as long as examination -in-chief.43
Victims were routinely implied to be liars, seeking compensation, or
vengeful, and were often described as the type of woman who could be
expected to consent to sexual advances, or as an inexperienced person who
consented and then later regretted her actions.44
The experiences that sexual assault victims have in the criminal
justice system can compound their trauma and victimisation, resulting in the
deterrence of victim s from reporting and/or continuing with their case.45
Accordingly, the 2007 ABS Victims Crime Survey indicates that only 25% of
sexual assault offences are reported to police46 and research suggests that
some women are so traumatised as a result of the preliminary hearing that
they are either unwilling or unable to follow through with the complaint.47
7 . The 2009 ‘Round’: More Changes to the Rule Book
As a result of the findings discussed above, there has been another
‘round’ of legislative reform. 48 The Sexual and Violent Offences Legislation
Amendment Act 2008 (ACT) took effect 1 June 2009. It amended the
Evidence (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act and the Magistrates Court Act,
providing modifications to the committal hearing process by allowing a
transcript of an audio or visual recording between police and a witness to be
admissible as evidence for all sexual assault victims.49 It also introduced the
concept of a ‘pre-trial hearing’ for non-disabled, adult victims of sexual
assault who are especially vulnerable,50 thereby proposing to reduce the
amount of cross-examination in these cases.51
The Evidence Amendment Act 2008 (Cth), which also aims to reduce
the trauma of a trial for victim witnesses, came into force on 1 January 2009.
This Act amended the Commonwealth Evidence Act, most importantly
section 41, which now states: ‘the court must disallow a question put to a
witness in cross-examination if the court is of the opinion that the question’ is
‘improper.’52 Section 41 also broadens the definition of improper questions,
and now includes questions that are ‘misleading or confusing É annoying,
harassing, intimidating, offensive, humiliating or repetitive É belittling,
insulting or otherwise inappropriate.’53
8. Punching above their Weight?
These new legislative provisions, like those that came before them,
are open to interpretation. For instance, the ACT amendments contain grey
areas which include deciding: the definition of a vulnerable witness; when the
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accused may be screened from the witness; when it is in the interests of
justice for the witness to give evidence in an open court; and, when the
witness be may be recalled to give further evidence.
Under s41 of the Evidence Act, unless the judge or prosecutor
perceives a question to be improper, it does not much matter if it is
discretionary or mandatory that they intervene. The definition of improper
questions is largely indeterminate, and the judge's interpretation of the
definition may differ greatly to the victim’s.
So, how will this current round of reform be applied? We are not
optimistic and empirically plan to document the application of the reforms.54
Research in NSW suggests that despite the same s41 change and added
judicial education, judges remain reluctant to intervene in the conduct of
cross-examination.55
The ACT amendments aim to ‘achieve the dual objectives of
treating complainants in sexual and violent offence proceedings and other
vulnerable witnesses with respect and dignity during the prosecution process,
and ensuring a fair trial for an accused.’56 Indeed, Lady Justice is depicted as
a scale with the rights of the accused to a fair trial balanced against the rights
of the victim. This ‘balancing approach is structurally skewed in favour of the
accused’:57 the victims’ corner could be conceived as a ‘lightweight’ battling
against the ‘heavyweight’ that is the rights of an accused to a fair trial. Judges
are forced to choose between conflicting moral imperatives within a legal
system that emphasizes the fair trial principle.
Judicial decisions are made within a context replete with
mythology.58 Assumptions of impartiality and so-called objective evidentiary
standards ignore the cultural backdrop that is not a blank slate. In fact, sexual
assault mythology is familiar to us all: women are ‘asking for it’ when they
wear skimpy clothing or dance provocatively; if a women has consented to
sex before, there is no reason to believe her if she says ‘no’; women who
‘tease’ men deserve to be raped; women make false accusations of rape to
cover up an infidelity or illegitimate pregnancy; a man can not control his
libido once a woman has ‘aroused’ him. Prevailing notions of sexuality and
sexual behaviour come from a stereotypical definition of ‘real’ or ‘legitimate’
rape and stereotypical constructions of the ‘good’ victim and ‘reasonable’
responses.59
Thus, the combination punch of the notion of a fair trial for the
accused and the many myths about sexual assault and male and female
sexuality have consistently served to ‘knockout’ victim witnesses.
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Alternatives to Prosecution: Restorative Possibilities for
Victims in Aotearoa/New Zealand
Elisabeth McDonald and Yvette Tinsley
Abstract
The authors have been funded by the New Zealand Law Foundation to
undertake comparative research examining overseas models of trial process
in sexual cases, with a view to recommending improvements to the criminal
justice system. Aspects of process from civil law jurisdictions has been of
interest to law and policy makers for some time, and has been brought to
recent public attention in the wake of several high profile historical cases
involving police officers. Early into the research, however, it became
apparent that reform of the criminal justice system would not of itself lessen
the incidence of sexual offending, nor victim/survivor satisfaction, without
examination of options for those who choose not to enter or participate in the
criminal justice process. As sexual offences remain one of the least reported
crimes, other ways of responding to those involved in the offending, whether
as victim, perpetrator or members of either person’s community or whanau,
must be considered and evaluated also. This paper provides an overview of
the current and proposed changes to the traditional aspects of sexual offences
trial process in New Zealand. Their proposals also draw on research
undertaken by the New Zealand Ministry of Women’s Affairs in 2009. The
paper also sets out their early thinking on alternatives to prosecution, some of
which are unique to post-colonial Aotearoa. Such alternatives include
restorative (or marae) justice and te ohhaakii a hine, as proposed by the
National Network Ending Sexual Violence Together (TOAH-NNEST),
which prioritises the role of whanau (family) and kaupapa Maori (Maori
values).
Key Words: Sexual offences, trial process, restorative justice, comparative
procedure, law reform.
*****
1. The Call for Change
In the Bay of Plenty in New Zealand in the mid-1980s a number of
young women claimed they were gang-raped by three police officers.
Although complaints were made at the time, no action was taken until a
journalist highlighted the issue in 2004. In March 2006, the three men were
acquitted of raping one of the women.1 Public concern about the case initially
centred on the fact that the jury was not told that two of the accused had been
convicted of raping another of the young women.
Alternatives to Prosecution
______________________________________________________________
146
As a result of this public disquiet, the Government responded in a
number of ways. Significantly, the Prime Minister stated: ‘[I]n my opinion,
no reasonable person would think that a troubled teenage girl engaging in
group sex with police officers in a regional town would believe that there
[was genuine] consent.’2 In July 2007, following a third trial in which the
police officers were acquitted, the Government set up a Taskforce for Action
on Sexual Violence ‘to lead and co-ordinate efforts to address sexual
violence and advise Government on future actions to prevent and respond to
this crime.’3 In the same month, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, in
partnership with the Ministry of Justice and the New Zealand Police,
commenced a two-year research project into sexual violence against adults.4
The Law Commission was asked by the Government to consider the
issue of the disclosure of an accused’s previous convictions at trial. In the
foreword to their 2008 report, the Commission concluded that ‘there could be
value in investigating whether the adversarial system should be modified or
replaced with some alternative model, either for sex offences or for some
wider class of offences.’5 The Government has now asked the Commission to
undertake this investigation and it is doing so in conjunction with the authors
and Professor Jeremy Finn from the University of Canterbury.6
This paper will discuss a number of recent and proposed law reform
initiatives in New Zealand, as well as some possibilities from other
jurisdictions. Such reforms operate, or will operate, within the current
adversarial process in New Zealand. However, it is apparent that reform of
the existing criminal justice system will not of itself affect the incidence of
sexual offending nor victim/survivor satisfaction without examination of
options for those who choose not to participate in the criminal justice
process. As sexual offences remain one of the least reported crimes, other
ways of responding to those involved in the offending, whether as victim,
perpetrator or members of either person’s community or whanau must be
considered and evaluated. The paper therefore concludes with an overview of
the New Zealand practices of restorative and marae justice, as well as te
ohaakii a hine, as proposed by the National Network Ending Sexual Violence
Together (TOAH-NNEST), which prioritises the role of whanau (family) and
kaupapa Maori (Maori values).
2. Recent Local Reform Initiatives
A. Rules of Evidence
Between the police officers’ trials and the Government response,
long-standing reform of the law of evidence was enacted. The Evidence Act
2006 contains some significant changes with regard to admissibility rules in
sexual cases. These include:7 a complete bar on offering evidence of a
complainant’s reputation in sexual matters (s 44) and on cross-examination in
person by the accused (s 95); provision of a support person (s 79); a
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presumption of non-disclosure of a complainant’s address and occupation (ss
87, 88); the ability for complainants to give evidence in alternative ways
(CCTV, behind a screen, video-link, pre-trial taped evidence) (s 103); and
that ‘good character’ evidence may be offered about the complainant (ss 37
and 40).
B. Police Questioning
The New Zealand Police have begun an ambitious cognitive
interview training programme,8 whereby officers will become accredited in
investigative interviewing and will receive ongoing workplace assessment
and training. Different levels of accreditation apply, and not all officers will
be accredited to interview witnesses in sexual cases. As the interviewing
framework develops, specialist interviewers should become more readily
available. A team at Police National Headquarters leads matters relating to
adult sexual assault and child abuse, and an Adult Sexual Assault
Investigation course is taken by around 40 officers each year.
It is hoped that the scheme of investigative interview training will
improve the experience of sexual offence complainants, and also elicit more
complete evidence. Secondary victimisation of complainants is a risk in all
investigations, and is heightened where the interviewer holds erroneous
beliefs about sexual violence (such as ‘rape myths’), or utilises inappropriate
interviewing techniques. It is likely that officers who attend sexual violence
victim interviewing courses commit fewer errors than those who do not,9
through greater awareness of appropriate techniques and education about the
varied ‘normal’ reactions of victims of sexual violence.10
C. Victim Support and Substantive Law Reform
In August 2008, the Ministry of Justice released a public discussion
document requesting public submissions on possible law changes aimed at
improving the criminal justice response to sexual violence.11 More recently,
the Government has focused on improving the situation for all victims of
crime.
In October 2009 eight initiatives to provide support for victims of
serious crime were announced (two of which specifically target victims of
sexual violence: a grant of up to $250 to cover some of the immediate one-
off costs faced as a result of offending (such as replacing clothing), and from
July 2010 specialised victims’ advisors will be available). In December 2009,
the Government released a public consultation document reviewing victims’
rights.12
3. Initiatives from Other Jurisdictions: Preliminary Thoughts
Even a cursory examination of the numerous approaches to trying
sexual offences reveals a number of promising options that may be adapted to
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suit the New Zealand context. For example, independent legal advice for
complainants, common in inquisitorial systems, does not form part of the
current New Zealand system. Inquisitorial jurisdictions have a number of
different formats for legal representation, such as the German procedure
where a victim can act as a ‘secondary prosecutor’ (nebenklager),13 joinder of
the victim as a civil party (partie civile) in France,14 or simply as of right as
in Austria.15 There are a number of arguments why independent legal
representation is considered inappropriate for adversarial systems, such as the
potential for conflict between the prosecutor and the victim’s lawyer and the
danger that the victim’s evidence might become ‘tainted’ from exposure to
other evidence,16 but a limited form of representation may be one solution.
This is the case in Ireland, where complainants are entitled to separate legal
representation for applications regarding the admission of sexual experience
evidence at trial.17
Another promising procedure is the ability for complainants to give
evidence pre-trial. The process in Austria allows vulnerable witnesses
(including victims of sexual assault) to be questioned pre-trial, with the
judge, prosecutor, defendant and defence counsel all present. The witness is
then excused from attending the trial.18 Besides the obvious benefit to the
complainant of only giving evidence once, pre-trial questioning is likely to
take place relatively closely in time to the offending, which may facilitate
more accurate memory recall.19 The closest equivalent in New Zealand is the
ability for complainants to give evidence in alternative ways, such as in a
video record made before the hearing.20 However, it is debatable whether this
section allows cross-examination to occur pre-trial,21 meaning a witness will
usually have to attend the actual trial as well.
It is not only features of inquisitorial systems that are a focus of this
comparative research. South Africa has a series of specialist sexual assault
courts that warrant investigation. While specialist courts may be able to
provide targeted facilities (such as CCTV facilitates and separate waiting
rooms for victims) and professionals who have received specialist training,
they are also likely to be resource intensive, and may be open to accusations
of impartiality or bias.22 New Zealand already has some experience with
specialist courts in the context of domestic violence, where family violence
courts have been in operation since 1992.23 A similar system, but focused on
sexual offending, is in place in Victoria, Australia where a sexual offences
list has been in operation since 2007.24
A. Specialist Prosecutors and Vertical Prosecution
To reduce secondary victimisation, some jurisdictions have
specialist sexual offence prosecutors.25 This specialisation can mean that
complainants are allowed more contact with prosecuting counsel than is the
norm, and prosecuting counsel take on a more active role in case building.
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Continuity of approach is furthered by continuity of counsel, whereby there is
beginning-to-end handling of a case by a single specialist lawyer with
expertise in sexual cases (sometimes termed ‘vertical prosecution’). Early
contact between counsel and victims can help to build rapport and trust;
vertical prosecution helps to maintain that trust.26
B. Independent Sexual Violence Advisors
ISVAs were introduced in a number of areas in the UK in 2006. Their
main roles are:27 advice and support; providing non-therapeutic support and
practical help to victims at the point of crisis and beyond; where required,
supporting victims through the criminal justice system and multi-agency
partnership working on behalf of the victim.
ISVAs therefore give practical support and information, liaise with
other agencies, and give the victim information about criminal justice
processes and any police investigation. They also provide continuity for
complainants throughout the process. Referring to the increase in uptake of
counselling, and lauding the role of ISVAs in reassurance and support of
complainants, the Stern Review recently noted that ‘as an example of a
reform to a system that is effective, cost-effective and affordable, the
establishment of ISVAs is hard to beat’.28
C. Sexual Assault Referral Centres
Referral centres bring together all legal and medical agencies and
departments in one place, and the UK Government hopes to have a SARC in
every police area by 2011. They offer medical care, psychological
counselling, legal advice and other support, all in one place from
professionally trained staff. Many centres are located in hospitals, as this
allows access to medical staff and equipment. The SARC is often the location
where police meet with the victim, and where forensic examinations are
carried out.29
These initiatives (as well as others, such as judge-alone trials) could
potentially be adapted for inclusion in New Zealand’s existing criminal
justice system. However, such reforms, even if successful in increasing
reporting and conviction rates, and improving the experience of
victim/survivors, will not assist those who seek redress or resolution outside
of the criminal justice system. This might be because they do not wish to go
through the stress of reporting to police and going to trial, because they do
not wish the offender to go to prison, because they are in an on-going
relationship with the offender, or because of privacy concerns.
Victims/survivors may prefer simply to have the chance to tell the offender
how the assault has affected them and to have an apology and undertaking
from the offender to seek help. For this reason, restorative and marae-based
justice have been available in limited situations in New Zealand.
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4. Alternatives to Prosecution
A. Marae-Based Justice
One model for whanau-centered restorative processes is followed by
the Mana Social Services Trust in Rotorua.30 Their work in the area of
domestic violence has been favourably reviewed,31 and it seems they are
willing to work with victims/survivors of sexual violence as well. As with
Project Restore NZ (discussed below), court-referred work is part of the pre-
sentencing process.
B. Project Restore NZ
Project Restore NZ was set up in 2005 and was inspired by Mary
Koss’s work with restorative justice in sexual assault cases (RESTORE
Arizona).32 Referrals may be court referred or from the community, with a
50/50 split to date.33
For court-referred processes, the timeframe involved can be
challenging. Courts may expect a resolution within 4-6 weeks so that
sentencing can take place. This does not always suit the victim; in fact, it can
undermine recovery. Restorative processes may take a long time (up to a
year or more). More reasonable timeframes may result if sentencing was
orientated more to treatment than punishment, offering a more natural fit
with restorative justice.
The model used differs from a typical restorative justice conference
as it involves more people and is more widely supported. But, as with
traditional restorative justice, the key is good facilitation and preparation of
both victim and offender to allow them to hear and be heard. The process
uses a community conferencing model, but is tri-faceted. Each case has a
community survivor specialist, a community offender specialist, and a
restorative justice facilitator. These parties each have different functions, but
operate together as a team.
The process is very flexible and is tailored to the individual
circumstances of each case. At each step there is an assessment about what is
required next, with the three experts working together to ensure that the
process is appropriate and targeted to the individuals involved. There is
recognition that the process is potentially harmful to participants (particularly
victims). As such, specialist survivor/offender input is seen as critical – there
is an ethical duty at each stage of the process to ensure safety and that the
process is appropriately paced.
C. Te Ohaakii a Hine
The Report of the Taskforce for Action on Sexual Violence34
incorporated the views of Te Ohaakii a Hine – National Network Ending
Sexual Violence Together (TOAH-NNEST), a group made up of community
workers and others who informed the work of the Taskforce. TOAH-NNEST
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is representative of both Maori and Tauiwi (non-Maori) and took care to
work in partnership, consistent with Treaty of Waitangi principles.35 As part
of this process, a commitment to Te Ohaakii a Hine was seen as important.
Below is an extract from the Report:
As a collective concept and one based in holistic ideas of
health, Te Ohaakii a Hine challenges individualistic
solutions... it involves facilitating whānau, hapū and iwi 
connectedness and healing…
A tangata whenua ‘ecological’ model involves
acknowledging that an individual is an active contributor to
an interdependent social structure, comprising of whānau, 
hapū and iwi. The model is helpful in understanding the 
extenuating issues associated with the development of
culturally appropriate prevention plans and strategies.
Each layer of the interdependent social structure
comprising whānau, hapū and iwi has a role and influences 
the experience of wellbeing as a whole. Imposing upon the
natural development of tangata whenua social structures are
imposed belief systems. These inadvertently influence the
quality of wellbeing that a whānau and their members may 
experience.
Expression of whānau ora is dependent on the capacity of 
whānau, hapū and iwi access to culturally appropriate 
knowledge. 36
Although this, in some way, refers to a state of being, it is also
viewed as a process by which mana can be restored to both victim and
offender.37 The way that this can happen, outside the coloniser’s criminal
justice system, is still evolving. The quote emphasises, however, the
importance for Maori to develop their own way to ensure re-alignment. The
authors are therefore working with members of TOAH-NNEST to ensure
that the local research is undertaken in a manner consistent with Treaty
principles, and that recommendations adequately reflect te ao Maori.
5. Conclusion
As is apparent from the variety of possible reforms and approaches
canvassed in this paper, the research being undertaken by the authors is
wide-ranging and the issues involved are multi-faceted. It is clear that there
will be no ‘quick fix’ to the problems facing New Zealand’s criminal justice
process with regard to the prosecution of (and other responses to) sexual
violence offences. The role of processes outside of the formal criminal
system is an area that also warrants further investigation. The research is
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ongoing, and as such, the authors are eager to share our initial thoughts, and
receive feedback and ideas drawn from the jurisdictions and experience of
readers.
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Primum non nocere (First do no Harm)
Katherine Brown
Abstract
There is a perception amongst clinical staff that the taking of forensic
photographs is harmful to the victim of an alleged sexual assault. This paper
will review current practice in Australia and explore the potential harms and
benefits that may arise, if both genital and non-genital photography for adult
victims of sexual assault are undertaken. In 2010 a small on-line survey was
conducted within the membership of the Forensic and Medical Sexual
Assault Clinicians Australia Inc. (FAMSACA). 34 clinicians responded.
Examiners were asked whether or not they took general and /or anogenital
forensic photographs and a range of questions regarding the benefits of and
barriers to doing so. It appears from the results of this survey that the reasons
for not taking photographs are more commonly related to lack of training,
insufficient health policy to provide direction and concerns about safe storage
of data rather than opposition from other staff and high levels of patient
anxiety. Perhaps it is time to re-evaluate the question of forensic photography
taken by health professionals?
Key Words: Clinical forensic photography.
*****
1. Introduction
Australia is a large continent with a small population. Formal
clinical training is required for medical subspecialties, however there were
few training programs in forensic medicine until recently so many sexual
assault examiners have little formal training and, in isolated rural areas,
limited opportunities for peer review.
Photographs provide a medium for peer review and quality
assurance. Appearing in court creates anxiety for medical practitioners. Well-
prepared health professionals deal with rigorous examination and cross
examination more easily, as they are more confident in explaining exactly
what their findings were, what the scientific interpretation of such findings
would be and the limits of uncertainty.
2. What is the Purpose of the Forensic Photograph?
The expression, ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’, shows that it
is often harder to accurately describe findings verbally and consistently, than
it is to present a photograph or an illustration. Forensic photographs become
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a record of findings at the time of the examination and can become an aide-
memoire in court, or for seeking second opinion and as a tool for teaching.
A photograph is similar to other evidence; to be supported by sworn
testimony regarding the time, location and photographer in order to
demonstrate that it provides a fair and accurate representation of the injury or
the anatomy. Good forensic photographs include an indication of the size of
the injury as well as formal identification of the victim. The forensic purpose
of photographs is to inform the court, not to unduly influence the outcome of
the trial.1
Digital photographs require additional storage safeguards as they are
easily altered. Like all photographs they require good light and adequate
training to obtain useful images. The original images for each case must be
stored in a separate file. Images can be presented as colour print or in a
digital format such as PowerPoint.2
3. What Evidence is There of the Benefit for Taking Forensic
Photographs?
Colposcopy: Video-colposcopy allows the victim to be
examined once and expert opinion provided on video
review rather than repeat examination. It allows the
experienced clinician to teach less experienced colleagues
without a large audience at the examination, avoiding re-
traumatising the victim. It assists health professionals to
recognise normal and abnormal findings and to describe
these more accurately if their photographs are submitted for
peer review. 3 4 5
Anoscopy: When an assault includes anal penetration
anoscopy can increase the likelihood of detecting
abnormalities such as erythema, abrasions, tears and
bruises in the anal region. Anoscopy is the insertion of a
small tubular device into the rectum, allowing visualisation
of the anal brim mucosa, with the colposcope to a depth of
9cm. Abnormalities can be photographed for peer review
and evidentiary purposes.6
Bite marks: Bite mark evidence has been used in court
since 1906. The bite mark will fade but photographic
evidence remains. This is especially useful when the victim
is fatally injured. The skilled forensic odontologist is able
to distinguish between the bite of an adult and a child and
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may match the size of the bite mark and any distinguishing
features of the teeth to an alleged offender.7
Bruises: Bruises occur as a result of blunt force trauma.
Patterns of bruising in children may not match the history
given by the caregiver. Some patterns, such as handprints,
fade quickly. Bruising after deep injuries may not appear
until 24 hours after the injury occurred. Photographs may
be taken on different days as the bruise changes colour or
shape. Photographs can indicate the distribution of bruising
as well as detail, for example revelation of an imprint
bruise, but aging is imprecise. 8 9
Abrasions, lacerations, incisions and stab wounds:
Abrasions are superficial whereas lacerations are deep
wounds, caused by blunt force. Incisions are linear wounds,
longer than they are deep, caused by a sharp object;
whereas stab wounds are deeper than they are long. An
examiner may be asked whether a particular type of
weapon could be the weapon used in the alleged assault.
Careful photography of the wound/s, including dimensions
of the wound/s, may allow the examiner to explain whether
or not this weapon could have been used to create that
wound. The photograph may provide a clear picture of
marks on the skin matching the weapon, for example the
serrations and dimensions of a knife or the pattern of the
abrasions caused by dragging a body across carpet or
gravel.10
Gunshots: Gunshot residue may be found on patients’
clothes or skin. Photographs taken prior to removal of
clothing allow the forensic team to see what the entry or
exit site looked like before treatment. If the patient has
blood or gunshot residue on their hands this can also be
photographed before the patient is washed. This avoids
delay for the patient while preserving the evidence.11
4. Obtaining Informed Consent for Forensic Photography
Informed consent involves provision of sufficient information
regarding the risk of a procedure, to a mentally competent individual, for that
individual to decide whether or not to undergo the procedure. Consent must
be voluntary, without undue pressure from anyone. The onus of disclosure is
on the health professional, whether or not the individual raises questions.
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The first issue is providing enough information for an assessment of
risk or benefit to be made. The second is gauging the level of understanding
of that information by the individual, which will vary depending on their
cognitive function, education, pre-existing mental health, age, use of alcohol
and/or other drugs and the level of distress experienced as a result of the
trauma that they experienced before, during and after the assault.
Written informed consent covering usage of photographs recognises
the patient’s individual right to respect and dignity, while providing the
health professional with an opportunity to seek peer review for quality
purposes and educating others about patterns of injury.12 If possible viewing
of genital photography should be limited to expert medical witnesses from
either side to protect the individual’s privacy. Photographs can be
supplemented by line drawings for the court.
In Australia the age for legal recognition as an adult is 18, however
the age of consent to medical treatment varies from state to state. The NSW
Minors (Properties and Contracts) Act 1970 permits a person aged 14, who is
deemed competent by the health professional, to provide consent to medical
treatment but where possible this occurs in consultation with a parent or
guardian.13
Treatment without consent may be necessary if the individual is
unconscious or otherwise incapable of giving consent however, except in
emergencies, it is preferable to obtain consent from a substitute such as a
non-offending spouse, close relative or legal guardian. The NSW
Guardianship Tribunal may provide the consent under the Guardianship Act
1987. A person under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol may need time to
sober up before they are capable of giving informed consent. Although
consent to examination may be given by someone other than the individual
being examined, consent to release of that material to the police remains the
prerogative of the individual unless the assault results in homicide.
5. Ethical Issues Associated with Clinical Forensic Photography
Autonomy: what is the patient’s approach to the problem?
Some argue that a patient cannot give informed consent
when they are acutely traumatised, due to factors relating to
competence when distressed and/or the influence of alcohol
or other drugs, however, if the process is divided into
consent to the taking of specimens and a separate consent
to the release of information the client has an opportunity at
a later date to decide not to release the forensic evidence
but the photographer does not have a chance later to take
photographs of the acute injury. 14
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Beneficence: what benefits can be obtained for the patient?
The benefits for the patient include a well-trained
workforce, an opportunity for peer review in a complex
clinical setting, photographic evidence of injury and the
ability to monitor healing of wounds.
Non-maleficence: what are the risks and how can they be
avoided? Risks include privacy, digital data protection,
coercion by clinicians, an increased level of embarrassment
during an already confronting process and poor quality
photographs. Risks can be reduced by appropriate health
policy, a Code of Conduct for forensic examiners and the
standardisation of education and training requirements for
examiners. The risks associated with not taking
photographs include loss of evidence for court and absence
of peer review. The evidentiary issue can be addressed to a
limited extent by the provision of detailed drawings but
peer review is less valuable in the absence of the exact
findings.15
Justice: how can the interests of different parties be
balanced? Justice encompasses fair and equitable treatment
of all parties. Is the provision of a photograph fair and
equitable from the point of view of the victim and the
suspect? That will depend on the injury, the quality of the
photograph, the data protection process, usefulness for peer
review and the opinion of the judge, who may have it
withdrawn from evidence to protect the suspect from
‘undue prejudice’ in the jury.
6. Use of Photography: Interpreting the Data
A questionnaire was provided to members of FAMSACA
electronically. Demographics were collected, but not used.
Examiners were asked whether their employer permitted forensic
photography. Two respondents stated that police took non-genital
photographs. Respondents who commented about anogenital photographs
expressed reluctance about taking photographs of adults. It was widely
accepted that, if photography was being undertaken, there should be specific
written consent for both adults and children.
 For more details on the data, please contact author.
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Client acceptability of non-genital photography was much higher
than acceptability of genital photography. Nevertheless, although clients find
genital photography less acceptable than non-genital photography, many
agree to have genital photography, as they perceive that the benefits of
photographic evidence of injuries outweigh any negative aspects.
Respondents reported that adults were more concerned than children about
genital photography.
Examiners were asked about factors inhibiting their use of
photography. Inexperience in taking clinical photographs was the most
significant factor. Other factors included appropriate use and storage, patient
anxiety, limited evidence base for the benefits of photography in adult sexual
assault, and not being part of the regular clinic routine.
Examiners were asked to describe the rationale for prohibition of
photography. These were the risk of photographs being viewed in an
inappropriate manner and causing embarrassment to the patient, the need for
appropriately trained staff and no specified reason. The reasons for other staff
objecting to photography included confidentiality of the pictorial record,
anxiety about the patient’s welfare and unspecified discomfort. One
respondent questioned the legitimacy of blocking forensic photography if it is
clinically relevant and the patient has given consent.
Examiners were asked to rate the importance of the factors
benefiting use of photography. 100% rated peer review as high or moderate
importance. 93% rated education and the value of the evidence in court as
high or moderate importance whereas client access had low importance for
more than 50%. The question of access has particular relevance to rural and
remote locations where the opportunity for peer review of complex cases may
reduce the problem of access as clients can be seen locally and their case
discussed with a more experienced colleague remotely. Four respondents
provided comments related to the usefulness of photographs for second
opinions, drafting the expert certificate and the importance of limiting
viewing to medical practitioners.
50% rated the importance of a second opinion, the availability of
peer review and the limitations placed on evidence when forensic
photography was not available as moderately important with more than 30%
rating them all as highly important. No respondent considered any item to be
of no importance at all, with peer review being the element with the highest
overall rating. Three respondents provided comments relating to the quality
of the photograph for evidence and peer review.
Peer review (8) had a high response linked with benefits to justice,
levels of experience and quality. Second opinion (6) correlated with
paediatrics, practitioner isolation, inexperience, sparing the patient multiple
examinations and accuracy of examination findings. Photographs
complemented diagrams and other documentation in court and provided
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education for lawyers (6). Quality of the expert evidence available to the
court was linked to peer review and second opinions. Respondents who
considered absence of photographs to be low risk considered that diagrams
could provide the evidence equally well (2), that quality could be a problem
(2) and that police photographers could provide the evidence (1).
Photographers were asked how often photographs were requested as
evidence. 50% of respondents had produced non-genital photographs of
adults in 10% of cases. 90% of examiners taking ano-genital photographs of
adults produced in court in 10% of cases. Similar percentages were reported
for photographs of children. Video evidence was never requested. Evidence
was requested as prints (13) or CDs (9).
Final comments focused on protecting client confidentiality,
obtaining good evidence of injury for peer review and the court and ensuring
that forensic photographers are adequately trained.
If ... the fear of reprisals from poorly consented photography
prevents clinicians from obtaining valuable clinical material, both the patient
and medicine are poorly served .16
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PART V
Regulating Desire
 
Selling Vulnerability: Commercial BDSM Sex and the
Power of Choice
Sharon Cowan
Abstract
This paper examines the interaction of the politics and regulation of selling
sex, with that of the sale of BDSM (bondage and discipline, sadism and
masochism). When women sell BDSM sex, complex questions of choice,
exploitation, vulnerability, power and agency are raised. Some of the policy
and legal debates about the regulation of sex work take place against the
backdrop of hetero-normative and gendered assumptions about power,
agency, and the subject position of the buyer and seller. Legal and social
questions about regulating commercial sex take on new and more complex
aspects when considered in the light of the sale of BDSM sex. Of course,
BDSM sex that amounts to actual bodily harm is unlawful in the UK, and
recent legislation in England and Wales has outlawed the possession of
extreme pornographic images. The Scottish parliament is currently debating
similar legislation. This includes images of some kinds of BDSM sex, on the
basis of the harm such images may cause to women participants, as well as
women more generally. Against the backdrop of these prohibitions, this paper
offers a feminist critical analysis of the sale of BDSM sex that ritualises and
eroticises vulnerability and unequal power relations.
Key Words: BDSM, prostitution, consent, queer, feminist, agency, choice.
*****
1. Introduction
This paper represents my, as yet still developing, thoughts on the
ways in which discourses around the regulation of SM, and the debates over
the regulation of prostitution come into conversation with each other. Clearly
consent has played a central role in both debates and is often used as a tool in
the armoury of those who oppose criminalisation of both forms of sexual
activity. In each area, SM and prostitution, consent has been posited as the
key concept that renders legitimate that what could be seen as exploitation of
the vulnerable and harm to dignity. The aim of this paper is to look at how
debates about the wrongs and harms of prostitution and SM develop when we
examine the selling of SM sex.
2. Prostitution and BDSM: Choice, Consent and Control
There is a long running and deeply riven debate in feminist
literature, familiar to many of us, over the regulation of prostitution. This is
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not to suggest that I think there is are two easily identifiably opposing views ;
Chancer exhorts us to eschew false and antagonistic dichotomies on issues of
pornography, prostitution and SM, such as sexual oppression versus sexual
repression.1 For this reason it is probably better to refer to a spectrum of
views despite the fact that those at either end of that spectrum would wildly
disagree. At one end of the spectrum, some feminists see prostitution as
representing the epitome of the patriarchal, heterosexist commodification of
women’s bodies. Catharine MacKinnonfor example, as well as many others,
has argued that under conditions of patriarchy, women’s consent is always
suspect.2 On the other hand, others would argue that those women who
choose to enter prostitution are rational agents who can often feel empowered
and liberated through selling sex. Between these polar extremes sit many
feminists who recognise, to varying degrees, that while individual women
can certainly token consent to sell sex, there are often more complex and
nuanced questions to be answered. For example, the exercise of agency, the
structural and material circumstances under which consent is given, the
question of what constitutes consent. The answer is clearly historically and
culturally contingent. As well as the actual range of options open to those
who make such choices. That is, there is a struggle between the need to allow
for agency as well as ensuring that wrongful and harmful behaviour is
appropriately regulated.
In England and Wales, while prostitution is not itself illegal,
soliciting, either by the buyer or the seller, is criminal, as are many other
activities associated with prostitution such as ‘brothel keeping’ and ‘living
off the earnings of a prostitute’. Contemporary debates and policy making in
the UK on prostitution, in Scotland, England and Wales, are to a large extent
dominated by the ‘women as victims’ anti-prostitution line, in the sense that
the focus is currently very much on trying to eradicate, punish via the
criminal law, the largely male heterosexual demand for commercial sex. The
government in Westminster are currently assessing the viability of the
Swedish model whereby men who purchase sex commit a criminal offence.
Recent criminal legislation in England and Wales criminalises a person who
has sex with someone coerced into prostitution3 regardless of whether the
accused person knew of this coercion. In 2005, in a discussion of 25 years of
political disagreement amongst feminists over what to do about SM, Ardill
and O’Sullivan presciently noted that what they call ‘revolutionary’ – i.e.
radical – feminists had been drawn into municipal politics and the Labour
party, and suggested that ‘It would be interesting to trace out the reception
their politics are getting in the Labour Party, and the influence they are
having.’4 In 2010 in UK politics, it seems as though these voices are
strikingly audible.
Where women sell SM sex, we might well think that even more
complex questions of choice, exploitation, vulnerability, power and agency
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are raised. To begin I should briefly clarify my terms. SM is shorthand for
sadomasochism – sometimes also referred to as BDSM (bondage/discipline,
dominance/submission, and sadism/masochism). I am consciously using both
terms together – where both sadism and masochism are present there is a
shared giving/receiving of pleasure that is not present where one party inflicts
violence on another purely for their own sadistic pleasure and without any
regard to the recipient’s will or desire. SM is more appropriately defined as
an erotic interest in the giving and receiving of painful physical or
psychological stimulation in a context of power and control. Sadism and
masochism have both been the subject of psychiatric categorisation and
appear in the APA’s Diagnostic Statistical Manual as psychiatric disorders,
though to be categorised as such they do have to cause the ‘sufferer’ some
distress. SM is currently more commonly understood as a minority sexual
practice. One that is often seen as extreme and in need of criminal regulation
and where, again, those who consent to participating in SM activities may be
seen as potentially vulnerable, open to corruption and coercion, and as Lord
Templeman in the infamous UK case R v Brown put it, whose consent may
be ‘dubious and worthless’.5
Just as they disagree about prostitution, feminists also have deeply
disagreed about SM. In the 1980s, the era of what some call the sex wars, as
a lesbian feminist you were, as Ardill and O’Sullivan have put it, either for
sexual liberation or for women’s liberation, the logical conclusion being that
you could not be in favour of both.6 The problem for lesbians who argued
against SM at this time was that SM was ‘irredeemably connected to
heterosexuality’.7 And heterosexuality was of course inextricably connected
to patriarchy, and, for some, facism.8
Though perhaps for different reasons, the courts in the UK have
agreed that SM should be regulated. With respect to the criminal regulation
of SM, in England and Wales, it was held under R v Brown that - established
exceptions aside, such as tattooing, sport, medical treatment and horseplay,
assaults amounting to less than actual bodily harm could be lawful if valid
consent was given, but that any injury amounting to or more serious than
actual bodily harm could not be justified by consent. 9 In Scotland, following
the rule that one cannot consent to an assault, the court decided in HMA v
McDonald,10 the only case in Scotland to raise the issue of SM acts, that the
accused could not plead a defence of consent to acts of extreme violence
which had ultimately ended in his wife’s death. 11 Not only is BDSM sex that
amounts to actual bodily harm unlawful in the UK, but recent legislation in
England and Wales, and law recently proposed in Scotland, has outlawed the
possession of extreme pornographic images. This includes images of some
kinds of BDSM sex, on the basis of the harm such images may cause to
women participants and women, in general. In paragraph 803 of the
explanatory notes to the Bill’s proposed section, which is now contained in
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the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, the government referred to
Brown as a case of ‘sexual torture’, and stated that the offence of possession
of extreme pornography set out in the Bill was in part justified by the
offences committed in Brown. In essence then, this paper examines the
interaction of the politics and regulation of selling sex, with that of BDSM.
3. Harm, Pain, Sex and Violence
Since prostitution based activities – soliciting, etc. are unlawful, and
SM is unlawful, it seems clear then that selling SM sex for money will attract
the attention of the criminal law. SMers and prostitutes are in some senses
‘sexual outlaws’. However, many would argue that the criminal law is not the
best tool to address the issues raised by prostitution. Indeed this is a debate
that has been running since the 1957 Wolfenden Report in the UK. Critics
have also argued that SM sex is not, unless it causes very serious harm, an
appropriate target of the criminal law, though even these folks disagree about
where this line of ‘serious harm’ ought to be drawn. Even if one agrees with
these, not uncontroversial, positions, might there be more reason to worry
about, and therefore use the criminal law to discourage, the selling of SM
sex? Does the combination of activities take two singular non-criminal
behaviours into the realm of compound harm?
With respect to SM, whether or not a practice harms or degrades and
humiliates the participants may well be thought to be a question of degree of
actual injury or harm inflicted. Though I think that someone like Sheila
Jeffreys’ rather expansive notion of harm would include even those who
visually represent such ‘violence’ as well as those who actually practice it.
However, according to a more postmodern feminist/queer perspective, the
question of criminalisation of harm is more likely to invoke questions about
of the kinds of sexual interactions that society values, raising the problem of
a circular justification of criminalisation – it is criminal because it is
humiliating because it is not the kind of sex we value. Similar circular
arguments are evident in the prostitution context – we do not allow people to
sell and buy sex because that undermines the value of sex, and the dignity of
the participants, usually that of the woman who sells sex in particular. In
other words, there are underlying and unstated historically, culturally and
temporally specific normative principles driving the differentiation of normal
i.e. permissible, dignity enhancing from abnormal i.e. impermissible,
degrading sexual behaviours. Some consensual encounters where activities
result in injury and in some cases even death are permissible and do not harm
dignity, others are not. 12 These normative principles play out differently in
feminist politics than in the criminal law, but they are present in both arenas.
Another question to consider here then is the distinction between sex
and violence. The courts in the UK and in other jurisdictions, for example in
the US, have taken the view that SM is violence, not sex. Lord Templeman, a
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member of the majority in Brown, accepted that both sex and violence were
present in the defendants’ acts but went on to treat the case as though it was
an example of pure violence – in other words, the violence occludes the sex.
A radical feminist position on this issue might well agree that both SM and
prostitution involve more violence than sex. However, while radical feminists
who are anti-SM often rely on a kind of false consciousness argument – that
those who practice SM may think they are expressing desire but are in fact
constrained by the internalised norms of heterosexism and patriarchy, a more
‘sex radical’ feminism would re-read SM as an opportunity for women to
step outside traditional gendered socio-sexual scripts of passivity and
victimhood, and away from subordination laden protectionism.13 And as
Wendy Brown has pointed out, some feminists themselves, in asking for state
redress against institutionalised male dominance, have here furthered the
reach of institutional power to definition of certain acts as violence – and I
would say the same is true for sex.14 In so doing, have sacrificed
emancipatory aims at the altar of (male) state regulation. The question is then
who gets to decide what counts as good sex or bad sex? The Supreme Court
of Canada in Butler ,the case that sets out the current rules in Canada on the
regulation of pornography, classifies pornography into 3 categories:
1. explicit sex with consensual ‘violence’;
2. explicit sex that is degrading/dehumanizing; and
3. explicit sex that is neither violent nor degrading. 15
The assumption is that the first two categories embody bad sex and
the third good sex.16 Presumably, sex that involves violence, and is sold, is
therefore doubly bad. As Carol Vance said in Pleasure and Danger all those
years ago: ‘It is all to easy to cast sexual experience as either wholly
pleasurable or dangerous; our culture encourages us to do so.’17
Thus, the policy, legal and theoretical debates about the regulation
of sex work have taken place against this backdrop of heteronormative and
gendered assumptions about power, agency, and the subject position of the
buyer and seller, giver and receiver. Legal and social questions about
regulating commercial sex take on new and more complex aspects when
considered in the light of the sale of BDSM sex.
4. The Pleasures and Dangers of Selling BDSM Sex
A more nuanced understanding of the desires, intentions, and
consents of those who participate in SM, as well as those who sell sex, and
the social structures within which they act, would challenge us to be more
precise about the basis for regulating the sale of SM sex. The questions here
then are: Is the selling of SM sex more or less harmful then selling non-SM
sex? This assumes of course that the two are entirely separable and distinct,
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that there is such a thing as ‘normal’ as opposed to abnormal sex, etc. As
Ardill and O’Sullivan say, ‘we are all on a continuum’.18 And, is the sale of
SM more or less harmful than the giving and receiving of SM sexual pleasure
in the context of a non-commercial exchange? In other words, are the reasons
that some worry about prostitution and SM exponentially increased by their
coming together, or would be want to rely on and extend any of the existing
arguments against criminalisation: agency, autonomy, privacy, freedom,
respect and desire. To allow for the public acknowledgement of and right to
public expression of sexual identity of those who sell and buy SM sex?
The Canadian Little Sisters case can be instructive here.19
Arguments were made by interveners in the Little Sisters case to the effect
that non-heterosexual porn was crucial to the political, and socio-sexual lives
and health of those historically oppressed on account of their sexuality. Could
a similar argument be made about SM prostitution? Legalising the sale of SM
sex not only ensures that both parties are consenting, but that making SM sex
available as something that one can buy benefits those whose sexual practices
have historically been criminalised, and demonised as cruel, abnormal and
dehumanising? In the Little Sisters example, however, Karaian argues that
the approach of the pro-queer interveners both valorised queer porn as being
better than heterosexual porn, but also left intact the notion that all
heterosexual pornography is monolithically problematic and oppressive. I am
not necessarily trying here to valorise the selling of SM sex. In arguing that
the provision of SM sexual services may allow for the expression of
marginalised sexual practices, I do not wish to merely reverse the
heteronormative hierarchy by juxtaposing queer as good or equal and SM
commercial sex with heterosexual vanilla as bad or unequal commercial sex.
As Karaian suggests, such reversal does nothing to challenge the constraints
of fixed binary gender identities, or the regulatory effects of law.20 The
broader aim is rather to take into account the contexts, histories and
implications of the practice of non-normative sexualities, including
sadomasochism, and the tools, conceptual and moral, used by law, such as
the public/private distinction, to regulate such practices.
5. Conclusion?
There is nothing inherent in gay/lesbian/queer SM that makes it
more necessarily progressive than heterosexual SM. I say this not because I
imagine that all SM regardless of the gender/sexuality of the participants is
oppressive and iterative of problematic gendered notions of active
masculinity versus passive femininity. However, nor is all SM inherently
emancipatory. Indeed, as Foucault intimated, perhaps nothing is bad, but
everything is dangerous, which is not the same as bad.21 Arguably then there
is no such thing as inherently bad sex or even good sex but all sex is
potentially, productively, dangerous?
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Taboo: Young Strippers and the Politics of
Intergenerational Desire
Maria-Belén Ordóñez
Abstract
Taboo is an extract from ethnographic research based in Montreal, Canada
where my research principally explored pleasure and citizenship as contested
terrains. Taboo, a once popular Montreal gay strip bar was where young men
stripped for primarily older gay men. This site serves as an example of felt
tensions and contradictions that exist between heteronormativity and pleasure
seeking bodies in Canadian contexts. Specifically, my ethnographic interest
in the Taboo stems from a police raid of the establishment in 2003 after it
was alleged that underage strippers were employed. In 2004, I spent some
time at a Montreal courthouse with the strippers as well as with a staff
member and customer. While the litigation around the Taboo is extensive,
my own interest deliberately departs from legal analysis. I track instead the
destabilization of everyday heteronormative contexts vis-à-vis the courts and
public life as well as the emergence of sexual citizenships and subjectivities
that challenge heteronormative desire. In this case, forces of pleasure and the
right to (sex) work, undermine the law. New forms of citizenship emerge
along with new methodologies for ethnographic engagement. Pleasure
seeking bodies push the limits of appropriate desire by negotiating what is
legally permissible while simultaneously fashioning public sex in terrains of
abject intergenerational desire. This police raid demonstrates not only an
aggressive response to what is otherwise ‘normal’ heterosexual activity (i.e.
women stripping for men of all ages), it also reflects a specific homophobic
response that is mainly tied to young sex workers catering to older gay men.
Targeting gay establishments is not particularly new in Canada, however, in
this case, it is an explicit panic around age differences that makes it a relevant
investigation into the limits of the law and the (re)fashioning of queer
pleasure and work.
Key Words: Taboo Strip Club, intergenerational desire, homophobia, bodies
without organs, heteronormativity, sex publics, sex work, pleasure.
*****
In the fall of 2004, 23 young male strippers from a recently raided
gay strip club in Montreal sat in a courtroom knowing that their case, like
most cases involving charges of ‘indecency’ in Canada, would crawl. The
police raid of the Taboo strip club on May 9, 2003 was exemplary of zealous
intergenerational homophobia. Of the 23 dancers, 15 pleaded guilty as a way
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to protect themselves and their work from a generally unsympathetic public.
Charges against seven found-ins were withdrawn in February 2006,
temporarily ending a legal saga. On the surface, this may be considered to be
a significant resolve rooted in necessary legal strategy. My ethnographic
inquiry was in the immediate sensory moments that could be tapped into.
Anxiety in the courtroom, for example, was articulated and sensed in both
English and French. I listened to bits and pieces, incoherently translating
official statements in my head while also attending to the descriptions of the
event as a collection of agreed upon injustices.
The story sounded familiar: 40 police officers raided the Taboo strip
club claiming that underage dancers were being employed and that ‘indecent’
acts were taking place in a back room. The charges were of being found in a
common bawdy house. Before meeting the strippers in the courtroom, I had
the opportunity to speak with a staff member, Nick Tremblay, who managed
the dance auditions and DJ’ed for the club. From the outset, I sensed the rage
and heard the resignation in Tremblay’s voice that no matter what the Taboo
club did to appease the police, to keep them happy and mostly to keep them
off their backs, it was of no consequence and certainly not advantageous for
normal business operations. Even after the Taboo was raided and legal
proceedings had begun, police officers snooped around outside the Taboo
and approached clients on their way into the club, interrogating them about
their activity, their employment and their marital status. This imposing
presence did not deter patrons from attending the Taboo, nor did it result in
shutting down the club during legal proceedings. Efforts to gather
information about Taboo clients meant that a machinery of truth telling and
confession would be processed through the prejudicial efficacy of police
officers. In the questioning of, or more precisely, harassing of Taboo patrons,
the police set up what they hoped would be an archive of perversion, where
sexual preference meets all other aspects of these men’s lives. Taboo patrons
and dancers on the other hand, continued to seek out their pleasures and their
right to work.
It is true, the men who strip at the Taboo are deliberately young
looking, and the majority of the clients are much older. In fact, a dancer’s
success rests in looking as young as possible (e.g. shaved bodies). In a
conversation with one of the strippers, I was told how this intergenerational
spectacle was fuel for the police. He had heard all kinds of homophobic slurs
during the raid, but what he seemed to remember the most was the aggressive
tone in which an officer had questioned a partially clothed group of strippers,
by yelling: ‘What’s wrong with you guys, stripping for old faggots!’. Of
course, the retelling of this memory speaks clearly and loudly to the fact that
there is nothing criminally wrong with ‘stripping for old faggots’.
The lobbying of child ‘protection’ advocates, (whose main impetus
perversely evades the sexual and physical abuse that is rampant in
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heteronormative families) directly endangers and infringes upon the rights
and freedoms of youths and adults. When Prime Minister Stephen Harper
asserted his plans for raising the age of consent (from 14 to 16), for the sake
of Canadian children, queer communities in particular began to envision a
bleak and unfavourable destiny motivated primarily by moral crusades. In the
case of the Taboo, the suggestion that underage stripping was occurring
effectively advanced the panic that comes with sex and gay youth.
The tedious process of proving innocence entails partaking in
discourses of assimilation as a way to prove sameness. Time and again,
‘success’ comes to those who assimilate into a heteronormative public and
the legal system is sure to facilitate this process (i.e. same-sex marriage).
Many citizens do not adhere to the limitations of the law and are not satisfied
with the privileges accorded to those that follow the rules of the apparently
normal. Radical changes on the ground, where democracy widens the net of
dissent through massive support for strip clubs like the Taboo, and at the
same time fearless and defiant support for the decriminalization of sex work,
will have to appeal to a sex public that does not necessarily fit into current
legal moulds. It may also mean a consistent questioning as to the kinds of
desires and pleasures that we choose to morally oppose through legal means.
What seems more promising is ‘the becoming-political of any reaching
toward, the becoming-political of sensation, as decision, as choice’1 It is a
lawless ethic motivated by a politics of difference and inspired by the
possibility that laws can be rewritten because pleasure-seeking bodies keep
moving.
With each new legal challenge around consensual sex, lines are
being drawn ‘to create a fissure between the inside and the outside, between
the known and the unknown, the self and the other’.2 EGALE Canada
(Equality for gays and lesbians everywhere), for example, while effective in
funding and educating around the legalization of same-sex marriage, was
slower to respond to less family oriented issues such as bathhouse raids.
When the age of consent was being debated in Canadian Parliament, many
gay men in Toronto came out and shared their early gay experiences with
older gay men at queer organized community venues. The back talk of
perverts could not be regulated, sanitized, or kept under wraps. Perversions
disperse.
Alternative responses take time to formulate and the risks in part
come with admitting to the limitations of organization itself. In Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s (2002) terms, it is not the organs but the
organisms, which are the enemies of desire and assemblages. Besides the
Body without Organs being an intensified circulation of something other than
organisms/organization, it is also the identification of blockages, specifically,
those that prevent new formations, connections, multitudes and coalitions of
diverse perversions. Categories of citizen subjects are not dependent on
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exclusive (pre-determined) characteristics such as sexual orientation,
ethnicity, age, class etc. Instead, the question lies in how the subject as an
open system might carry out the work of an uncooperative political actor in
an intensified, unorganized public sphere. The difficulty in pursuing such
connections is not only due to the way in which sensing bodies must confront
blunt applications of the Law, it is also in the moments when the body
refuses to reach out towards different bodies and to temporally alter a
familiar politics of desire.
In the case of the Taboo strip club, it is obvious that the sex work of
young looking gay men in the company of older men initiates a knee jerk
reaction. ‘What’s wrong with you guys stripping for old faggots?’ is not
merely a random observation uttered by an otherwise, decent police officer.
The fear of intergenerational sexual exchange within the confines of the
Taboo club accommodates a very limited perception of what
intergenerational desire looks like. The challenge is to threaten the enclosed
space of the Taboo by suggesting that the erotics and assemblage of this
exchange happens outside of the Taboo as well as outside of legal
preoccupations with what is allowable and ‘organised’.
Discussion as to why people trust the officious state sanctioned
violence by way of raids, is a discussion that can be refashioned if the
emphasis changes from proving ‘innocence’ to insisting instead on the value
of sexual difference, perversion, and labour rights for sex workers. The point
is not whether the Taboo is a legitimate business that operated as an ‘ill
refuted’ bawdy house (as if this should ever need defending) but that the
realm of public desire between consenting individuals does not need a
defence or a rationale of productivity. Affective consent is done without
discursive preambles or public debate; it is done in the sensory moment. In
this case, movements and observations of those who watch and participate
rely on sensory exchanges. Affectivity blurs any real lines between dominant
public spheres and private interaction. Regardless of this and perhaps
understandably, Nick Tremblay seemed to return to a discourse of innocence
that was consistently tied to the professional conduct of a business that
exceeded the expectations of the police.
Michael Warner argues that defiance of the ‘normal’, as opposed to
an ‘acceptance’ of the so called perverse, is necessary as a way to break
down entrenched bourgeois ideas around dignity and respectability.3
Resigning by assimilating into more acceptable sexual forms unfortunately
admits that there is an embedded truth/power to heteronormative sexual
shaming. His analysis of queer culture offers an important connection to
what is rarely theorized: abject occupation in public. Specifically, Warner
suggests that ‘straight’ culture could learn from queer conceptions of
sexuality, partly because (many) queer cultures recognize that the abject is
neither deplorable nor undesirable. In the sacred spaces of a heteronormative
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public, abject occupation interrogates ostensibly ‘normal’ sexual relations as
permanently defined. The tensions that are felt through abjection, redirect
the interests of a middle class majority who would like to keep difference out
while at the same time, perpetuate a discourse of a ‘common good’ that is by
definition always intrinsically taken for granted, universalized, and
characterized as inclusive. The making of sex publics that are discarded
therefore, emerge as ‘disarticulated remains’.4 Following Erin Manning’s
logic, these remains ‘contest the sovereignty of the nation state from within,
even when resistance is not enacted with this purpose in mind’.5 It is the
impossible intelligibility of abject bodies that continue to challenge the
imperative of the Law.
In legal proceedings, press conferences and the like, Taboo strippers
and management had little to say about being ‘queer’. Instead, they often
relied on gay identity markers and felt that the raid and increased police
surveillance was ultimately homophobic. So much was the essentialist claim
to being gay, that one of the defence attorneys representing the found-ins
suggested that homosexuals inherently have different ways of doing
striptease or, more generally perform eroticism differently. This difference,
he argued, is what is always already understood as indecent in Canada’s
Criminal Code.
Through official public channels of communication, the idea of
‘queer’ would most likely disintegrate as an alternative because it would not
submit to a discourse of shame. The discourse of identity difference on the
other hand, (being an essentialist gay subject with different desires) has a
certain ring to it, a viable discursive strategy that can be used to articulate the
perceived difficulty of being different. It is easier to argue for the stability of
identity as a legitimate political category that ultimately caters to the
national-politic, then it is to acknowledge the ‘mutations of a body-in-relation
that are not predetermined by a given ideal that seeks to organize and
categorize the realm of the biological possibilities of the body’.6 Potentiality
therefore, is in the existence of emerging differences in movement, in-
relation, and in dis-identification. Erotic exchange at the Taboo is not
indecent, yet the police insisted that their preoccupations were with the
possibility that there may be underage stripping (and sex) going on. What
surfaces are inevitable tensions of a tenuous public/private divide, whereby
most of the men pleaded guilty to charges of indecency in order to keep their
working lives private? While legal strategy forced a characterization of their
erotic display as being essentially tied to ‘gay identity’, defiance in the legal
terrain begins with the rejection of culpability and identity markers. Those
men who remain silent understand too well the relevance of their silence in
maintaining a normative public sphere and those legal strategies that insist on
essentialist claims of difference limit the body’s movement in-relation.
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What is also at stake is not necessarily the absolute denial of
prostitution but the question as to whether any bawdyhouse law should be
applied in any given situation. In other words, the rejection of charges is not
due to an incorrect application of bawdy house laws, but the very acceptance
that a guilty/not guilty plea should even exist when it comes to consensual
sex—paid or unpaid. Public sex and the attempts to regulate its various
manifestations must contend with the flows and breaks of public desire,
especially when it is opposed to the legitimacy and predictability of
heteronormative coupling. Here is where the pleasure seeking body must
assert a discourse outside of ‘equality’ and for those whose trade is sex must
insist on the legitimacy of sex as work.
In Lauren Berlant’s and Michael Warner’s terms, the making of ‘a
queer world’ has no correlation to ‘domestic space, to kinship, to the couple
form, to property, or to the nation’.7 Instead, the kinds of intimacy that they
describe, flourishes as a counter public: ‘an indefinitely accessible world
conscious of its subordinate relation’.8 The relative transgression that begins
to take shape is contingent upon refashioning the usual positionings of
obedient sexual citizens of the state. As for public sex, the push and pull back
into normative folds could not be exclusively described as a mode of
resistance nor is it viable to uphold the law as the medium for pushing the
bodies’ limits. Tension increases when the bodies’ insistence moves towards
something else, or something more. The disorder that accompanies these
movements has an impact that is shared and at the same time, can oscillate
between different sensory worlds. These worlds collide and are sustained as
pleasure-seekers find themselves at times without the words to describe an
agreed upon sex public. Beyond description, it is the sensory forces that keep
bodies moving and searching. For the young Taboo strippers and found-ins,
refusal to completely succumb to the law while being harassed provokes the
bodies’ potentiality in forging queer worlds.
Notes
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6 Ibid, p.105.
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Same-Gender Sex and the Common Good
Matthew Pierlott
Abstract
Aristotelian scholar and natural law theorist, Michael Pakaluk, has argued in
several places that specific ‘views’ can be understood as ‘common goods’
and promoted by the state. In particular, the views that both sexual activity
and marriage ought to be connected to procreation are such common goods
and this justifies both the promotion of sodomy laws and the resistance to
including sexual orientation in anti-discrimination laws and extending
marriage rights to same-gender couples. These three arenas for progress on
gay rights serve to undermine the proper view of sexuality, in his opinion. I
argue that Pakaluk may be right that the state has an interest in tying sex and
marriage to reproduction and family-raising, and that these views are indeed
common goods, but Pakaluk is wrong in what this entails. First, there are
other views that a society may hold that serve as common goods and that
require a balance to be struck. Further, the view that marriage requires a
moral commitment to the new members of one’s legally extended family
provides a value to marriage, even in the absence of offspring, that the state
should recognize. Second, Pakaluk incorrectly interprets such sexual activity
as representative of moral character. Such a misinterpretation casts extension
of marriage rights as endorsement of perversion. On the contrary, such an
extension can serve to strengthen both the view that sex is ideally connected
with reproduction and that marriage is ideally connected with raising a
family.
Key Words: Same-sex marriage, sodomy, natural law, Pakaluk, common
good, ethics.
*****
In a series of articles, the philosopher and respected Aristotelian
scholar Michael Pakaluk, a vocal and devout Catholic, defends a natural law
perspective and argues that the acceptance of homosexuality in law corrodes
the stability of society by undermining a natural common good. A full
appreciation of his view requires more time and space for explication than is
allotted to me here, so I will condense his view and focus on those aspects
most directly treating the relation between same-gender sex and the law,
specifically his use of the idea that certain ideas serve as common goods.
Before examining his claims, it is important to note the persuasive
strategy that Pakaluk has promoted with regard to gay rights,1 which we see
him apply in later arguments.2 If interpreted charitably, it highlights the
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points of fundamental disagreement with opponents that he has identified. If
interpreted uncharitably, it reads like a propagandist’s rhetoric manual.
Pakaluk offers the following strategy guide for how to argue against gay
rights: (1) argue that the gay rights proposal are ‘radical’ (e.g., they
undermine the family; they leads to polygamy; etc.); (2) argue that they limit
freedoms through coercive state action (e.g., they conflict with religious
freedom; set parental authority against public morality); (3) argue that the
proposals are expressions of a culture war, i.e., that there is a proper view of
marriage that serves as a common good and an opposing view of marriage
being promoted at the cost.
This third leg of the strategy, i.e., that gay rights recognition
undermines the common good of society, is where Pakaluk focuses his
contribution to a familiar line of rhetoric. To understand his contribution, we
must understand his concept of the common good. A common good is what
people attain through coordination that they could not attain individually, and
includes the instruments they use to attain it.3 Any association is formed to
achieve some common good, and forming political society itself instantiates a
basic human good. Pakaluk argues against Finnis on Aquinas’ position on
this point. Finnis argues that political society is merely instrumental to basic
intrinsic goods of the family; while Pakaluk views the coercive use of law to
stabilize families as necessary, i.e., that the law promotes and enforces a view
of the family.4 His examples of common goods include a system of reservoirs
and pipes to supply water to the town,5 and a militia formed by homesteaders
for the protection of farmland from invading marauders.6 The infrastructure,
its maintenance, the water itself, the structure of the militia and the virtues of
self-control and courage in the individual militiamen are all common goods.
Similarly, Pakaluk conceives of certain beliefs as common goods. If
a belief lies at the foundation of an association, then not only does each
member hold it, but each knows that all members hold that belief in common.
A good example of a belief representing the common good of an association
is the belief that family bonds are (or that marriage is)7 indissoluble. I cannot
achieve the good of a stable family on my own, and only can do so with the
coordinated aid of others provided we all agree that our bonds are
indissoluble. To the extent that my parents, siblings, spouse or children all
consider our relations to be temporary and contingent, I lack stability in my
family.
Society, too, has core beliefs that represent some common goods of
the political association. Typically, for society, this often is embodied in
some law, policy or regulated practice,8 which binds the view in the citizen’s
conscious.9 Laws imply a view of things, and this view reflects the interests
of the state itself: ‘Every action and every law…carries with it a view about
what sort of things are good and bad.’10 The state, according to Pakaluk, has
an interest in (among other things): (1) promoting family to raise citizenry;
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(2) protecting the rights of children to be raised in a family; and (3)
encouraging the mastery of sexual desires in citizens.11 In order to achieve
this, society has a privileged view of marriage, which is at odds with a more
contemporary deflated view. Marriage is for the founding of a family, not just
a long-term erotic friendship among private individuals.12 This belief is a
common good.
It is on the view that marriage and sex are for procreation and the
founding of a family that Pakaluk begins his attack of gay rights. He claims
there are basically three areas of concern in the U.S. gay rights movement,
each of which represents a more progressive stage of endorsement.13 First,
they seek the repeal of antisodomy laws, which removes censure or penalty
against them. Second, they seek antidiscrimination legislation and
enforcement in such things as housing and hiring practices, which enforces
equality and implies civic approval of their status. Finally, they seek to obtain
marriage rights, which, according to Pakaluk, assign privileges to them,
which, in effect, promotes homosexuality activity by rewarding couples
engaged in it. It is of interest that this framework presumes that recognition
of same-gender couples is not an enforcement of equality, but an
encouragement. Obviously, one might view the non-recognition of same-
gendered union and silence regarding discrimination as itself a censure or
penalty, but such a framing would not lend itself easily to accusations of
being ‘radical,’ ‘restrictive,’ ‘an agenda item in a culture war.’
Each of these areas of concern of gay rights activists must be
challenged. Regardless of their enforceability, anti-sodomy laws convey the
state’s interests in family promotion. Sodomy divorces sex from procreation,
undermining the natural understanding of family. Antidiscrimination laws
confuse discrimination on a feature unrelated to character with discriminating
on the basis of character:
The fact that someone engages in homosexual activity
typically tells us something about his character…he lacks
the virtue of self-control [if he knows it is wrong, or]…he
lacks practical insight…, because he mistakenly takes
something bad to be good.14
Such laws directly conflict with the free exercise of religion, outlawing
discriminatory actions individuals and institutions feel committed to on
account of their religious beliefs. Thus, the state would pit parents against
schools where non-discrimination would be enforced and encouraged, and it
would force property owners to permit activity on their property against their
moral conscience.
When it comes to the third area of concern, i.e., marriage, Pakaluk
directly trots out the familiar line of natural law theorists:
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It is the only friendship that can form between previously
unrelated persons, where the joint activity has a direct basis
in nature, since each spouse’s enjoyment of the body of the
other comes through the union or organs that are naturally
fitted for each other, and the procreation of children comes
as a natural result.15
Gay marriage advocates exploit the cultural division between a new view of
marriage as a long-term erotic friendship and an older traditional view of
marriage as an institution for the founding of a family. The state obviously
has interest in the latter as the privileged meaning; so all citizens find that
older view to be a common good. Objectively speaking, whether or not any
particular citizen is aware of her own interest, this view is itself a common
good, and it undermines everyone’s interests to reject it, including those of
gays and lesbians.
Adoption privileges for same-gender couples, often associated with
marriage rights, precisely because of the connection of marriage as founding
a family, should also be resisted. Children should be placed in the ideal
family where the ‘complementarity’ of male and female are represented.16
Naturally, under his view, we would prefer an adopting couple to an adopting
widow or widower. Gay couples in practice deny the importance of
complementarity, and recognizing their claim as legitimate in law is in effect
erasing the importance of marriage itself as a social institution.
Ultimately, Pakaluk is making an extended slippery slope argument.
He argues that the repeal of antisodomy laws makes the law blind to
homosexual activity, which provides legitimacy to the view that only some
religious sentiment underlies resistance to antidiscrimination, i.e., the law
does not recognize same-gender coupling as essentially antisocial, as it
should. He thinks traditional marriage is a naturally arising unique
friendship, albeit mediated through political institutions (again, political
institutions are only legitimate when the instantiate, protect and encourage
our natural associations). Marriage, supposedly, has an objective nature prior
to the state.17
Obviously, many of the presumptions of this Thomistic natural law
position are suspect. There is much anthropological evidence that marriage
and family forms are varied. For just one example, the Na of Yunnan
province has no marriage, and siblings raise the sisters’ children together.18
Much zoological evidence exists that sex can serve multiple functions among
the different species, the bonobo (pan paniscus) being one of the more
interesting examples.19 Furthermore, the presumptions about purposeful
design in our reproductive system is out of step with the non-teleological
explanations for natural biological facts so successfully supplied by standard
accounts of the theory of evolution. So, the natural law premises are already
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dubious presuppositions from a religious intellectual inheritance. To be fair,
Pakaluk has other reasons to defend these foundational claims that do not
appeal to religion.20
Rather than overturn the premises, I would like to accept them for
the sake of argument. Pakaluk is surely aware of these criticisms, and I have
found that critiquing the bases of an ideology is helpful only to those willing
to reform their view in the presence of good reasoning. Instead, I wish to ask
why there is a bias in the application of these ideas. If it is a natural common
good in a society to view marriage as an institution sanctioning procreative
sex within the framework of creating a family, and simultaneously
discouraging both non-procreative sex and extra-marital sex as expressions of
civil vice, then why shouldn’t the state require that straight couples seeking
marriage licenses provide positive results on fertility tests and offer binding
promises to the state to have children? Couples who marry with no intention
of having children are thwarting the state’s interests, and abusing the natural
function of sex. Couples with fertility issues should at least be obligated to
adopt if the wish to obtain marriage privileges, since there is no sense in
assigning these to the couple with the expectation that children will emerge in
their due course, as one might with a fertile couple. Again, if unenforceable
sodomy laws are important because they imply a ‘view about what sort of
things are good and bad,’ why shouldn’t there be anti-non-procreation laws
forbidding marital sex except around ovulation?
I suppose there are two ways to resist my suggestions. First, one
may propose that there are other common goods that are being undermined
by my proposals. For example, the privacy of individuals or the natural
liberty of individuals seems violated. But if one requires the law to be ‘blind’
to fertility with respect to marriage, why not require it to be ‘blind’ to the
possession of sexual organs? Are my sexual organs somehow less private
than their functionality? Again, if I allow liberty for married couples to
engage in non-procreative sex because it is somehow ‘natural’ and ‘right’ for
the state to allow this, why shouldn’t it allow other non-procreative acts in
order to preserve individual liberty, even if such acts do not further state
interests? Furthermore, once I open up the idea that there can be a conflict
among common goods, requiring the state to balance the promotion or
protection of these, one can argue that other common goods require
permission of same-gender marriage (e.g., equality before the law, or the
belief in the separation of church and state). Even if we grant that the
privileging of the heteronormative family is itself a common good, other state
interests may require that we allow ‘deficient’ forms of family to be
permitted or even encouraged for the sake of other common goods.
A second way to resist my suggestions might be to revert back to the
idea that we naturally desire the friendship of marriage, so the state only need
bear witness to that, and only need explicitly discourage the contradiction of
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it. The state does not need to ‘define’ marriage as between a man and woman,
explicitly excluding same-gender marriage. The proper response to same-
gender marriage proposals is ‘a kind of chuckle at the absurdity of it’ because
it is ‘impossible’ since marriage has a natural objective pre-political character
that essentially involves heterosexual union for procreation.21 The state
merely needs to witness the natural fact that it is the male-female coupling
that realizes a family. This position, however, conflates two issues: the
relation between marriage and family, and the relation between sex and
procreation.
Is marriage about founding a family? Very plausibly so, at least in
the broad contemporary American context. Yet, same-gender couples seem
capable of this. They may adopt, of course. But further, a spouse joins a
family through marriage and adds to his or her own, widening and
strengthening the family even in the absence of children. Such widening of
familial bonds creates solidarity within society and is especially in the
interest of the state. So, apart from the procreative act itself, marriage
strengthens family, and would justify the permission of infertile couples to
marry. On the other hand, the ‘moral’ rejection of gay and lesbian children
and siblings weakens familial bonds, as the civil rejection of equality
regarding orientation weakens political solidarity.22 Bear in mind that the
‘law of political society may…lose its force if it contravenes [the claims and
duties constitutive of the associations, like families, that compose it].’23
Pakaluk would reject that homosexuals are suitable to raise a family, but even
granting the deficient form of their family it is open to interpret their union as
serving the core view of proper marriage, rather than symbolically
undermining it.
Is sex meant merely for procreation? This is dubious, even though a
religiously enshrined idea. If sex can be understood as, among other things, a
natural expression of love, or even as a naturally desirable transaction for
mutual enjoyment, then the state should not interfere with or refuse to
recognize these natural expressions without good reason, whether they are
being expressed by a heterosexual married couple or not. Pakaluk tries to
provide a good reason, but fails.
In his identification of the gay-rights agenda, Pakaluk claims that
the important logical relations among their three areas of concern require
erasing the legal rejection of sodomy in order to legitimate the charge of
unjustified discrimination in order to extend unwarranted privileges to their
membership. Quite the contrary is the case; the important logical relations
among the three areas require the reverse. First, the naturally arising
desirability for an erotic loving relationship and for familial belonging
requires the state to bear witness to these without unwarranted exclusion.
Second, defending against exclusion requires the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws to express the view that the denial of these goods
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from individuals is unnatural, and this view serves as a common good. Third,
the lawful promotion of non-discrimination and punishment of discrimination
makes the legalization of a fundamentally discriminatory law incoherent and
illegitimate, and requires that religious sentiments promoting otherwise be
viewed as antithetical to the good of the state.
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Challenging the Order of Things: Un-Australian Families
and Reproducing Homosexuals
William Leonard
Abstract
In Anitgone’s Claim Judith Butler reads Sophocles’s text as exemplary of
the lengths to which the state will go to silence alternate structures of
kinship and desire. This paper uses (as it reworks) Butler’s notion of
‘incestuous desire’ to make sense of the hostility shown toward same-sex
marriage and families in the current Australian context. The paper argues
that a familial and reproductive homosexual desire challenges as it threatens
the complex articulation of sex, gender and sexuality on which traditional
western kinship structures depend. In Australia, federal legislative reforms
that (re)define marriage as the union of a man and woman and that seek to
restrict same-sex couples’ ability to form families are attempts to secure a
particular form of social contract and with it social privilege.
Key Words: Same-sex marriage, gay, lesbian, transgender, reproduction,
desire.
*****
1. Introduction
In 2004 the Australian Parliament amended the Marriage Act to
ensure that marriage in Australia remains an exclusively heterosexual
prerogative.1 The amendment was in response to the Ontario Court of
Appeals ruling that redefined marriage as the ‘voluntary union for life of two
persons to the exclusion of all others.’2 The ruling opened the way for same-
sex and other non-heteronormative couples who married in the Canadian
province to have their unions recognised in Australia.3
However, the Commonwealth’s speedy legislative intervention gave short
shrift to this obligation. As the then-Prime Minister, John Howard, argued,
the proposal would:
…insert a definition in the Marriage Act which gives
formal expression to what most people regard to be the
case and that is marriage as we understand it in Australia is
between a man and a woman. …This is not directed at gay
people. It’s just directed at reaffirming a bedrock
understanding of our society.4
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In 2008, the incoming labor Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, affirmed his
Government’s support of the amendments, cementing bipartisan opposition
in Australia to same-sex marriage.5
This paper argues that legislative amendments defining marriage as
a homosexual-free zone act in concert with other legal and social restrictions
to constitute reproduction and ‘family-making’ as exclusively heterosexual.
In Australia, opposition to same-sex marriage has become a rallying point for
resistance to reforms that challenge deeply held assumptions about the
definitive relationship between heterosexuality, reproduction and
reproductive desire, and the ontological primacy of the oppositely sexed and
gendered couple.6
2. A Hierarchy of Reproductive Formations
Successive Australian governments have been trenchant in their
support of what John Howard once called ‘the great Value of family life.’7
This support has rested on devaluing, and wherever possible excluding,
alternate family forms, represented and demonised most powerfully in the
figure of the homosexual family. As early as 1993, Jocelyn Newman, the
liberal party spokesperson on the family, claimed gay couples were not an
ideal family while single-parent families ‘were not ideal but better than
nothing.’8 In 1995 Tim Fischer, the then-leader of the National Party, accused
homosexuals of ‘conducting a campaign of stealth to create a ‘non-
reproductive’ society.’ 9 The coalition’s fierce, if not hysterical objections to
the legal recognition of same-sex couples were reminiscent of the British
Government’s now-infamous amendments ten years earlier to their Local
Government Act. In 1988 Thatcher’s government enacted amendment Section
28 banning local authorities from publishing material promoting
homosexuality as ‘a pretend family relationship.’10 In a single and
unequivocal Act, homosexual families gained legal recognition as nothing
more than an imitation or fake.
If Fischer failed to recognise the possibility of homosexual
reproductive desire, or if this failure was less one of recognition than an
attempt to secure reproduction and its desire as exclusively and definitively
heterosexual, Thatcher and company acknowledged but at the same time
dismissed such desires and family forms as illegitimate. Although not
identical in their rejection of homosexual families, this Transatlantic
Coalition provides a coarse typology of families and couples: a typology and
a moral universe, which has at its centre the reproductive, legally-sanctioned,
heterosexual couple. This is the gold-standard by which other reproductive
and romantic formations are judged, from defacto heterosexual couples, to
single parent units, and at the outer limits of this constellation, homosexual
families.
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3. Antigone’s Claim
In Antigone’s Claim Judith Butler offers a reading of Sophocles’
play that shows how incestuous desire unravels the relationship between state
and family on which depends the power and authority of Antigone’s maternal
uncle, Creon, King of Thebes.11 Antigone’s crime is to bury her brother
Polyneices, a burial Creon has explicitly forbidden. Polyneices raises an army
against his brother Eteocles, whom he believes has usurped his rightful place
as ruler. In the ensuing battle, both brothers are killed and Creon, declaring
Polyneices a traitor, denies him a proper funeral.12
Butler offers a compelling critique of Hegel’s and Lacan’s canonical
readings of the play. According to Butler, Hegel and Lacan reduce Antigone
to a figure of kinship that ‘conditions the possibility of politics without ever
entering into it.’13 For Hegel, Antigone represents a fading social order
bedded in relations of blood. Creon, by contrast, represents a new and
emerging world in which belonging is conferred not by the particularities of
kinship, but by the state as payment for individual loyalty to a set of abstract,
ethical principles. For Lacan, Antigone represents the symbolic order, a set of
hetero-gendered subject positions, based on a singular and universal kinship
structure.14 The symbolic order is the quasi-transcendental condition of
subjectivity and sociality and its very effectiveness depends on its
withdrawing or appearing absent from the particular social forms it enables.
According to Butler’s critique, both Hegel and Lacan associate
Antigone with a social order that must be replaced or its effectivity hidden if
all that Creon represents is to take its place. For both, Antigone appears only
to disappear, her death a sign of the necessary disjunction of kinship and the
social.
Butler, however, argues that in Antigone’s world, kinship and the
social, far from being disjunct, are mutually-constituting effects of a non-
event: the prohibition against incest. As Butler points out, there is something
strained and unfamiliar in Hegel and Lacan’s oppositional reading of
Antigone and Creon. One supporting kinship, the other the state, for
Antigone has ‘already departed from kinship, herself the daughter of an
incestuous bond.’15 Antigone is the child of Jocasta and Oedipus, her son, a
relationship that transgresses the incest taboo. Rather than supporting
kinship, Antigone’s presence, the simple fact of her being, throws those
relations into disarray. Butler argues that the taboo on incest has been
understood and theorised as the line that demarcates nature from culture.
According to Levi-Strauss, ‘The prohibition of incest…is the fundamental
step…in which the transition from nature to culture is accomplished.’16 By
linking the taboo on incest with the exchange of women, argues Butler, Levi-
Strauss confuses a particular set of sexed, gendered and sexualised
relations—a particular kinship structure—with what he understands to be a
universal natural law.17
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For Levis-Strauss, the prohibition against incest is always and
everywhere realised as the exogamous exchange of women among men. This
not only meets the biological need for genetic diversity, but also inaugurates
a symbolic network, which signifies, among other things, male power, female
subordination, group affiliation and the interdependence of clans and tribes.18
The exchange of women marks the moment where biology is transformed
into culture, the first and grounding symbolic system that sets human
subjectivity and sociality apart from the natural order.
In this reading a specific kinship arrangement, one in which men are
subjects and women objects of exchange, is both cause and effect of the
incest taboo. This particular arrangement is, for Levi-Strauss and Lacan, the
structure by which the incest taboo is realised and through which culture
unfolds from nature. According to Levi-Strauss and Lacan, subjectivity and
sociality are effects of this single cause. As Butler argues, this structuring of
kinship, far from being opposed to the social is integral to it, is carried within
the social as the condition of its own emergence. What follows from this is
that all social formations are indebted to this kinship structure, even as this
debt remains unacknowledged. Creon may well figure transformations within
the public sphere but for Levis-Strauss and Lacan, those transformations
nonetheless depend on, as they are an effect of, a singular kinship structure.
Although the public sphere may be subject to endless transformation, what
remains constant, unchanging over time, is hetero-patriarchal power and
privilege.
Antigone’s challenge, then, is not to pit kinship and family against
the state. Rather, as a daughter of incest, she questions the universality of the
incest taboo and its realisation in and through a singular, hetero-patriarchal
kinship arrangement. If in Creon’s world the incest taboo mandates a network
of clearly defined and unambiguous relationships—and with that a hierarchy
of singular and clearly demarcated sexed and gendered identities—incestuous
desire unravels as it multiplies those relationships and identities. Oedipus is
son and husband to Jocasta, father and brother to Antigone. Jocasta is mother
to her husband Oedipus and her granddaughter Antigone. Antigone is sister
and cousin to Etocles and Polyneices. On it goes.
At the same time, this multiplication of kinship relations and
identities destabilises sex and gender and the relationship between the two.
‘By the time the drama is done’, writes Butler, ‘[Antigone] has taken the
place of every man in her family.’19 Furthermore, it challenges the normative
and singular channelling of desire on which dominant kinship structures
depend. As many commentators have noted, Antigone’s at times operatic
declarations of loyalty to her dead brother border on the incestuous. ‘If my
husband had died’, Antigone laments,
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I could have another, and a child by another man…but with
my mother and father in Hades below, I could never have
another brother…. O my brother. And now he leads me
thus by the hands, without marriage, without bridal, having
no share in wedlock or in the rearing of children.20
Incestuous desire further complicates this scene, ‘brother’ referring at once to
Polyneices and Oedipus, both of whom have been denied a ritual burial.
Incestuous desire haunts as it questions the structuring of kinship on
which Creon’s power and authority rest. It is not that Antigone posits an
alternate world predicated on incestuous desire. ‘Antigone’ writes Butler, ‘is
caught in a web of relations that produce no coherent position within
kinship.’21 Rather, she brings into focus a set of relations at once multiple and
diffuse buried if not bedded within kinship, relations that hint at a world no
longer structured by the incest taboo. It is a world where kinship is no longer
governed by the law of the phallus and where power and privilege do not
automatically reside in hetero-patriarchs of one kind or another. Antigone
questions the inevitability of Creon’s world; suggesting that beyond the
limits of kinship, as Creon, Levi-Strauss and Lacan understand it, there are
other ways of being, loving and belonging.
4. The Order of Things
The threat that Antigone’s claim poses to Creon’s world-view is
analogous to the threat that the homosexual family poses to the authority of
Australia’s current coalition of hetero-patriarchs and their dependents. In a
recent interview, Tony Abbott, Federal leader of the Opposition, declared
that like ‘most people’ he ‘felt a bit threatened by homosexuality.’22 ‘[T]here
is no doubt’, he continued, ‘that [homosexuality] challenges…orthodox
notions of the order of things.’23
By claiming the right to form families, same-sex couples, like
Antigone, challenge the orthodoxy of the ruling hetero-patriarchs’ view of
the order of things.24 The reproducing homosexual, like incestuous desire,
threatens to reveal the contingency of contemporary arrangements,
debunking the myth that a singular, natural and universal structuring of
kinship is the origin and end of human subjectivity and sociality. It is not
surprising, therefore, that in Australia the figure of the reproductive
homosexual has become an over-determined site for a constellation of fears
and anxieties over medical and social technologies that challenge the sanctity
of the hetero-patriarchal family. In 2002 the Victorian Government, under
pressure to grant lesbian couples access to infertility treatment services,
referred the matter to the Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC).25 The
terms of reference were broadened to include consideration of: allowing
lesbian couples and single women access to assisted reproductive
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technologies (ART); legislation of altruistic and/or commercial surrogacy;
and extension of adoption rights to lesbian and gay-male couples.26
Many of the public submissions to the VLRC took the opportunity
to vilify same-sex couples and families, seeing them as emblematic of a
network of explosive social ills, which, like Armageddon, had the power to
tear society apart. According to Dempsey these social ills included: fatherless
families, headed by single women or lesbian couples, where children were
deprived of male leadership; same-sex couple families where children were at
increased risk of becoming sexually promiscuous if not homosexual; and
children born into a complex web of biological and social surrogate
relationships, depriving them of a stable and fixed sense of personal and
familial identity.27
The Government’s response was to grant lesbian couples and single
women access to ART.28 However, it refused to legalise surrogacy or grant
same-sex couples adoption rights. In likewise refusing to consider same-sex
marriage, and in restricting the opportunities for same-sex couples to form
families, the government reaffirmed Newman and Thatcher’s hierarchy of
reproductive formations. Again the married, reproductive heterosexual
couple is at the centre with the reproductive homosexual couple pushed to the
outermost limits of what constitutes or is recognised as family.
Similar fears and anxieties have been aired in several other national
jurisdictions. During public debate in Denmark in 1997, lesbian-couple
families were used by many MPs to represent the destructive potential of
what Lykke refers to as ‘assisted reproduction and repro-genetics’.29 In
France in 1998 debates over the proposal to institute civil unions as a
possible alternative to marriage for same-sex couples hit the wall ‘when
questions of reproduction and adoption surfaced.’30 Like the Victorian
Government, the French Government decided to deny adoptive rights to
openly lesbian and gay couples. In the commentary that accompanied the
ruling Sylviane Agacinski claimed that ‘it goes against the ‘symbolic order’
to let homosexual couples form families.’31 ‘It takes a certain ‘violence’’, she
wrote, ‘if one is homosexual, to want a child.’32 For Agacinski the
reproducing homosexual is a terrorist whose desire to parent is an act of
violence against ‘the order of things.’
Clearly, the reproducing homosexual is a threat to all those who
overinvest in the hetero-gendering of human association. It represents the
thin edge of a wedge of biological and social technologies that, like
incestuous desire, threaten to multiply kinship relations and identities. In the
process they undermine the myth of a singular and universal kinship structure
and its singular lines of authority and ownership. As Weston, Butler and
others have argued there are a multitude of family forms in which children
may have more than two adults who operate as parents: adoptive families;
fostering arrangements; parents divorced and remarried; same-sex couples
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with children from previous heterosexual relationships; and more. In these
arrangements family members are part of extended kinship networks that
already exceed those of the nuclear family.33
Medical technologies complicate these social technologies,
producing new and sometimes more intricate kinship arrangements. Recent
developments in gamete banking, for example, make it possible ‘for
transsexual people…to obtain children who are genetically their own.’34
Transsexual men may be offered storage of oocytes or ovarian tissues while
transsexual women may store spermatozoa before commencing hormone
therapy. The cross-hatching of the social and the biological renders visible
the workings of hetero-normativity on which the primacy of the nuclear
family depends. Like Anitgone’s question, the revelation that hetero-
normativity is more machine-like than natural, undermines any claim that it
reflects the necessary and universal order of things.
If the reproductive homosexual undermines the association between
(hetero)sex and reproduction, how much more explosive is the transsexual
family. Here the blending of the biological and the social cross and recross,
undoing if not crossing out any necessary connections between sex and
gender and gender and sexuality in family formation. A transsexual man who
donates his oocytes is at once the biological mother and donor father of his
children. The woman who carries that child is at once the gestation and
surrogate mother. And where in this nexus of reproductive desire does the
question of sexuality or sexual orientation lie? The relations that unfold from
this scene neither respect nor recognise the bigotries of hetero-normativity.
These reproductive desires cannot be named without doing more than a
‘certain ‘violence’’ to the existing reproductive order of things.
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What’s Wrong with Having Sex with Animals?
James A. Martell
Abstract
This chapter will first consider bestiality in the context of the right to sexual
privacy established by the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Lawrence v. Texas; second, consider a criteria that might be used to
determine whether an animal has granted its consent to engage in sexual
activity with a person; and third consider bestiality within the context of the
ethical theory of utilitarianism and Kant’s categorical imperative.
Key Words: Bestiality, sexual privacy, consent, utilitarianism, categorical
imperative.
*****
In the United States, bestiality is a crime in a majority of states. It
may be possible, however, to argue that state statutes prohibiting bestiality
are unconstitutional under the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Lawrence, the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional the Texas Statute that made ‘deviant sexual intercourse,
namely, anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man) a criminal act.’1
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, explained that the
penalties and purposes of the Texas law ‘have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.’2 Bestiality fits within
the category of ‘the most private human conduct’ in ‘the most private of
places.’
The Court specifically considered the balance between the right to
privacy and society’s ‘moral code,’ coming down firmly on the side of the
right to privacy:
The condemnation [of homosexual conduct] has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and
acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family.
For many persons these are not trivial concerns but
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
moral principles to which they aspire and which thus
determine the course of their lives. These considerations
do not answer the question before us however. The issue is
whether the majority may use the power of the state to
enforce these views on the whole society through operation
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of the criminal law. ‘Our obligation is to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.’ (Citation
omitted.)
. . . . [There is] an emerging awareness that liberty gives
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.3
Again, bestiality fits within the Court’s concept of liberty for adults
to decide how to ‘conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.’
Finally, the Court discussed at length the historical context within
which anti-sodomy laws had developed and found that: ‘The long standing
criminal prohibition of homosexual sodomy . . . is as consistent with a
general condemnation of non-procreative sex as it is with an established
tradition of prosecuting acts because of their homosexual character.’4 The
same might be said for bestiality: The prohibition of bestiality arose out of a
general condemnation of all non-procreative sex.
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence was
followed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2008). In Reliable
Consultants, the Court held unconstitutional the Texas statute that prohibited
the selling, giving, lending, distributing or advertising for any device
‘designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human
genital organs.’5 The Court in Reliable Consultants interpreted the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lawrence as recognizing a substantive constitutional right
‘to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the most private human
contact [sic], sexual behavior.’’6 In a footnote, the Reliable Consultants court
noted that it was following ‘the precise instructions from Lawrence ... that the
statute violates the right to sexual privacy.’7 If there is a substantive
constitutional right to ‘sexual privacy’ and if the state does not have the right
to legislate morality, then there does not seem to be a basis for arguing that
bestiality can be prohibited.
One problem, however, with Lawrence and Reliable Consultants, is
that both decisions refer to sexual conduct in the privacy of the home. In her
recently published book From Disgust to Humanity, Sexual Orientation and
Constitutional Law, Martha Nussbaum argues for an extension of the
Lawrence court’s decision to intimate sexual conduct that occurs in private
settings outside the home.8 Nussbaum bases her argument on two legal
distinctions:
A distinction between conduct that is self-regarding,
affecting the interests and rights of consenting parties only,
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and conduct that is . . . other regarding, affecting the
interests of people who do not consent.
[and]
A distinction between conduct that is secluded from
nonconsenting parties and conduct that is not secluded, but
impinges on the interests of nonconsenting parties (the
former is ‘private’ and the latter ‘public.’)9
Applying the two distinctions, Nussbaum argues that Lawrence
should be construed to protect ‘consensual secluded adult conduct.’10 In
determining what is ‘secluded’ Nussbaum argues that: ‘The test is whether
there is ‘substantial risk’ that the conduct will be observed by a casual
passerby.’11 Applying Nussbaum’s test to bestiality (which Nussbaum would
not do)12 one can argue that sexual activity with an animal should not be
prohibited so long as there is not a substantial risk that the conduct will be
observed by a casual passerby who may be offended. Thus, sex with animals
in a private barn, in an isolated pasture not visible from any roads, or in the
woods away from footpaths should arguably be legally permissible.
Even if bestiality is legal, a common argument is that bestiality is
nonetheless wrong because animals cannot consent, or at least do not have
the language skills necessary to verbally express their consent. But in sexual
activity involving two persons we often rely on non-verbal consent. An
animal might give the same type of consent that a person would give by
continuing to participate in the sexual activity or allowing the sexual activity
to continue. Many of us have experienced the male dog ‘humping’ our leg.
The dog would appear to be requesting sexual stimulation and would
probably permit more direct manual stimulation of his genitalia by the
person.
Nussbaum argues that the animal must be able to consent ‘in a way
that is relevant to the best legal notions of consent in sexual assault doctrine.’
But under the modern law of sexual assault, verbal consent or nonconsent
and physical resistance or nonresistance are no longer relevant. A sexual
assault occurs when ‘the actor causes submission of the victim by means of
sufficient consequence reasonably calculated to cause submission against the
victim’s will.’13 It is the actor’s conduct that determines whether a sexual
assault has occurred. ‘The prohibited conduct by its very nature negates the
existence of the victim’s consent.’14
Some have asserted that a lack of resistance cannot be taken as
consent because animals may be unable to resist the person’s advances as a
result of their docile nature.15 Beetz points out, however, that ‘many
zoophiles do not regard nonresistance as sufficient evidence for consent.
Instead, they also place great importance on positive reactions from the
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animal, such as approaching the person, cuddling, rubbing against the person,
not trying to move away, and displaying sexual excitement.’16
We perform hundreds of acts on animals without their consent on
the farm and in the laboratory. Some of those activities may have sexual
characteristics such as the collection of semen, pregnancy testing, artificial
insemination, and castration and may very well be far less beneficial and
much more uncomfortable to the animal than sexual activity and yet no
objection is made on the grounds that the animal is unable to consent to such
actions.
It might be argued that consent can never be voluntarily given by an
animal because the animal cannot be fully informed as to the nature and
extent of the sexual activity before giving such consent;17 but the same is true
of sexual activity between two persons. We do not generally give an
elaborate explanation of our desired sexual activity and obtain specific verbal
consent to the proposed sexual activity before proceeding.
Finally, it might be argued that if a child cannot consent to sexual
activity with an adult, then an animal cannot consent to sexual activity with a
person. Our criminal code seems to presume a child cannot give consent to
sexual activity. However, a more careful examination leads to the conclusion
that the issue is not consent but power. Colorado, for example, defines sexual
assault on a child to mean any sexual contact between two persons if the
victim is less than 15 years of age and the actor is at least four years older
than the victim.18 The four year age differential is an essential element of the
offense.19 A 14 year old is presumed unable to consent to sexual activity with
an 18 year old. However, there is no prohibition on sexual activity between a
13 year old and a 16 year old, or any other combination, so long as there is
not a four year age differential. Thus, it would seem we believe a child of any
age can consent to sexual activity so long as the other person involved is not
in a more powerful position as a result of a significant difference in age. If we
apply the same power analysis to bestiality, we cannot simply presume all
animals are unable to given consent. For example, the power differential
between a male human being and a female chicken is significant enough for
us to presume the chicken cannot give consent to sexual activity; but, the
power differential between a full grown male horse and a man or women
would seem to be tipped in favor of the horse.
If bestiality is legal and if we can presume the animal consents
under the foregoing analysis, we still need to consider whether bestiality is
ethically acceptable. An argument supporting bestiality can be made based on
a utilitarian ethical theory. For the classic utilitarian, the morally correct
action would be the action that, on balance, increases pleasure and minimizes
pain.20 As Bernard Rollin points out: ‘Researchers have shown dramatically
that love and affection can make a major difference to the physical health of
experimental animals.’21 If we assume an animal has sexual needs and desires
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and that the inability to satisfy those needs and desires will result in
frustration while satisfaction will result in pleasure, and if we assume that the
animal has exhibited its desire for sexual pleasure, in the case of a male dog,
by rubbing its genitals against a person’s leg, for example, then under a
utilitarian ethical theory, it would be wrong for us to refuse to maximize the
animal’s pleasure.
It may be more difficult to argue that bestiality is morally acceptable
under a Kantian ethical theory. Kant’s categorical imperative is: Always treat
others as ends in themselves and never solely as means. Rollin persuasively
argues that there is no morally relevant difference between persons and
animals22 and extends Kant’s categorical imperative to animals:
. . . [I]f we wish to use Kantian terminology, we must say
that any living thing with interests is an end in itself,
worthy of moral consideration merely in virtue of its being
alive. That, in turn, means that even if we use another
living creature as a means, it must never be merely as a
means, but we should always keep in mind a respect for its
end, that is, its life, and the interests and needs associated
with that life which matter to it...23
Bestiality would serve to fulfill the animal’s desire for sexual
pleasure and, thus, would further the animal’s ‘interests and needs.’24
Kant’s categorical imperative as applied to bestiality makes a strong
argument against sexual activity between persons and animals that is
intended only to provide sexual pleasure for the person because in such case
the animal is being used solely to satisfy the sexual needs of the person.
Similarly, sexual activity that is intended only to provide sexual pleasure for
the animal, allowing the dog to ‘hump’ my leg for example, would violate
Kant’s categorical imperative because I would be allowing myself to be used
solely to satisfy the sexual needs of the animal. But if the sexual activity
between the person and the animal produces sexual pleasure for both, it
would not seem to violate Kant’s categorical imperative because neither
would using the other ‘solely’ as a means of obtaining sexual pleasure.
So, if: (i) the animal does not suffer any harm, injury, pain, fear, or
distress; (ii) the animal demonstrates consent by affirmative, positive actions,
‘such as approaching the person, cuddling, rubbing against the person, not
trying to move away, and displaying sexual excitement’;25 and (iii) both the
person and the animal experience sexual pleasure; what’s wrong with having
sex with animals?
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PART VI
What is Good Sex, What is Bad Sex
 
Rape: Unlawful but not Unhealthy?
A Philosophical Analysis
Stephanie Koziej
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to understand and critique the absence of rape in the
DSM-IV-TR by examining the distinction between sexual paraphilias (as
defined by the DSM) and sexual crimes. The incongruity of these two
categories is usually explained by the use of different criteria in the
respective definitions of pathological sexual behavior and unlawful sexual
behavior. Nevertheless, an important feature of the legalistic paradigm, the
absence of consent of the other, has been equally integrated in the diagnostic
criteria of five out of the eight paraphilias in the DSM. However, the absence
of consent is neither is sufficient, nor a necessary condition, in diagnosing a
sexual dysfunction. To substantiate this conclusion, another feature must be
incorporated: an aberrant sexual desire, differing from the ‘normal’ desire in
committing coitus with a mature individual. Therefore, it would follow that a
rapist is not diagnosed as suffering from a paraphilia, if this second feature
were missing, unlike child molesters and sexual sadists. To explain the
phenomenon of not incorporating rape in the DSM, this paper will
hypothesize that the teleological paradigm, which emphasizes the natural
function of the sexual desire as procreation, still implicitly incorporated as a
criterion for mental disorder. Consequently, though a rapist’s acts are very
similar to the acts of a frotteurist, the rape will not be diagnosed as a
symptom of mental sexual dysfunction, simply because the latter involves
coitus. We’ll claim that, even though coitus lost its authority in DSM-IV-TR
as a negative standard, it kept its influence as a positive standard and hence
DSM-IV-TR applies a double standard for what is considered non-
pathological in the realm of sexuality.
Key Words: Rape, DSM-IV-TR, DSM-V, paraphilia, consent, paraphilia
coercive disorder, coitus, distress.
*****
1. Presentation of the Problem
Our Western legal system defines rape as illegal because the
necessary precondition, mutual consent to the sexual deed, is missing.1 In this
our laws follow public opinion, which reacts to stories on rape with horror
and disgust and which considers them immoral and wrong. Hence it is
surprising to discover that the American Psychiatric Associations DSM-IV-
TR, which reserves an exclusive category for sexual disorders, does not
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include rape in this classification.2 We can therefore conclude that while rape
is considered immoral and illegal, it is not seen as a sign of mental
disturbance.
However, let us compare several Paraphilias that are listed in the
DSM-IV-TR with rape. If an individual touches the genitals of a non-
consenting other and/or rubs his own genitals against a non-consenting other,
according to the DSM, this person can be diagnosed with Frotteurism. If an
individual exposes his genitals to an unsuspecting stranger, he is diagnosed
with Exhibitionism; and if he observes an unsuspecting person who is naked,
he is diagnosed with Voyeurism. However, if an individual should touch the
genitals of a non-consenting other, observe this subject’s naked body, rub his
own genitals against or expose them to this subject, and then subsequently
copulate with this subject, then this behavior does no longer meet any of the
diagnostic criteria for a sexual disorder.
Intuitively some will feel that something isn't right here. In this
paper I would like to argue that this intuition is grounded in an inconsistency
in the reasoning that the DSM applies to distinguish healthy from
pathological sexual behavior. Let us consider some examples from the
criminological practise that will illustrate that this suspicion is also shared by
others.
The claim that rapists are criminals without any mental illness has to
be nuanced, since a number of mental disorders are eligible to their behavior,
for example Impulse Control Disorder (ICD) or Antisocial Personality
Disorder (APD). 3However, the claim remains that rapist behavior is not a
paraphilia, a sexual disorder, which is surprising since here is a behavior that
apparently belongs to the dimension of sexuality but that gets no place in the
category the DSM especially created for the sexual realm. The claim that
rapists never get diagnosed with a paraphilia has to be nuanced too. The
criminal practice shows that creative solutions have been found to include
rapists among the Paraphiliac. It has become a common practice among some
examiners to apply the diagnosis Paraphilia NOS, sometimes this diagnosis
gets further specified as Paraphilia NOS–non-consent other times as
Paraphilia NOS–biastophilia.4 5 6 But, citing Marshall:
This solution is definitely not satisfactory as the DSM
offers no criteria under Paraphilia NOS for diagnosing
rapists, and it was likely not the intention of the DSM
authors to have rape included in this catchall category.7
This frequent practice renders a direct evidence of the need for a distinct
category for rape in the DSM.
Some rapists may receive a diagnosis of Sexual Sadism, but
empirical studies have shown that this diagnosis won't hold for all rapists. 8
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The term ‘rapist’ names a very heterogeneous group and only a small
percentage of these offenders find particular sexual satisfaction in the
humiliation and suffering of their victim. Hence a distinction has been made
between sadistic and non-sadistic rapists.
Until now I have shown firstly that we can intuitively feel that there
is something wrong with excluding rape from the list of paraphilia; and
secondly that examples from the criminological practise show that there is an
actual need for including rape in the DSM. At this point it is important to
note that the APA is aware of this need to include rapist behavior in DSM.
The APA subgroup of Paraphilia has proposed to add a new paraphilia to the
list: Paraphilia Coercive Disorder.9 This paper could be a support to this
proposal, for it will demonstrate why the inclusion of PCD in the list of
Paraphilias is, if we consider the evolution from DSM-I to DSM-IV-TR, a
logical step.
2. Conceptual Analysis
Previously I mentioned that the purpose of this paper will be to
uncover an inconsistency in the reasoning of the DSM. I will argue that the
exclusion of rape from the list of paraphilia is paradigmatic for this
inconsistency and I will come to this conclusion through a conceptual and
historical analysis of the relation between pathological and healthy sexuality.
When one reads the accompanying passage on the ‘Diagnostic
Features’ and the ‘Associated Features and Disorders’ that the APA includes
in DSM-IV-TR’s chapter on Paraphilia, it is difficult to understand why rape
was not included in this list of Paraphilias. Indeed, the behavior of a rapist
has a lot of features in common with sexual behavior that does meet the
diagnostic criteria for Paraphilia. Firstly, according to the APA, the last of the
three essential features of a Paraphilia is ‘recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving children or other
non-consenting persons’ but sexual behavior with a non-consenting other is
exactly what defines rape.10 Secondly, the diagnosis of Pedophilia,
Voyeurism, Exhibitionism, Frotteurism and Sexual Sadism with a non-
consenting victim, are made when these bizarre sexual behaviors cause
‘interpersonal difficulties’, even if these don’t distress the offender. 11 We
find the same features in rape. And finally, the DSM notes that in case of a
paraphilia ‘often impairment in the capacity for reciprocal, affectionate
sexual activity […] may be present’.12 This is obviously also a result of rape.
Hence the only difference between rape and the behavior that does get
diagnosed as paraphilic, is that the rapist has intercourse (or attempted) with
his/her victim.13 This implicitly shows that the standard for what the DSM
considers to be healthy sexual behavior is, just like at the beginning of
sexology, Coitus.
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If coitus is the norm for nonparaphilic, mentally healthy sexual
behavior, then what about oral, anal activities, masturbation and
homosexuality? These sexual activities do not get mentioned in DSM-IV-TR,
even though they do not involve the coital act. We can hereby conclude that
DSM-IV-TR applies a different standard for these cases. Here, the norm or
standard to separate normal from paraphilic sexuality is not Coitus. If we take
a closer look at the diagnostic criteria for the separate paraphilias, we learn
what this different standard is. For Pedophilia, Frotteurism, Exhibitionism,
Voyeurism and Sexual Sadism, the presence of an unsuspecting stranger or
non-consenting person is enough to consider it paraphilic. In the remaining
paraphilias, Fetishism, Transvestic Fetishism and Sexual Masochism, this
bizarre sexual behavior has to be the source of distress for the sexual subject,
for it to be considered a paraphilia. Hence we could conclude that here the
standard for healthy sexual behavior is either the absence of distress in the
sexual subject or the absence of a non-consenting victim and hence the
absence of distress in the sexual object. We can illustrate this with an
example. The fondling of the genitals of a non-consenting woman is
considered an act of Frotteurism, but if the woman gave her consent this is
thought to be a perfectly healthy sexual act, even if it does not result in
coitus. In this second case no personal or interpersonal distress is caused by
the fondling and consent has been given by the sexual object; thus the
behavior is considered healthy. Maybe this seems obvious to us, but at the
end of the 19th century, in 1886, Krafft-Ebing writes in his Psychopathia
Sexualis:14
[M]utual masturbation seem[s] to indicate the probable
existence of pathological conditions. Masturbation of
another and passive onanism may occur in connection with
senile dementia and inverted sexual feeling...15
This illustrates the radical use of coitus, or procreation, as the standard of
non-pathological sexual behavior, at the beginning of sexology. Earlier in the
same work he writes clearly:
With opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the sexual
instinct, every expression of it that does not correspond
with the purpose of nature - i.e., propagation - must be
regarded as perverse.16
In his Three Essays on Sexuality written in, 1905, Freud applies the
same standard when defining sexual perversions.17 In the passage on
‘Deviations in respect of the sexual aim’ he writes:
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The normal sexual aim is regarded as being the union of the
genitals in the act known as copulation […] Perversions are
sexual activities which either (a) extend, in an anatomical
sense, beyond the regions of the body that are designed for
sexual union, or (b) linger over the intermediate relations to
the sexual object which should normally be traversed
rapidly on the path towards the final sexual aim.18
However, we can observe a shift already between these two
psychologists. To stay with the example of fondling, Freud, unlike Krafft-
Ebing, claims that passive onanism does not necessarily indicate pathological
conditions, at least if it leads to coitus. He writes:
A certain amount of touching is indispensable (at all events
among human beings) before the normal sexual aim can be
attained. […] So that lingering over the stage of touching
can scarcely be counted a perversion, provided that in the
long run the sexual act is carried further.19
So here, still, Coitus is the norm for healthy sexuality, even though it
is less rigidly applied. We do not need to go back so far in time to find
examples in sexology where this same standard for healthy sexual behavior,
i.e.; coitus, is used. The first editions of the DSM applied this standard. In
the DSM-III, for example, the diagnostic criterion for Voyeurism and
Exhibitionism included the following condition: there must be no attempt at
further sexual activity.20 This seems to mean that the acts of observing
unsuspecting naked people or exposing ones own genitals to unsuspecting
strangers, are not problematic in themselves, but only become problematic if
no attempt for further sexual activity -i.e., coitus is made. Gradually coitus
lost its authority as the standard for healthy sexuality. To stay with the same
example, in DSM-III-R the APA dropped this extra criterion for
Exhibitionism and Voyeurism, and a new condition entered the diagnostic
criteria of these two and all other paraphilias: the sexual subject must have
acted on his specific paraphilic urges or must be markedly distressed by
them.21 Even though the authors of DSM-III-R did not clarify the omission
of that former criterion for Voyeurism and Exhibitionism, it is a telling
example of how the trend is moving away from Coitus as the standard for
healthy sexual behavior towards a new standard, the absence of distress.
Even more exemplary for this evolution is the elimination of
Homosexuality as a Paraphilia in the DSM. In the 7th printing of DSM-II,
Homosexuality as a category was replaced by the category Sexual
Orientation Disturbance which no longer included all homosexuals, but only
‘those homosexuals who are disturbed by, in conflict with, or wish to change
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their sexual orientation.’22 In DSM-III this category was modified into the
category of Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality, which was not considered a
Paraphilia, but an Other Psychosexual Disorder. In ‘Appendix C’, at the end
of DSM-II, where the authors clarify the changes that have been made, they
explain:
A significant proportion of homosexuals are apparently
satisfied with their sexual orientation, show no significant
signs of manifest psychopathology[…], and are able to
function socially and occupationally with no
impairment[…]. If one uses the criteria of distress or
disability, homosexuality per se is not a mental disorder.23
Hence the diagnosis of Ego-Dystonic Homosexuality is only made
for those individuals to whom their sexual orientation is a ‘persistent source
of distress’.24 The final step in this evolution was the total elimination of this
category from DSM-III-R. These examples from the history of sexology
show how the standard for healthy sexual behavior has shifted from coitus to
the absence of distress, both in the sexual subject, and in the sexual object.
However, now I want to claim that this shift did not happen consistently: It
only happened for non-coital sexual behavior, but not for coital sexual
behavior.
Let us first consider non-coital sexual behavior. This sexual
behavior is considered healthy as long as it does not inflict any distress. If
this non-coital sexual behavior is a source of distress for the sexual subject, it
fulfils the diagnostic criteria for paraphilias like: Sexual Masochism, Sexual
Sadism with a consenting partner, Fetishism and Transvestic Fetishism. If the
sexual behavior does not distress the sexual subject, but distresses the sexual
object, for example when the victim is surprised or does not give consent,
then this behavior fulfils the diagnostic criteria for paraphilias like:
Frotteurism, Voyeurism, Exhibitionism, Sexual Sadism with a non-
consenting partner and Pedophilia. However, in the case of coital sexual
behavior, the non-consent of the other does not seem to be so crucial: at least,
that’s what the absence of rape, under the classification of paraphilias
implies. Rape causes distress, but yet is not a paraphilia, and this seems to
imply that coitus remains the standard for nonpathological sexuality, at least
where intercourse happens.
Hence coitus kept its authority as a positive standard: the
performance of coitus indicates healthy sexuality, regardless of the
circumstances in which it is performed. But lost its authority as a negative
standard: the absence of coitus is no indication for unhealthy sexuality.
This can be illustrated by the following facts. In DSM-I rape is
included under Sexual Sadism, next to mutilation and sexual assault, but in
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DSM-III this inclusion of Rape under the category of Sexual Sadism is
nuanced. 25 The author’s note :
Rape or other sexual assault may be committed by
individuals with this disorder [i.e.; Sexual Sadism]. In such
instances the suffering inflicted on the victim increases the
sexual excitement of the assailant. However, it should not
be assumed that all or even many rapists are motivated by
Sexual Sadism. Often a rapist is not motivated by the
prospect of inflicting suffering, and may even lose sexual
desire as a consequence. 26 27
This is of course a justified nuance and remark, but by isolating and
eliminating non-sadistic rape from the category of Sexual sadism, without
providing an extra category for this type of rapists, the APA implicitly shows
how coitus is still applied as a positive standard in the DSM.
3. Conclusion
We can conclude that coitus lost its authority in DSM-IV-TR as a
negative standard for mentally healthy sexual behavior, but that it kept its
influence as a positive standard and hence DSM-IV-TR applies a double
standard for what is considered non-pathological in the realm of sexuality.
This is why some, as I claimed at the start of this paper, may feel that the
absence of rape as a paraphilia is incorrect; and why a proposal to include a
category Paraphilia Coercive Disorder in DSM-V is legitimate.28 I would like
to propose that Coitus as a standard for healthy sexual behavior should lose
its authority completely and therefore it should be possible to include forced
intercourse as a symptom of unhealthy sexual behavior. After all, in this era,
where anti-conception is legalised and frequently used, and the natural
function and possible result of coitus, i.e.; procreation, can be avoided, coitus
becomes an empty standard. We should instead focus on another important
result of intercourse: the elaboration of a bond between lovers, through the
expression of reciprocal compassion, love, tenderness and mutual sexual
pleasure. But unlike with procreation, coitus is not the only means to this end;
and unlike procreation this end will never be reached through any forced
intimate behavior, be it intercourse and rape or any other forced erotic act
that lacks the consent of the sexual object.
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Notes
1 With ‘rape’ I'll only refer to coerced sexual intercourse, sometimes other
forms of coercive penetration of other parts of the human body is regarded as
‘rape’, but this will not be the subject of this paper.
2 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (4th ed., revised). Author, Washington, DC, 2000.
3 WL Marshall, ‘Diagnostic Issues, Multiple Paraphilias and Co-Morbid
Disorders in Sexual Offenders: Their Incidence and Treatment, Aggression
and Violent Behavior,vol 12, 2007, p. 18.
4 RA Knight, ‘Is a Diagnostic Category for Paraphilic Coercive Disorder
Defensible?’, Archives of Sexual Behavior. Nov 3, 2009 [Epub ahead of
print]. DOI 10.1007/s10508-009-9571-x
5 RA Prentky, E Janus, H Barbaree, BK Schwartz & MP Kafka,  ‘Sexually
Violent Predators in the Courtroom: Ccience on Trial.’ Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, vol 12, 2006, p. 357.93.
6 D Thornton, ‘Evidence Regarding the Need for a Diagnostic Category for a
Coercive Paraphilia’, Archive of Sexual Behavior, 2009, MO DA [Epub
ahead of print]. DOI 10.1007/s10508-009-0583-6.
7 WL Marshall, op. cit., p. 17.
8 HE Barabaree, MC Seto, RC Serin, NL Amos & DL Preston, ‘Comparisons
between Sexual and Nonsexual Rapist Subtypes: Sexual Arousal to Rape,
Offence Precursors, and Offense Characteristics’, Criminal justice and
Behavior,vol. 21, 1994, p. 95-114.; WL Marshal & P Kennedy, ‘Sexual
Sadism in Sexual Offenders: An Elusive Diagnosis’, Aggression and Violent
Behavior: A Review Journal, vol 8, 2003, p. 1-22.; W L Marshall, P
Kennedy, & P Yates, ‘Issues Concerning the Reliability and Validity of the
Diagnosis of Sexual Sadism Applied in Prison Settings’, Sexual Abuse: A
Journal of Research and Treatment, vol 14, 2002, p. 301-311.
9 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5 development, Proposed revision,
Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders, Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders
not currently Listed in DSM-IV, Paraphilic Coercive Disorder, retrieved 9
April 2010, http://www.dsm5.org/ProposedRevisions/Pages/ proposed
revision.aspx?rid=416#.
10 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (4th ed., revised). Author, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 566.
11 ibid
12 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of
mental disorders (4th ed., revised). Author, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 567.
13 In contrast with the pedophile, the victim is not a minor; and in contrast
with the sexual sadist who might also rape his sexual partner, it’s the coital
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act that brings the offender sexual satisfaction, not the infliction of pain and
humiliation on his victim.
14 R Krafft-Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis, trans. FJ Rebman, Paperback
Library Inc., New York, 1965.
15 Ibid, p. 504.
16 Ibid, p. 79.
17 S Freud, ‘Three Essays on Sexuality’, The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, volume VII(1901-1905),
trans. J Strachey, The Hogarth Press, London 1953, p. 125.243.
18 Ibid, p. 159.60.
19 Idem, p. 156.
20 American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3th ed.).APA, Washington, DC, 1980.
21 (3th ed., revised). APA, Washington, DC, 1987.
22 (3th ed.). APA, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 380.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p. 282.
25 (1st ed.). APA, Washington, DC, 1952, p. 39.
26 (3th ed.). APA, Washington, DC, 1980, p. 275.
27 This remark was eliminated from DSM-IV-TR. This version of the DSM,
the most recent one, does mention Rape as one of the manifestations of a
Sadistic disposition (DSM-IV-TR, p. 573), and thus returns to DSM-I.
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Pornography: Is There a Connection between Treating
Things as People and Treating People as Things?
Evangelia Papadaki
Abstract
This paper argues against the existence of a connection between the
personification of pornography (the treatment of pornography as a woman)
and the objectification of women (the treatment of women as objects). More
specifically, I argue that there is not a constitutive connection between men’s
personification of pornography and women’s objectification (an idea
originally suggested by Catharine MacKinnon). Drawing on Melinda Vadas’
philosophical analysis of MacKinnon’s constitutive claim, I explain why
men’s personification of pornography does not in fact constitute women’s
objectification.
Key Words: Pornography, objectification, personification, MacKinnon,
Vadas.
*****
1. Introduction
Pornography’s power, it has been argued, should not be
underestimated. Through the use of pornography, women are treated as
things. A number of feminists have tried to show that there is a connection
between men’s use of pornography and women’s objectification. I will, more
specifically, focus on the argument that men’s use of pornographic images as
real women (personification) is (constitutes) the treatment of real flesh-and-
blood women as objects (objectification). The idea that there exists such a
constitutive connection is originally Catharine MacKinnon’s. She has
famously claimed that pornography involves ‘sex between people and things,
human beings and pieces of paper, real men and unreal women’. And, as a
result, ‘the human becomes a thing’.1 Melinda Vadas, in her article ‘The
Manufacture-for-Use of Pornography and Women’s Inequality’, has provided
an interesting philosophical analysis in defence of this constitutive argument.
Vadas boldly claims that ‘when pornographic artefacts are treated as women,
ipso facto women are treated as objects’.2 So, men’s treatment of
pornographic images (for example, pieces of paper) as real women
constitutes women’s treatment as objects.
In this paper, I argue that a constitutive connection between
pornography’s personification and women’s objectification does not exist.
More specifically, I argue that Vadas does not succeed in establishing the
existence of such a connection.
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2. Vadas’ Constitutive Argument between Personification and
Objectification
I will start with an analysis of Vadas’ constitutive argument between
personification and objectification in pornography. She defines pornography
as:
any object, whether in appearance male, female, child or
transsexual, or part or parts of these, or variations of these,
or combinations of these, that has been manufactured to
satisfy sexual desire through its sexual use or consumption
as a woman.3
‘As a woman’, she explains, means ‘in the role, function, or capacity of a
woman’. Pornography, according to her definition, is that manufactured
object which satisfies sexual desire through its use in the role, function, or
capacity of a woman. Vadas makes it clear that she employs the term
‘manufacture-for-use’ to emphasise the fact that pornography is
manufactured in order to be sexually used; that ‘it does not simply waft to
earth from the heavens above’.4 Pornography consumption, then, involves
personification: pornographic images of women (things) are treated as
women (persons).
Use of pornography, for Vadas, is not speech. It is, rather, a sex act.
She writes that ‘… men who have sex with pornography have sex’. Men’s
consumption of pornography ‘is the process of a man’s moving from sexual
arousal to sexual satisfaction or orgasm’.5 Vadas takes sexual satisfaction and
satisfaction of hunger to be analogous. She holds that it is impossible for a
photograph or picture or any other representation of food to satisfy a person’s
hunger. Representations of food are not food, but only representations, and
‘the body will not accept representations of food as food.6 Similarly, a
representation of a sexual object could not, according to Vadas, satisfy a
person’s sexual desire. She finally reaches the conclusion that ‘where their
consumption produces sexual satisfaction, the manufactured objects that are
pornography are not representations of sexual objects, but are themselves
sexual objects’.7
When men use pornographic images as real women, then, these
images are not representations of women; they are women. But what does it
mean exactly to say that a pornographic object (say, a piece of paper) is used
as (in the function, role, or capacity of) a woman? The intended use of
pornography for Vadas is the production of sexual satisfaction, and this
seems to commit her to the (insulting) claim that the ‘role, function, or
capacity of’ a woman is that of producing sexual satisfaction to men.
According to Vadas, when men use pornographic objects as women
(for the satisfaction of their sexual desires), these objects are women. So the
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pornographic objects in question belong to the category of women. This is
problematic, according to Vadas because a new category of reality is created
by pornography’s manufacture-for-use; the category of those individuals
who are both women and non-persons.8 Vadas claims that the existence of
‘women who are not persons’ makes it the case that women are not
necessarily persons, and so it follows that their personhood is unrelated to the
sex act. Consent, then, which is a person-related ability, is conceptually
outside the practice of the sexual, which means that women’s sexual identity
can only be limited to their being rapable.9 When pornography is
manufactured-for-use, according to Vadas, all women are harmed, since all
women become not necessarily persons and are identified as rapable. And
this, for Vadas, is an injustice: as a consequence of pornography
consumption, women are identified as rapable, whereas men as the
consumers of women’s rapability.
Vadas’ argument in favour of a constitutive connection between
personification and objectification in pornography is part of a more general
view that she espouses: that when X is used as Y, X is Y, and not merely
used as Y. Pornographic images used as women are women. Use of
pornography, for Vadas, is not unique in turning one thing into another. In
her article, she discusses the example of a toy-gun used as a real gun, and
argues that the object in question is indeed a real gun since it was used as
one. How something or someone is used is sufficient, for her, to determine
the category this thing or person belongs to.
3. Problems with Vadas’ Constitutive Argument
This section deals with a number of worries concerning Vadas’
constitutive argument. Let us begin with Vadas’ general position that when X
is used as Y, X is Y. In order to show the implausibility of this position, I will
focus on a particular case of objectification, taken from E. A. Poe’s
‘Berenice’. In this tale, the hero treats Berenice as nothing more than her
teeth.
… the teeth of the changed Berenice disclosed themselves
slowly to my view. … the teeth! – the teeth! – they were
here, and there, and everywhere, and visibly and palpably
before me; long, narrow, and excessively white, with pale
lips writhing about them, as in the very moment of their
first terrible development. They came to full fury of my
monomania, and I struggled in vain against its strange and
irresistible influence. … In the multiplied objects of the
external world I had no thoughts but for the teeth. … They
– they alone were present to my mental life. … I shuddered
as I assigned to them, in imagination, a sensitive and
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sentient power, and, even when unassisted by the lips, a
capability of moral expression...
This is a clear case of objectification: a woman is reduced to one of
her body parts. The man in the story sees and treats her as if she were merely
her teeth. Vadas would say that Berenice actually is her teeth in this case. But
can Berenice lose her humanity simply because she is treated as her teeth by
one man? Who is he to decide whether Berenice is a person or an object? It
seems irrational to hold that Berenice is an object, just because such a
disordered individual failed to see and treat her as a person. To say this
would be to ignore the way that other people treat Berenice. If everyone (or
almost everyone) else treats Berenice as a person what would she then be,
according to Vadas? An object or a person?
Moreover, there are some parts in the story where Berenice seems to
be treated (albeit subconsciously) as a person by the hero himself. For
example, the man in question talks to Berenice and listens to her, therefore
attributing human qualities to her. If she were just her teeth, the man would
not engage into conversation with her. What does this make Berenice, for
Vadas? An object? A person? An object and a person at the same time?
Perhaps Vadas would say that Berenice is a person (she belongs to the
category of persons) every time she is treated as a person by the hero,
whereas she is an object whenever she is treated as her teeth by him. But that
would make Berenice a creature constantly sliding from the category of
objects to that of persons. It would be extremely difficult, not to say
impossible, for us to know when Berenice is an object and when she is a
person. If people could so easily switch from the ontological class of persons
to that of objects, we would be uncertain about what other people are and
even about what we are.
Also, if treating a person as an object necessarily turns this
individual into an object, it is extremely easy to turn a person into an object.
One, according to Vadas, would need to treat another as an object just once
and the latter would become an object. But it does not seem plausible to think
that a person can so easily lose her humanity and become an object.
This is also because treating a person as an object is considered by
Vadas to be a mistreatment. And it is strange to hold that the way a person is
misused is what defines this person’s identity. It would be more plausible to
say that someone’s identity is defined by how they should be rightly used,
rather than by how they happened to be misused by someone.
Going back to pornography now, saying that pornographic images
used as women (for the satisfaction of men’s sexual desires) are women is
equally absurd. The fact that pornography consumers treat a piece of paper as
a person cannot be sufficient to make this piece of paper into a person. The
object in question is a piece of paper (a thing), which happened to be used as
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a person. If we took it that everything that is used for the production of male
sexual satisfaction is a woman, then we would end up with an unreasonably
broad category of woman, which would include, among flesh-and-blood
women - pieces of paper, men, children, animals and anything else that might
be used by men to produce sexual satisfaction. But why should we be willing
to call woman (imagination permitting) virtually anything? (And what would
feminism be in this case? A movement about objects, men, animals, etc?)
But even assuming that we could live and function in a world where
anything can be a woman, Vadas’ argument is still problematic. As I briefly
mentioned earlier, it is implausible and also insulting to take women’s role or
function to be that of providing sexual satisfaction to men. So, even if we
take it that men do in fact use those pornographic pieces of paper to produce
sexual satisfaction, it is far from plausible to say that they are using these
piece of paper as (in the role, function, or capacity of ) women. Strangely,
Vadas finds herself committed to a view held only by the most extreme
misogynists: that women’s role or function is that of producing sexual
satisfaction to men.
Saul suggests that it makes more sense to take Vadas’ claim about
women’s function as a claim about a function, one among many functions. In
other words, that the best way to read Vadas is as saying that one of women’s
functions is that of providing sexual satisfaction to men. However, Saul
rightly argues, this claim is no less problematic, since some women are not
interested in providing any sexual satisfaction to men, and most (if not all)
other women only want to provide sexual satisfaction to men of their
choosing, at times of their choosing.10
At this point, I will argue that even if Vadas could find a way to
respond to the above objections, she would still be unable to make her case
that there exists a constitutive connection between personification and
objectification in pornography. As I will explain, Vadas’ own claim that
when X is treated as Y, X is Y actually prevents her from establishing the
constitutive connection that she wants between personification and
objectification.
Accepting Vadas’ claim that when X is treated as Y, X is Y and so,
in the case of pornography, when pornographic images are treated as women
they are women, has the adverse effect from what Vadas hopes: instead of
women being reduced to objects, objects (pornographic artifacts) are elevated
to people. Pornographic artifacts are used by men as women (people), and
according to the claim that when X is treated as Y, X is Y, the artifacts in
question would have to be women (people). The pornographic artifacts in
question, then, have in a sense been upgraded to the category of persons
(women).
Now, since pornographic artifacts have been elevated to the
category of persons, Vadas’ further claim that person-related properties and
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abilities, such as consent become conceptually irrelevant to sex with flesh-
and-blood women does not hold. What seems to follow, interestingly, is the
exact opposite: since pornographic images are now members of the category
of persons/women, person-related abilities like consent become conceptually
relevant, not only to sex with flesh-and-blood women, but also to sex with
personified pornographic images. This is the case because the images in
question now belong to the category of persons and consent undoubtedly is
conceptually relevant to sex with persons. From this it seems to follow that a
man must make sure he has the consent of both real women and personified
pornography before sexually using either. Rape of paper, then, seems
inevitable for a pornography consumer.
The absurdity of the conclusion that we get from Vadas’ argument
reveals yet another mistake Vadas is making. According to her, the fact that
X belongs to the category of Y seems to imply that X and Y should
necessarily be treated in the same way. Even if personified pornography and
flesh-and-blood women belong to the same category, then, this does not
mean that we should treat them in the same way, or that we have the same
moral responsibilities towards both of them. Whereas consent with flesh-and-
blood women is clearly necessary in order to sexually use them in a morally
correct way, not many people would expect men to actually wait for
pornography’s consent before using it for their sexual gratification.
So, even if Vadas was right to say that women are reduced to objects
when pornography is personified by being placed in the same category as
pornographic objects (which, as I have already explained is not the case,
since Vadas fails to establish the connection that she wishes between
personification and objectification in pornography), it would still not follow
that consent to sex with flesh-and-blood women is conceptually irrelevant, in
the same way that it is with pornographic artefacts.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, I have argued against the existence of a constitutive
connection between the personification of pornography and the
objectification of women. Men’s treatment of pornographic artifacts for the
production of sexual satisfaction does not constitute the treatment of real
flesh-and-blood women as objects, unlike what anti-pornography feminists
MacKinnon and Vadas have claimed.
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The Influence of Family Dynamics in Young Sexual
Offenders’ Behaviours
Ricardo G. Barroso, Celina Manita and Pedro Nobre
Abstract
Despite the existence of many studies on adult offender populations, sexual
crimes committed by people under 18 have only been examined and valued
in depth during recent years. However, there has been significant progress
regarding risk factors and general characteristics of the problem, and
strategies for intervention with these youngsters has been amassed. The
authors are conducting a study, in the Portuguese context, about young sex
offender populations. This paper, drawn from a work in progress, attempts to
provide an overview of adolescent sexual offender characteristics. The main
focus of this paper is limited to one of the study’s aims; specifically, the
study of family dynamics. In particular, the consequences of deception and
family secrecy in juvenile sex offender’s development.
Key Words: Juvenile sex offender, sexual offense, family secrecy, treatment
dimensions.
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1. Juvenile Sex Offenders
Sexual abuse is widely recognised as a significant problem in
society and it has typically been a transgression associated with adult
offenders. However, since the nineties, scientific and clinical interest in
juvenile’s sexually delinquent behaviour has begun and it has since then
steadily increased. Many studies show us that from all sexual offenses, a
significant proportion is perpetrated by young people. It has been estimated
that about 20% of all rapes and 20-50% of cases of child abuse are committed
by juveniles.1 The brutal implications of such crimes make it essential that
researchers identify the aetiology of sexually coercive behaviour and develop
more effective prevention strategies and better treatment methods.
Most authors and institutions, as well as jurisdictions, define
juvenile sex offenders as those between the ages of 12 and 18 who have been
officially charged with a sexual crime; having performed an act that could be
officially charged or committed sexually abusive/aggressive behaviour.2 In
other words, a youth who commits any sexual act with a person of any age,
against the victim’s will, i.e., without consent, or in an aggressive, exploitive
or threatening manner. In general, the same set of laws is used in regard to
adults and adolescents in terms of what constitutes a sexual crime.
Behaviours considered unacceptable and illegal include fondling, frottage,
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oral copulation and penile, digital or object penetration of the vagina or anus.
Also included are such behaviours as voyeurism and exhibitionism.
Historically, sex offenses by adolescents have been minimized by
“boys-will-be-boys” attitude, penalized probably with physical punishment
and warning or reprimands to behave.3 But several mediatised cases in some
countries (most of them extreme ones in what concerns their characteristics)
have increased social attention and, as a result, political attention.
Unfortunately, much of these responses have been emotionally reactionary
and not transmitted and/or sustained by research.
Recent investigations suggest most juvenile sex offenders don’t
develop a persistent pattern of severe antisocial behaviour3 and a significant
quantity of juvenile sex offenders may not differ significantly from other
juvenile non sex offenders. Juveniles who have committed sex offenses are a
heterogeneous group.4 They differ according to victim and offense
characteristics. They also vary in others factors including: sexual knowledge
and experiences, academic and cognitive functioning, types of offending
behaviours, mental health issues, child maltreatment, and family violence.5
There is, however, a growing body of research supporting the effectiveness of
specialized treatment for individuals who have offended sexually.6
Researchers do not have definitive answer to the question of why
some youngsters demonstrate sexually abusive behaviour and others do not.
In the recent years there have been several efforts to classify juvenile sex
offenders and explain this type of behaviour in youngsters. 7 One of the most
commonly used typology of juvenile sex offenders proposes three types of
young sex offenders: a) the dead-end pathway, b) the delinquent pathway,
and c) the deviant sexual pathway. The first form of young offender consists
of young people who have committed acts of sexual abuse during their first
explorations of sexual behaviour.8 Ignorance about sexuality and lack of
acceptable sexual guidance and education might explain these abusive acts.
The levels of recidivism are low for this type of young offender. The second
type refers to adolescents who show extensive delinquent behaviour. The
sexual crimes are part of their antisocial and criminal routine. These young
people are characterized by high treatment needs. The third type refers to
those juveniles who will be diagnosed with deviant psychosexual
development because their abusive acts are the result of their psychosexual
dysfunction. These last juveniles are usually considered to be at the highest
risk to remain sex offenders in their adult life.9
The simplest method of classifying juvenile sex offenders is by
taking into account the nature of their typical or most serious sexual offense.
Typically, three categories are used: child abusers, rapists (abusers of peers
and/or adults), and hands-off sexual offenders (such as exhibitionists and
voyeurs). Frequently a division is also made between offenders acting alone
or in groups as well as intra-familial and extra-familial offenders.10
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2. Theoretical Explanations
Several etiological theories have been formulated and published to
account for sexual offending behaviour which may also apply juvenile sexual
offending, despite it being a relatively new topic in the field of scientific
research. This paper will explore three of these theories; psychiatric theory,
the attachment theory, and a more recent theoretical explanation in the field,
the multimodal self-regulation theory.
Psychiatric theory follows the traditional psychoanalytic
perspectives established by Freud.11 Freud suggested there are three parts of
the human psyche that control human behaviour and compose individual’s
personality: id, ego and superego. Despite rigorous studies regarding the use
of psychoanalytic treatment in psychiatric disorders, but not specifically for
sex offenses, we still do not have authoritative verifications that any of these
three levels exist.12 Nevertheless, psychiatric treatment is based, many times,
on these fundaments and tries to reach deep into the individual and reveal the
base reason for a person’s behaviour and make an effort to correct them. This
model is limited in several ways.13 For example, test validity of the projective
instruments is nonexistent. Furthermore, there are some conceptual
difficulties that fail to adequately describe the processes in young sex
offenders, particularly because this theory is viewed as inadequate when used
to explain ‘normal sexual development’. Additionally, the theory does not
consider the role of other psychological variables that impact and reflect
personality development, such as cognitive or social factors.14
The most celebrated etiological theory on sexual offending by
youngsters is the one formulated by Barbaree and collaborators which
encompasses the experimental, social and environmental influences previous
theory has not considered.15 Juvenile sex offenders are often assumed to be
raised in abusive families. These authors suggest that abuse and/or neglect by
their parents results in the children developing an attachment disorder. As
consequence, they will be predisposed to seek the attention of others in a
negative manner. In order to satisfy their needs, they will often engage in
aggressive, violent and manipulative behaviour. This then may impact their
efforts to begin social contacts and pro-social actions with peers. As they lack
the social skills required to engage in acceptable intimate relationships, they
may be rejected, resulting in low self-esteem. This syndrome of social
disability often results in an antisocial and/or criminal way of life. For that
reason, sexual offending is seen as one of the negative behaviours of this
lifestyle, usually as compensation for feelings of social incompetence.
Recently, Stinson and collaborators presented another theoretical
explanation for juvenile sex offending: multimodal self-regulation theory. 16
The theorists stress that conceptualization of sex offending, as the result of
one variable is an oversimplification of human behaviour. Multimodal self-
regulation theory combines elements from the developmental, cognitive,
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behavioural and personality frameworks. This theory concentrates on
important developmental antecedents to sex offending behaviour and
emphasizes ways in which they interact with internal and external events in
childhood, adolescence and adulthood to produce sexually deviant outcomes.
For some people, early emotional vulnerabilities, ineffective responding from
parents or caregivers, negative events in childhood, and difficulties with
peers may contribute to scrapes with regulating or modulating negative affect
or behavioural impulses.17 The drive to maintain emotional or internal
stability may lead these persons to involve in sexual and/or criminal activity,
all of which may promise short-term gratification or satisfaction with little
effort or resources required.
3. Future Studies
One of the aims of this research is to enhance our understanding of
the relationship between childhood experiences and the perceptions of that
experience in a cognitive worldview, which could be associated to sex
offending. In this theory, we remember that childhood experiences and the
perceptions of that occurrence are important in the early phase. This research
is also intended to explore the socialization process within the juvenile
offenders’ family. We should highlight, nevertheless, that with this we are
not supposing parents are responsible for their adolescent’s criminal career.
Insufficient, sometimes speculative, attention has been paid to the role of
family context in the aetiology course of development and treatment of
adolescent sexual offenders. Young sex offenders grow up in family systems
and social environments that shape their personalities and course of
development over time. Some authors have emphasized that the knowledge
of juvenile sex offenders’ family dynamics is critically incomplete,18 Some
studies present that sex offender’s families are more likely to involve patterns
of deceptions and secrets. Others underscore the fact that the continuous use
of family secrets as a coping mechanism can in return contribute, in part, to
sexual offending behaviours. Sex offending has both a sexual component and
a deception one.19 Deception occurs when the offender coerces the victim
into silence or manipulates the victim in believing that secrecy is in her best
interest. Deception also occurs when offender chooses not to reveal the
offense or when he creates a misperception about the event often by lying to
others about what he was doing or about the reasons for the act. The focus of
our work is on whether secrecy shapes or influences the development of
inappropriate regulatory strategies and if this tendency towards deception and
secrecy is indicative of a multigenerational family pattern of secrecy and
deception. This could happen because a portion of family members of
juvenile sexual offenders were sexually, physically or psychologically abused
themselves as children.20 Juveniles and children who were abused live with
strong feelings of secrecy and isolation, with only a part revealing their
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victimization. As a consequence, family secrecy has many potential negative
consequences for the normal development of children including lack of
intimacy, distorted reality and feelings of powerlessness. These three
consequences of family secrecy are also common characteristics of sexual
offenders, because the studies that verified the effects of this variable are co-
relational in their nature, which only demonstrates association and not
causation. Specific mechanisms, by which these variables may function to
increase the risk of juvenile sexual offending, stay to be determined before
concluding their causative function.
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Life is a Cabriolet, Old Chum: Autoeroticism, Death and
Law in J. G. Ballard’s Crash
Mark Thomas
Abstract
It was reported that the manuscript of Crash was returned to the publisher
with a note attached, reading ‘The author is beyond psychiatric help’.
Ballard took the lay diagnosis as proof of complete artistic success. Crash
conflates the Freudian tropes of libido and Thanatos, cathexis and anti-
cathexis, overlaying these onto the twentieth century erotic icon, the car.
Beyond mere incompetent adolescent copulatory fumblings in the back seat
of the parental sedan or the clichéd phallic locomotor of the mid-life Ferrari,
however, Ballard engages the full fatal potentialities of the automobile as the
locus and sine qua non of a perverse, though nonetheless apparently
functional erotic – ‘autoeroticism’ transformed into automotive, traumatic or
surgical paraphilia, driving (as it must) Helmut Newton’s insipid photo-
conceptual montage of BDSM and orthopædics into an entirely new
dimension, dancing precisely where (but more crucially, because) the ‘body
is bruised to pleasure the soul’. The serendipity of quotidian accidental
collisions is supplanted, in pursuit of the fetishised object, by contrived
(though not simulated) recreations of iconographic celebrity deaths – James
Dean’s head-on in a Porsche 550 Spyder and Jayne Mansfield’s alleged
decapitation in a Buick Electra 225. A fetish for the techno-Apocalypse:
intermingling blood, semen, engine oil and the violent reconstruction of
anatomy and the anatomised. Within a staunchly patriarchal (yet
paradoxically egalitarian) landscape – the freeway, the car park and the
police holding-yard – sex is transformed by the replacement of the normative
sites of penetration with the inflicted wound: ‘the lungs of elderly men
punctured by door-handles; the chests of young women impaled on steering-
columns’. Such an obsessive pursuit of this autoerotic-as-reality necessitates
the rejection of the law of human sexual regulation, requiring the re-
interpretation of what constitutes sex itself by looking beyond or through
conventional sexuality into Ballard’s paraphiliac and nightmarish consensual
Other. This Other, born of the twentieth century’s love affair with the car,
allows for (if not demands) the tangled wreckage of a sports car to function
as a transformative sexual agent, creating, of ‘woman’, a being of ‘free and
perverse sexuality, releasing within its dying chromium and leaking engine-
parts, all the deviant possibilities of her sex’.
Key Words: Abasiophilia, thanatos, autoeroticism.
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The hand brake | Penetrates your thigh
Quick - Let's make love | Before you die
The Normal: ‘Warm Leatherette’
1. Introduction
Given the title of this paper, you might find it rather odd that I start
out with a short passage from such an unlikely, and apparently unconnected,
source: Thomas Hardy’s Far From the Madding Crowd.
Gabriel Oak has returned to the farmhouse, and called his two dogs.
While his older dog, George, has come when called, the younger dog –
George’s son, and as yet not fully trained, although enthusiastic to a fault –
has not. Lying down to sleep, Gabriel Oak is alerted to the sound of his flock
of sheep running at high speed in the distance.
… it appeared that the poor young dog, still under the
impression that since he was kept for running after sheep,
the more he ran after them the better, had driven the timid
creatures through the hedge, across the upper field, and by
main force of worrying had given them momentum enough
to break down a portion of the rotten railing, and so hurled
them over the edge of the chalk pit.
George's son had done his work so thoroughly that he was
considered too good a workman to live, and was, in fact,
taken and tragically shot at twelve o'clock that same day -
another instance of the untoward fate which so often
attends dogs and other philosophers who follow out a train
of reasoning to its logical conclusion, and attempt perfectly
consistent conduct in a world made up so largely of
compromise.1
Crash ‘perfects’ – an odd term, I know – a hypothesis whose
æiology lies scattered throughout a much earlier novel, The Atrocity
Exhibition.2 The modernist-liberal trajectory towards ultimate knowledge and
social perfection is transfigured by Ballard into the purely ballistic arc of
Vaughan’s final (and, at least partially, successful) attempt to be united in
death with Elizabeth Taylor. Death, as Baudrillard suggests, is ‘a natural
implication in this limitless exploration of the possible forms of violence to
the body’, adding, however, that this is ‘never (as in sadism or masochism)
what the violence purposely and perversely aims at.’3
It was reported that the manuscript of Crash was returned to the
publisher with a note attached, reading ‘[t]he author is beyond psychiatric
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help’. 4 One wonders how the same reviewer might have responded to the
manuscript of Swift’s Modest Proposal or what he or she might have added
to the urbanely mythical ‘Lose the gerbil, Brett’ of Brett Easton Ellis’s
American Psycho fame. But Ballard apparently took the lay diagnosis as
proof of complete artistic success.
Crash conflates the Freudian tropes of libido and thanatos, cathexis
and anti-cathexis, overlaying these onto the twentieth century erotic icon, the
car: literalising the cosy metaphor of Western culture’s ‘love affair with the
car’ while simultaneously denuding it of passion, creating a techno-image of
Eliot’s (or Prufrock’s) unromantic ‘restless nights in one-night cheap hotels’.
As Baudrillard observed:
In Crash, there is neither fiction nor reality—a kind of
hyper-reality has abolished both… This … violently
sexualized world totally lacking in desire, full of violent
and violated bodies but curiously neutered, this chromatic
and intensely metallic world empty of the sensorial, a world
of hyper-technology without finality—is it good or bad?
We cannot say. It is simply fascinating, without this
fascination implying any kind of value judgment
whatsoever. And this is the miracle of Crash. The moral
gaze—the critical judgmentalism that is still a part of the
old world’s functionality—cannot touch it. Crash is
hypercritical, in the sense of being beyond the critical.5
The nature of the novel (so described) is not lost in translation into
the legal imaginary. In a theme to which I shall return, there are no rules of
engagement on the field of Armageddon.
Beyond mere incompetent adolescent copulatory fumblings in the
back seat of the parental sedan or the clichéd phallic locomotor of the mid-
life Ferrari, however, Ballard engages the full fatal potentialities of the
automobile as both the locus and sine qua non of a perverse, though
nonetheless apparently functional erotic – ‘autoeroticism’ transformed into
automotive, traumatic or surgical paraphilia. For Crash is a Bildungsroman
in which Ballard – the character, not the author – transforms to a new erotic.
Convalescing from his first car crash, he realizes that ‘the crash
between our two cars was a model of some ultimate and yet undreamt sexual
union.’6 His transformation is guided by the ‘hoodlum-scientist’,7 Vaughan,
who is obsessed with many wounds and impacts – by the ‘dying chromium
and collapsing bulkheads of…two cars meeting head-on in complex
collisions…by the identical wounds inflicted on their bodies, by the
compound fractures of their thighs impacted against their handbrake
mountings, and above all, by the wounds to their genitalia – her uterus
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pierced by the heraldic beak of manufacturer’s medallion, his semen
emptying across the luminescent dials that registered for ever the last
temperature and fuel levels of the engine.’8 Through Vaughan, Ballard
discovers the ‘true significance of the automobile crash, the meaning of
whiplash injuries, the ecstasies of head-on collisions’.9
The linking of the technological and the erotic is, of course, not a
new phenomenon: the lurking id of Victor Frankenstein’s creation
(eventually, perhaps, made explicit in Madelaine Kahn’s proportional
speculation about his Schwannstücker in Mel Brooks’ Young Frankenstein)10
derives from the fictional technology of re-animation.
More recently, Rebecca Blake’s photographs – composed through
the eyes of Laura Mars11 – unite haute couture glamour with the immediate
aftermath of urban violence – replete with models draped elegantly in faux-
trauma across the bonnets of pristine concours d’elegance sports cars.
In a similar vein, Helmut Newton’s photo-series of the orthopaedic-
chic transplants the recuperative brace onto the bodies of high fashion
models.12 But in neither Blake’s nor Newton’s photographs is there any true
union of the technology of trauma and the erotic. Both seek the erotic in an
essentially conventional, modernist (if masculine), aesthetic. Framed against
these utterly conservative images of women, the technological appears as
nothing more than quirky metallic maquillage. Blake’s blood is patently
applied rather than exuded.
Beneath Newton’s orthopædic appliances, the muscles, ligaments
and tendons of couture-femininity are physically untraumatised (even if these
images might, on one view, be constructed as a deeply misogynistic 20th
Century manifestation of the whalebone corset or the hobble skirt). As
pornography, Newton’s direct niche market – the incipient or full-blown
abasiophiliac – is too narrow a constituency, and given Newton’s undoubted
commercial acumen, their attractiveness must lie in a less confronting
aesthetic.
In Crash, however, notwithstanding its fictional status, the blood is
real: the orthopædic paraphernalia support – in fact functionalise – the
traumatised body. The novel’s natural stage is the hospital ward, rather than
the wardrobe or make-up stations of the film set or the photoshoot. Blake
and Newton play with technology-as-the-sexual. While Cronenberg’s film
version of Crash13 suffers the same fate as Mary Harron’s American
Psycho,14 substituting depoliticized and de-intellectualised elegance for the
viscerality of their respective novels, Crash-as-novel evokes a life lived
within a true marriage of metallurgy, the body and (more significantly), the
mind: a true fetish for the techno-Apocalypse, driving (as it must) Helmut
Newton’s insipid photo-conceptual montage of BDSM and orthopædics into
an entirely new dimension, dancing precisely where – but more crucially,
Mark Thomas
______________________________________________________________
249
because – the body (to invert William Butler Yeats’s phrase) ‘is bruised to
pleasure soul’.15
While convalescing from his own crash, Ballard muses:
I saw the interior of the motorcar as a kaleidoscope of
illuminated pieces of the bodies of women. This anthology
of wrists and elbow, thigh and pubis formed ever-changing
marriages with the contours of the automobile.16
The union of the human body and the car body itself presents an
inversion of the terminology of orthopaedics or the cultural artefact of
technology as extensional to the human. Baudrillard describes this ‘classical-
cybernetic’17 relationship as ‘the evolved functional capacity of a human
organism which allows it both to rival Nature and to triumphantly remould its
own image’18 … Frankenstein bound. Yet, in Crash, once within the interior
of the car, its human occupants become a prosthetic extension of the
machine. Like Frankenstein’s creature reversing roles, ‘the passenger
compartment enclosed us like a machine, generating from our sexual act an
homunculus of blood, semen and engine coolant’.19 Humanity becomes an
extension of the technological.
Conventionally, the car is the extension of` masculinity . . . the male
person extended, transformed and (perhaps) enlarged by technology – a
Freudian lesson learned, painfully, by the American car industry with the
launch of the Edsel. In many ways, Ballard reverses this, the human
occupants of vehicles serving only as a means to their own ends (both
philosophically and literally): is the car anthropomorphised by its analogous
leakage of internal fluids; or is the human technologised by the imprint of the
steering wheel, the penetration of the handbrake lever?
Often I watched him [Ballard’s ‘hoodlum scientist’,
Vaughan] lingering over the photographs of crash fatalities
… as he calculated the most elegant parameters of their
injuries, the junctions of their wounded bodies with the
fractured windscreens and instrument assemblies.20
La petite mort, literalised, is Ballard’s ‘darkness tangible’. The
serendipity of quotidian accidental collisions is supplanted, in pursuit of the
fetishised object, by contrived recreations of iconographic celebrity deaths –
James Dean’s head-on in a Porsche 550 Spyder and Jayne Mansfield’s
alleged decapitation in a Buick Electra 225. A fetish for the techno-
Apocalypse, intermingling blood, semen, engine oil and the violent
reconstruction of anatomy and the anatomised.
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Yet Ballard’s moral significance – the dissolution of passion and
human contact in a world dominated by technology – is clear: ‘The
destruction of this motorcar and its occupants seemed, in turn, to sanction the
sexual penetration of Vaughan’s body; both were conceptualized acts
abstracted from all feeling, carrying any ideas or emotions which we cared to
freight them’.21
This moral significance, however, is displayed in a language that is
at odds with the raw viscerality of what is actually happening. Whereas in
American Psycho, Bateman’s psychopathology is narratised (repetitively) in
the crudest of Anglo-Saxon vulgar vernacular, Crash’s human sexuality –
both inter se and trans-technological – takes the form of clinical reportage,
defined in the detached polysyllabic faux-Latin of the forensic pathologist:
Her body, with its angular contours, its unexpected
junctions of mucous membrane and hair, detrusor muscle
and erectile tissue, was a ripening anthology of perverse
possibilities.22
Within a staunchly patriarchal (yet paradoxically egalitarian)
landscape – the freeway, the car park and the police holding-yard – sex is
transformed by the replacement of the normative sites of penetration with the
inflicted wound: ‘the lungs of elderly men punctured by door-handles; the
chests of young women impaled on steering-columns; the cheeks of
handsome youths torn on the chromium latches of quarter-lights’.23
Penetration remains as a guiding trope of sexuality, but it is confounded by a
perversity of focus.
Such an obsessive pursuit of this autoerotic-as-reality necessitates
the rejection of the law of human sexual regulation, requiring the re-
interpretation of what constitutes sex itself by looking beyond or through
conventional sexuality into Ballard’s paraphiliac and nightmarish consensual
Other. This Other, born of the twentieth century’s love affair with the car,
allows for (if not demands) the tangled wreckage of a sports car to function
as a transformative sexual agent, creating, of ‘woman’, a being of ‘free and
perverse sexuality, releasing within its dying chromium and leaking engine-
parts, all the deviant possibilities of her sex’24 – a transformation that is at
once literally crippling, yet ultimately (or so it is said) liberating.
The abandonment of human affect – either real or delusional – is
conventionally accompanied by the positive (and positivist?) postures of
coercive legality. Even in American Psycho, there is the dogged presence of
the private detective, Donald Kimball, signifying the existence of a normative
legal framework against which Bateman’s conduct (or fantasy) must be
judged.25
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The conventional trajectories of power within the body of dystopian
literature – the imposition of Orwellian coercive force, or the manipulative
Foucauldian self-censorship of Brave New World – are inverted in the
dystopian anarchy of Ballard-land. Law is impotent in the face of Ballard’s
vision. Such a fetishised or transformed anatomy subverts the paradigms of
conventional (or even conventionally perverse) sexuality. The legal
ambiguity (or ambivalence) of fetishised abasiophilia – the pseudo-orifice;
the glass-shard gash as displaced vagina; the surgical scar as the perverse site
of erogeneity – are penetrations not conceived of either in the language or the
ontology of the criminal calendar of sexual offences.
… the deviant technology of the car-crash provided the
sanction for any perverse act. For the first time, a
benevolent psychopathology beckoned towards us,
enshrined in the tens of thousands of vehicles moving down
the highways.26
In a sexualised and eroticised landscape constituted by broken glass,
where torn and distorted metal reflect an equally transformed and shattered
anatomy, conventional regulation of the erotic falls short of any historical
analogue of a claim by Recht to effective normative force in the field of
human sexuality. In Crash, police – to the extent that they have any tangible
presence – are mute witnesses to the sexual dysphoria, or ex post facto
repositories of the post-orgasmic debris. In fact, the police at times function
as facilitators for Ballard’s education at the hands of Vaughan. As they prowl
the night in search of fresh stimulation:
[o]n the calm summer evenings these fast boulevards
became a zone of nightmare collisions. Listening to the
police broadcasts on Vaughan’s radio, we moved from one
accident to the next. Often we stopped under arc lights that
flared over the sites of our major collisions, watching while
firefighters and police engineers worked … to free
unconscious wives from beside their dead husbands.27
In neither case do they – the police – represent agency or normative
force, vaguely ineffectual in even such a simple task as crowd control at the
site of [yet another] fatal accident, or reduced to menial occupations such a
sweeping the road in the aftermath of an accident,28 remaining (it seems)
wholly uncomprehending of the nature of the events which they witness as,
for the most part, passive voyeurs.29
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2. Conclusion
I confess, at this stage, to having no settled conclusion – or at least
to being ambivalent about what conclusion to draw. It would be too easy to
dismiss Crash as a misogynist fantasy, reducing as it does the feminine to
little more than a series of fresh orifices generated by the violent interaction
with the metallic – after all, in the passage quoted earlier, it is woman who is
disfigured by the hard surfaces of the car’s interior, her uterus pierced by ‘the
heraldic beak of the manufacturer’s mark’ –the male presence is signified by
no more than a scattering ejaculation. Ballard’s perverse techno-Apocalypse
is liberating only from the perspective of a male gaze into a misogynist
microscope.
Yet Dr Helen Remington - the widow of (and witness to) the driver
who was launched through the windscreen onto the bonnet of Ballard’s car –
the very moment at which Ballard himself is launched on his perverse
trajectory – is at least as enthusiastic a participant in the drama, as is the
crippled Gabrielle. Despite the disfiguring possibilities, the female
participants act throughout consensually – although that, too, within a
feminist discourse, might be explained as a post-traumatic false
consciousness.
If I have passed then (perhaps surprisingly without comment) over
the numerous sites of a demanded feminist critique, it is because, like sheep
herding to George’s son, they are the uncritical – or hypercritical – given.
Such a given pre-exists the assembly lines at Ford, Chrysler and General
Motors, and are simply carried, ineluctably, to a transcendent and aspirational
(if perverse) omega point of techno-sexual logic.
Postscript: Like Dysart, the enervated psychiatrist who begins to
hear the tinkling bridle of Alan Strang’s eroticised horse-god, Equus, I have,
in a sense, become my own Vaughan. His obsessive catalogue of photographs
of mutilated anatomy and consummation in death with the actress Elizabeth
Taylor is matched by my own annotations to the text, my own lists of the
instances of mutilation and examples of the language of violent (loving)
impacts or the medical terminology of motor-vehicle trauma … my own late
night Google searches for and cataloguing of images to illustrate this paper
(which I finally eschewed in deference to less obsessive, or perhaps more
delicate, sensibilities).
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1 T Hardy, Far from the Madding Crowd.
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a walking stick as a prop; ‘Jenny Kapitän, Pension Dorian, Berlin, 1977’ in
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which shows a model wearing an elaborate plastic and leather back brace
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13 Crash (1996), dir D Cronenberg, screenplay D Cronenberg.
14 American Psycho (2000), dir M Harron, screenplay M Harron.
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17 Baudrillard, ‘Two Essays’.
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